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ABSTRACT
USING “CHAOS” IN ARTICULATING
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AND CREATION IN GOD’S
CREATIVE ACTIVITY
Eric M. Vail, B.A., M.Div.
Marquette University, 2009

Out of dialogue with Old Testament studies and the sciences, there has been a rise
in recent years in the use of “chaos” language by theologians in their articulation of a
theology of creation. There has been little uniformity in how the word is used among the
fields, or even within some fields—especially by biblical scholars doing ancient Near
East comparative studies. Under the umbrella of this popular terminology, some ideas
have found refuge whose theological implications warrant evaluation.
Within this dissertation the range of ideas that fall under “chaos” within the
physical sciences, Old Testament studies, and theology is identified and evaluated.
However, the more focused evaluation is on the appropriateness of the choice to apply
the term to particular circumstances, whether that is entropy or unpredictability in science
or the tohu wabohu and tehom of Genesis 1:2 in biblical studies. Choosing the term
“chaos” as a label reflects an interpretation of the data and shapes subsequent thinking
and speaking about the data. As much as reflect the world (the facts), it construes a
world/worldview in which scholars work in their fields. The implications of the ideas
that have been developed under “chaos” are evaluated herein, but it is the initial
application of the term to the data that is the root issue which receives the greater focus.
After critiquing the current uses of “chaos” in the physical sciences, in
interpretations of Genesis 1 by scholars such as Jon D. Levenson, and in the creation
theologies of contemporary theologians like Catherine Keller, an alternative grammar of
creatio ex nihilo and God’s relationship to creation is proposed. This framework builds
upon the pneumatology of Lyle Dabney—in which he develops the language of
“possibility” and the Spirit operating “trans”-creation—by developing the idea of the
Word operating transcarnate to creation. It is within this framework that it is suggested
that “chaos” be used as a label for circumstances where any part of creation expresses
itself discordantly with God and neighbor, both with whom God makes possible for it to
participate in loving community.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Some Background Concerning Recent “Chaos” Language in Christian Theology
and the Problem at Hand

1. Current Interest in “Chaos” Language in Biblical Studies and ScienceTheology Dialogue

“Chaos” elicits feelings of uncertainty and confusion, being in danger or out of
control. Using the term is in vogue within many academic disciplines. Scanning through
a listing of recent publications will yield multiple titles from nearly every discipline with
“chaos” in them. Even so, there is a great deal of divergence in what is meant by the
term, whether it is used in a technical way for discipline-specific notions or in a popular
sense as a synonym for “confusion.”
Biblical and theological studies are no exception to this growing surge of “chaos”
use. The stated impetus for theologians who incorporate “chaos” language with varying
accompanying notions is typically from two fronts. One front is the field of biblical
studies and the use of “chaos” therein. According to the testimony of James
Hutchingson, who himself has developed a theology incorporating “chaos,” “Chaos
would likely not emerge as an important theological concept were it not for the prominent
role it plays in the initial verses of the Bible.”1 The second front is the host of changes in
Western intellectual thought in the past few centuries, particularly in the sciences, that
has given rise to new cosmologies, especially ones including notions of “chaos.”
In the center between these fronts is the concern of theology to offer an account of
the faith in the present milieu. Some theologians feel that incorporating notions of
1

Pandemonium Tremendum: Chaos and Mystery in the Life of God (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2001), 99.

2
“chaos” that are being proposed along these two fronts has promise for articulating the
Christian faith within the broader intellectual and cultural milieu. There have been
several theologians to take up the challenge of listening to the “chaos” language being
used on these fronts and incorporating these various notions in their theology.2

2. Some Recent History behind the Interest in “Chaos”

From the side of biblical studies there has been much fodder for theological talk
about “chaos.” Much of this development can be attributed to archeological discoveries
made in the last 150 years, which have been extremely helpful in reconstructing the
worldviews of people in the ancient world. Of particular usefulness have been the
uncovering and translation of Egyptian, Babylonian, and Canaanite religious writings.
With these discoveries it was natural to compare the writings of these people groups with
the more familiar writings of the Israelites, especially the cosmogonies of these various
peoples.3 In addition, there was a desire in the nineteenth-century to replace many of the
ways in which the Old Testament and its theological views had been portrayed to that
2

E.g., Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London; New York: Routledge,
2003); Morris Inch, Chaos Paradigm: A Theological Exploration (Lanham, Md.: University Press of
America, 1998); Enda McDonough, Between Chaos and New Creation: Doing Theology at the Fringe
(Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1986); James Hutchinson, Pandemonium Tremendum: Chaos and Mystery in
the Life of God (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2001); Beatrice Bruteau, God’s Ecstasy: The Creation of a SelfCreating World (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997); Don Cupitt, Creation Out of
Nothing (London; Philadelphia: SCM Press; Trinity Press International, 1990); Ruth Page, God and the
Web of Creation (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1996); Phyllis Neiman, "The Myth of Chaos: Implications for
Jewish Religion," D.H.L., Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2002.
3
Rebecca Watson in Chaos Uncreated: a Reassessment of the Theme of “Chaos” in the Hebrew Bible
(New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2005) offers a helpful distinction between cosmology and cosmogony that
will be used throughout this paper. Cosmology is a group’s perception of nature and the structure of the
universe. Cosmogony is the group’s mythology of its formation (3, n. 8). Rémi Brague also has helpful
descriptions of these terms. Cosmogony concerns the emergence of things and cosmology is a reflection on
the nature of them (The Wisdom of the World: The Human Experience of the Universe in Western Thought
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003], 3). He also uses the term cosmography to cover some of
what Watson includes under cosmology; he uses it to indicate “the drawing or description (graphein) of the
world as it appears at a given moment, with regard to its structure, its possible division into levels, regions,
and so on” (3). This term may at times be employed.
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point. Comparative studies were embraced as a means for providing new ways of
framing Israel’s writings and theology.4
While working as a repairer of cuneiform tablets, George Smith was the person to
locate both the Epic of Gilgamesh and Enuma elish in the British Museum’s collections.5
In 1876 he was the first to identify a literary form he called a “chaos myth” and to
suggest that the Babylonian Enuma elish was the oldest source for this myth in the
ancient Middle East. E. Schrader had already suggested in 1863 that there exists in the
Bible’s Primeval History the idea of a pre-existent chaos.6 Smith made the additional
suggestion that Israel’s own creation account, with its pre-existent chaos, is dependent on
the older text of its neighbor.7
Nearly twenty years after Smith, Herman Gunkel, out of his studies of Enuma
elish, was the first to claim that just as there is in Enuma elish a connection between
divine combat with the chaotic sea—the sea-monster Tiamat—and the establishment of
order from Tiamat’s corpse, so also in the Old Testament there are integrally related
themes of “chaos-conflict-creation” (i.e., Chaoskampf).8 These claims concerning 1) the
4

K.A. Kitchen, Ancient Orient and Old Testament (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1966), 17ff.
Geoffrey Dobson, A Chaos of Delight: Science, Religion and Myth and the Shaping of Western Thought
(London: Equinox, 2005), 382, n. 147.
6
Watson, 15, n. 24.
7
Watson, 15. On March 4, 1875 Smith reported his finding of Enuma elish in a letter to a local news
paper, the Daily Telegraph (Dobson, 382, n. 147). It was not until the following year that he published
Enuma elish under the title of The Chaldean Account of Genesis with his hypothesis about the connection
between Genesis 1 and Enuma elish. Schrader then echoed Smith’s proposal the year after Smith published
it (Watson, 15, n. 24).
8
Watson, 16. Gunkel claimed this in his 1895 work, Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit. This
work is now available in an English translation—Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the
Eschaton: A Religio-Historical Study of Genesis 1 and Revelation 12, translated by K. William Whitney, Jr.
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006). Gunkel’s construction of events in the transmission of the myth to Israel
starts with the Marduk myth, which is transferred to Israel. There is then a “poetic recension of the YHWH
myth” (Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton, 82). In this recension there is a loss of
many mythological and polytheistic facets. Eventually in this sequence is the writing of Genesis 1, in
which the Marduk myth was, “as far as it was possible, completely Judaized” (82). Gunkel’s hypothesis
becomes quite foundational for comparative studies done by biblical scholars after Gunkel. It has not gone
without criticism. E.g., Alexander Heidel critiqued it in his 1963 translation of Enuma elish (cf. John Seo,

5
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presence of “chaos” in Scripture, 2) the dependence of Israel’s writings on its neighbors’,
and 3) the presence of Chaoskampf in both ancient Near East (ANE) and biblical texts
have been often repeated since.
The field of biblical studies is not alone in presenting a chaos / creation paradigm.
On the second front there have been centuries-long progressions in scientific thinking that
have led to a more widespread embrace of talk about self-organizing complexities
emerging out of “chaos.” The history of this development will be given in greater detail
in the next chapter. However, it is important to note that most scientists mean something
quite different by the term “chaos” than is typically used by biblical scholars.
In using “chaos” as a technical term, scientists typically mean unpredictability.
Unpredictability comes from some admitted problems with making any accurate
predictions on “chaotic” systems. The most famous feature of these systems is
“sensitivity on initial conditions.”9 This basically means that “small causes can have
enormous and unexpected consequences.”10 A small cause can unpredictably snowball
into progressively bigger effects; the final result is vastly disproportionate to the smallest
of influences. The smallest of influences causes problems for calculations as well.
Because every computer has limitations of memory and the certain ways its software is
programmed to make calculations, it will inevitably have to round off decimals at some
point. This rounding off can make enormous differences in the final calculations, which

"Creation and Conflict in the Beginning: A Study of the Ancient Near Eastern Background, Historical
Context, and Theological Role of the 'God's Battle with Chaos' Model of Creation in Isaiah 40-55" [Ph.D.,
Drew University, 2002], 115)
9
T. A. Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God: Divine Action and Scientism (Leuven; Paris; Dudley, MA:
Peeters, 2004), 242.
10
Ibid.
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could drastically differ from the true values.11 Every calculation on these complex
systems at best is an approximation.
Another issue with these “chaotic systems” is that in order to predict where the
system will be in the future “one needs to have knowledge of the exact details of the
initial conditions.”12 This knowledge of initial conditions eludes us. According to the
Heisenberg Principle, you can measure the location of a particle, but not its motion at the
same time. In measuring one you disturb the other and vice versa. Thus, “In chaotic
systems it is fairly easy to explain how unpredictability arises: it is due to our inability to
know and, even with the help of computers, to calculate the exact values of the initial
conditions (these are thus external factors), and since there is sensitivity on initial
conditions (which is an internal factor of the system), the indeterminacy will result in
longer-term unpredictability.”13 In the world of science, unpredictable systems are
“chaotic” systems.
There is a second use of “chaos” in science that more closely mirrors popular use.
Systems lacking clear order, ones with a great deal of entropy, are often labeled as chaos.
Thus, structures or order are said to develop in and/or out of “chaos.” This usage often
provides an easy bridge to the way in which “chaos” is used in biblical studies. However,
the differences in worldview between the ANE and contemporary science can be easily
blurred in bringing into a single conversation the use of “chaos” by scholars in the two
fields.

11

Ibid., 241.
Ibid., 243.
13
Ibid, 251.
12
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3. Unsettledness Concerning Creation Theology within the Theological Milieu
into which “Chaos” Notions Are Being Considered

Suggestions of there being anything primordial to “creation”—which is included
in some of the notions of “chaos”—were once taboo for Christians for several reasons,
one of which was their potentially dualistic implications.14 The only options, other than
the orthodox formulations of creation out of nothing, were believed to be
emanationism/pantheism or dualism.
Multiple features have changed, however, on the landscape on which creation
theology presently is being done. These changes will be examined in more detail in the
following chapters; however, for now it should be noted that some of those changes
include broader shifts in Western intellectual thinking, the role of Scripture in theological
discourse, and claims about the theology of biblical texts.
On this new landscape, where familiar landmarks for Christianity’s traditional
way of speaking about creation are now eroded away, there is not yet consensus about
how to speak intelligibly about God’s creative activity and relationship to creation. Some
theologians have built upon an array of “chaos” notions from biblical studies and/or
science in developing a theology of creation. Because of the new landscape our closer
attention to the work of recent theologians is warranted before dismissing them offhand
as heterodox. In this present work it is assumed that there is wisdom in the tradition
concerning certain things that Christians want to affirm about God and God’s relationship
to creation. There is also wisdom in some cautions offered in the tradition against certain

14

By way of example, another reason was that “creation” for over a millennium was defined in terms of
being. It would have been nonsensical to talk of the existence (being) of anything other than Being itself
prior to God’s creative act. This definition of “creation,” although not uncommon today, as will be seen, is
no longer used to the exclusion of others by all scholars; it is not thought to be comprehensive enough.
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positions that are best avoided because of their undesirable implications. Nevertheless,
with different and altered landmarks on the landscape, not only will things we want to
affirm have to be said differently, but new things may need to be said as well that were
not at issue in prior contexts.15

4. A Problem Needing Consideration

The heart of the problem being investigated is the intersection of several
discourses. First, to continue the geographical metaphor a moment longer, there is a lack
of consensus on how to speak theologically about God’s creative activity and relationship
to creation in this altered environment; the features of the landscape are still being
investigated along with how to communicate Christianity’s convictions anew within this
new environment. Some of the proposals being put forth lie outside the comfort levels of
many who view traditional theological formulas of the church as binding. Their
discomfort is not even as much because of the new ways of communicating issues of
theology, but because these new suggestions sound like they affirm things about God, the
world, and/or God’s relationship to creation that have been shunned throughout the
tradition. There remains the task of giving a palatable account of the church’s faith for
this age just as Aquinas did in his day when Aristotelianism replaced Platonism as the
dominant philosophical framework.
Second, within the realm of biblical studies long-standing conclusions are coming
under increasing fire. Since the suggestions of Schrader, Smith, and Gunkel in the
nineteenth-century there have been three trends. First, “chaos” has been used frequently
as the controlling category or descriptor for many Old Testament images. A significant
15

See Zachary Hayes, O.F.M., What Are They Saying about Creation? (New York: Paulist Press, 1980).
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problem that has arisen in this trend is how “unclear and inconsistently applied”16 the
term “chaos” is. Second, the dependence of Israel’s writings upon those of its neighbors
has been frequently repeated. It is common practice to identify terms, images, myths, or
specific texts from other ANE cultures that may have been sources for Israel’s writings.
Authors will claim in differing ways that Israel’s writings show “dependence” upon
them, “borrow” from them, or these other ANE texts “lie in the background.”17 Third,
the presence of a narrative within Enuma elish, other ANE writings, and the Bible in
which creation-as-ordering comes out of Chaoskampf is frequently cited. These three
suggestions have been cited as fact without ever having been incontrovertibly proven.
These ideas were not incontrovertibly proved based on the data when they were first
suggested and have not been since. If anything, evidence against them has increased at
the same time these ideas have gained wider currency. Even though proponents have
never proved their case, the truth of their framework is so taken for granted that the
burden of proof is now on the side of the naysayers. These three ideas are simply
presumed as a sound framework for interpreting Scripture and making additional
comparisons between the Bible and other ANE texts. Even more troubling, the use of the
term “chaos,” Israel’s adoption of the “chaos myth,” and a narrative framework of
“chaos-conflict-creation” (Chaoskampf) has moved into the theological arena.18 A closer
examination into the current level of the evidence needs to be made before basing
theology on this wave.

16

Watson, 18.
Bernhard Anderson is one author who employs such phrases: see, e.g., Creation Versus Chaos: The
Reinterpretation of Mythical Symbolism in the Bible (New York: Association Press, 1967), 168, 172. It
should be noted, however, that Anderson has become more moderate in his comparative claims over the
course of his career.
18
Cf. Watson, 18ff.

17
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Third, within the realm of science, the use of the adjective “chaotic” to describe
systems that are unpredictable—do not exhibit linear determinacy—is misleading. There
is not total confusion and randomness in these systems; rather, it is a matter of epistemic
limitation and finitude of our calculation machines that is currently at issue. The systems
may or may not be chaotic; we do not know. Things that we do know are that the
“apparent randomness of chaotic behavior is complemented by an underlying orderliness
of behavior.”19 There are patterns in these systems, “constants,”20 areas called attractors,
etc. “Chaotic” behavior in science is not erratic.21 Thus, in both biblical studies and
science “chaos” is commonly used, but it is used quite differently and there are questions
being raised about doing so in both fields.
This leads to the main problem: the intersection of these issues. In attempting to
find ways to express God’s creative activity and God’s relationship to creation for the
present era, it is increasingly becoming popular to use “chaos” language borrowed from
biblical studies and/or science, as questionable as that language may be in the respective
fields. This contributes to the inclusion of ideas within theology which themselves are
raising concerns. There is a need to not only evaluate what is happening in these
discourses, but to find a way to move forward with the task of theology.

5. Present Status of the Problem

One of the greatest difficulties with the use of the term “chaos,” especially in
biblical and ANE studies, is its lack of clear definition and consistent application. A
good analogy for what is going on is that there is an entire menu of ingredients from
19

Ibid.
Ibid., 246.
21
Ibid., 251.
20
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which authors select—even at times moving between ingredients in a single work—when
arguing for various notions they label as “chaos.” Ingredients from which authors
typically pick include: 1) whether it is created or not, 2) whether it should be properly
conceived of as either concretely existing or not existing, 3) its relationship to God’s
initial creative act, 4) its value or morality, 5) whether it is an active force (sometimes
personified) or inert stuff, a condition, 6) in motion or stationary, 7) what the activity of
chaos is within creation and its fate, 8) what arena(s) in which their notion of “chaos” is
typically discussed (matter/cosmos,22 individual human activity,23 history and politics,24
etc.), 9) what God’s relationship toward chaos is, and 10) what God’s activity relative to
chaos is. The switches that some authors make in the ingredients they include in their
recipe for “chaos” at times can be attributed to the particular text they are discussing at
the time; however, instead of being a defense, this shows how amorphously this term
functions in the field as a catchall for so many divergent ideas.
This listing of ingredients needs further explanation. 1) Whether God created
chaos or not is at issue. Some scholars suggest that God began by creating chaos;25
22

This is by far the most common arena for discussion, often the only arena in which authors will discuss
“chaos.”
23
See, e.g., Bernhard Anderson, "The Persistence of Chaos in God's Creation: Order and Chaos Belong
Together in God's Creation, but Potential Chaos of another Kind was Introduced when God Created Human
Beings Endowed with Freedom," BR 12, no. 1 (1996): 44; Morris Inch, Chaos Paradigm: A Theological
Exploration (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1998), 16; Enda McDonagh, Between Chaos and
New Creation: Doing Theology at the Fringe (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1986), 51.
24
See, e.g., Bernhard Anderson, “The Persistence of Chaos in God’s Creation,” 44; Andrew Angel, Chaos
and the Son of Man: The Hebrew Chaoskampf Tradition in the Period 515 BCE to 200 CE (London: T & T
Clark Intl, 2006), 11; Timothy Beal, Religion and its Monsters (New York: Routledge, 2002), 30, 33, 36;
Morris Inch, 16; Enda McDonagh, 51. There are some authors who clearly emphasize notions of “chaos”
within multiple realms; see James Hutchingson, 96; Jon D. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil:
The Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence, 1st ed. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), 35ff.
25
See Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, Creation Out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and
Scientific Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker; Apollo, 2004), 33f and Hans Küng, The Beginning of all
Things: Science and Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2007), 115. Andrew Hahn
notes the existence of this position ("Tohu Va-Vohu: Matter, Nothingness and Non-being in Jewish
Creation Theology," Ph.D. [Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2002], 49), but Brevard Childs
(Myth and Reality in the Old Testament, Studies in Biblical Theology, 2nd ed. [London: SCM Press Ltd.,
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others suggest that chaos (or certain images or manifestations of it) are uncreated26 or
primordial;27 still others bypass altogether the conversation about the Bible’s position by

1962], 31) and Claus Westermann (Genesis 1—11: A Commentary, trans. by John J. Scullion, S.J.
[Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1984], 109) outright speak against this position. Whether
authors believe God started by creating chaos or God used a primordial chaos, it is not uncommon for
authors to assert that this chaos was viewed as the material for creation within the Bible; cf., e.g., Timothy
Beal, 14-15, Peter Bouteneff, Beginnings: Ancient Christian Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 3, 13; Andrew Hahn, 51; Jon D. Levenson, 122; Enda
McDonagh, 4; Nahum Sarna, Genesis: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 6; Luis Stadelmann, The Hebrew Conception of the
World. A Philological and Literary Study, Analecta Biblica 39 (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1970),
12. This same type of suggestion was made in the twelfth-century C.E. by those trying to link the biblical
images with Plato’s Timaeus (Willemien Otten, “Reading Creation: Early Medieval Views of Genesis and
Plato’s Timaeus,” in The Creation of Heaven and Earth: Re-Interpretations of Genesis I in the Context of
Judaism, Ancient Philosophy, Christianity, and Modern Physics, edited by George H. van Kooten [Leiden;
Boston: Brill, 2005], 240). Rebecca Watson challenges this idea, claiming that the Bible is silent about the
what from which God creates (18, n. 30). Similar ideas of cosmos being made out of chaos have been
suggested in science, although careful attention to what is meant by “chaos” is necessary; cf. Arnold Benz,
The Future of the Universe: Chance, Chaos, God? (London; New York; Continuum, 2000), 35, 132. This
notion in science has grown since Immanuel Kant; following him, others theorized about gravity pulling a
chaos into the various masses we now have (cf. Christopher Kaiser, Creational Theology and the History of
Physical Science: The Creationist Tradition from Basil to Bohr, Studies in the History of Christian
Thought, vol. 78 [Leiden; New York: Brill, 1997], 335).
26
There are plenty of scholars who believe this is part of the biblical tradition; cf., e.g., Douglass Knight,
"Cosmogony and Order in the Hebrew Tradition,” in Cosmogony and Ethical Order, ed. by Robin W.
Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 136, 138, 139;
Bernard Batto, Slaying the Dragon: Mythmaking in the Biblical Tradition (Louisville, KY:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), 76, 79, 85, 87; and Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology
of Becoming (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 5, 10. Others suggest such a notion is contradictory to
Scripture and Israelite thinking in general: cf., e.g., Herman Gunkel, Creation and Chaos in the Primeval
Era and the Eschaton, 81; Copan and Craig, 12. William P. Brown, Structure, Role, and Ideology in the
Hebrew and Greek Texts of Genesis 1:1—2:3, Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series 132
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 72, believes it is certainly against the teaching of Genesis 1. Gunkel was
surprised that he was seeing what he thought to be remnants of ideas foreign to Israel’s monotheism in
Scripture. Suggestions that the Bible teaches an unoriginate matter are not new; Justin Martyr suggested
the similarity between Genesis 1 and the khora of Plato’s Timaeus (Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The
Doctrine of "Creation Out of Nothing" in Early Christian Thought., tans. by A. S. Worrall [Edinburgh: T &
T Clark, 1994], 122); cf. William P. Brown, “Divine Act and the Art of Persuasion in Genesis 1,” in
History and Interpretation: Essays in Honour of John H. Hayes, ed. by M. Patrick Graham, William P.
Brown, and Jeffrey K. Kaun (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 19-32., for a very accessible
treatment of khora in Plato’s Timaeus.
27
For examples of those who believe the Bible speaks of a primordial chaos see Andrew Angel, 11;
Bernard Batto, 3, 47, 76, 84, 85, 87; Timothy Beal, 44; Arnold Benz, 132; Stuart Chandler, "When the
World Falls Apart: Methodology for Employing Chaos and Emptiness as Theological Constructs,” Harvard
Theological Review 85, no. 4 (1992): 467; James Hutchingson, 96; Jon D. Levenson, 47; Karl Löning and
Erich Zenger, To Begin with, God Created…: Biblical Theologies of Creation, trans. by Omar Kaste
(Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2000), 20; José Morales, Creation Theology (Dublin, Ireland;
Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2001), 16f., 18, 110; Luis Stadelmann, 12. Even Claus Westermann, who
rejects a notion of primordial chaos in Genesis 1 (102, 109), believes the Psalms still have some texts
supporting the idea (29). Rebecca Watson’s investigation of possible “chaos” references in the Psalms,
through which she rejects the claim of there being chaos or Chaoskampf therein, is a challenge to
Westermann’s concession; see, e.g., her direct rejection of his reading of Ps 93:3-4 (134). David T.
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remaining ambiguous.28 2) Depending on the opinion of whether “chaos” is believed to
be created there are different options concerning whether it exists autonomously /
independently from God,29 is dependent on God,30 or should not even be categorized as
existing or not existing.31
3) These first two opinions affect how people see the relationship of “chaos” to
God’s initial creative act: whether “chaos” exists only before that chaos-ending act,
whether chaos exists before and after God’s initial act,32 whether chaos is a primordial
material that God formed/forms into cosmos, whether it is created and then formed into
cosmos,33 whether it is a facet of creation (e.g., this is a chaosmos),34 or there is a kind of
“chaos” that is a later introduction within creation.35

Tsumura also sides with Westermann that there is no primordial chaos in Genesis 1 (Creation and
Destruction: A Reappraisal of the Chaoskampf Theory in the Old Testament [Winona Lake, IN:
Eisenbrauns, 2005], 190). In the work of James Hutchingson one can see the way a systematic theologian
has integrated this allegedly biblical notion of primordial chaos into theology (cf., e.g., 101).
28
See, e.g., Bernard Anderson, “The Persistence of Chaos in God’s Creation,” 19; Arnold Benz, 35; Peter
Bouteneff, 3, 13; Karl Löning and Erich Zenger, 10; José Morales, 18; Luis Stadelmann, 12; John A.
Wilson, “The Nature of the Universe,” in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man: An Essay on
Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1977),
52.
29
See, e.g., Douglass Knight, 136, 138f; Bernard Batto, 76, 84, 87, 98; Jon D. Levenson, 5ff. For opposing
views see Claus Westermann, 110 and William P. Brown, Structure, Role, and Ideology, 72. For
treatments of views from ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Timaeus, and the early church respectively, see
John A. Wilson, 52; Claus Westermann, 31; William P. Brown, “Divine Act and the Art of Persuasion in
Genesis 1,” 20ff; Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of "Creation Out of Nothing" in Early
Christian Thought, trans. by A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994), 122.
30
See, e.g., Andrew Hahn, 49; Morris Inch, 3; Hans Kung, 115.
31
This is primarily the categorization proposed by Catherine Keller, 12, 161, 169. However, Beatrice
Bruteau, God’s Ecstasy: The Creation of a Self-Creating World (New York: The Crossroad Publishing
Company, 1997), 9, and James Hutchingson, 101, also have positions in which chaos itself plays a part in
generation/creation.
32
See, e.g., Bernhard Anderson, “The Persistence of Chaos in God’s Creation,” 19; Douglas Knight, 138f;
Bernard Batto, 85, 98; Andrew Hahn 64; James Hutchingson, 96; Catherine Keller, 12, 161; Jon D.
Levenson, 47, 122.
33
See n. 19.
34
See, e.g., Bernhard Anderson, “The Persistence of Chaos in God’s Creation,” 19; Beatrice Bruteau, 9;
James Hutchingson, 98; Morris Inch, 3, 71, 77; Keller, 168f, 194; Karl Löning and Erich Zenger, 18, 20f;
Enda McDonagh, 6.
35
See, e.g., Bernhard Anderson, “The Persistence of Chaos in God’s Creation,” 19, 44; Enda McDonagh, 4.
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4) Value judgments about “chaos” and assertions about its morality differ no
matter how people view “chaos” in relation to God’s first creative act; some view it as
negative and/or evil36 while others view it as positive and/or a created good.37 There are
other options in which “chaos” is viewed simply as a fact, as neutral.38 Some also claim
that there is in “chaos” the possibility for evil or good, or it is the source of both.39
7) There are so many notions of “chaos” that have been proposed implicitly and
explicitly that its proposed activity or place within creation is quite diverse. It can be
seen as an active anti-creation anarchical force,40 something non-personified that
threatens order,41 or simply an instance of disorder, which is seen as the opposite of

36

See, e.g., Bernard Batto, 3, 84, 87, 98; Stuart Chandler, 476ff; Jon D. Levenson, 16, 47. Even Claus
Westermann speaks negatively about the darkness in Genesis 1:2 (104). Many authors reject seeing the
images of Genesis 1:2 negatively or as evil; cf., e.g., Nahum Sarna, 7; David T. Tsumura, 190; William P.
Brown, “Divine Act and the Art of Persuasion in Genesis 1,” 32; Structure, Role, and Ideology, 72.
Catherine Keller believes that there has been a trend in Western culture to demonize chaos; she claims we
are tehomophobic (15, 26).
37
See, e.g., Bernhard Anderson, “The Persistence of Chaos in God’s Creation,” 19; Beatrice Bruteau, 9;
Catherine Keller, 166; John Haught, 189. Claus Westermann points out that the waters of the deep can just
as often bless as they can destroy (105); Rebecca Watson shows in the Psalms how much more often this
positive function is the case; see, e.g., 52, 65, 136, 140, 271.
38
This type of position has been more common in those describing positions earlier in history, in Greek,
early church, or Enlightenment contexts. Cf., e.g., Gerhard May, 22, 122; William P. Brown, “Divine Act
and the Art of Persuasion in Genesis 1,” 21; Christopher Kaiser, 335.
39
For those who see chaos as possibility for either, see Catherine Keller, 29, 80, 122ff; Morris Inch, 4; cf.
William P. Brown, “Divine Act and the Art of Persuasion in Genesis 1,” 23. James Hutchingson suggests
that “chaos” can be both the possibility and source for either (101, 105); cf. Beatrice Bruteau, 9.
40
For those who see this theme in the Bible see, e.g., Andrew Angel, 1, 18; Bernard Batto, 3, 48, 76, 79,
84f, 98, 213, n. 19; Timothy Beal, 5f, 9, 14, 30, 44; Stuart Chandler, 467; Andrew Hahn, 40f; James
Hutchingson, 96f, 105; Jon D. Levenson, 16, 47; Karl Löning and Erich Zenger, 18; Luis Stadelmann, 18.
William P. Brown suggests that making the imagery an apocalyptic/mythic character was a post-canon
move (Structure, Role, and Ideology, 238; contra Andrew Angel’s research in his dissertation which shows
it remained predominantly an image of historical situations). Claus Westermann believes that there are
hints of this in the Psalms but not in Genesis 1 (29, 31); cf. Andrew Hahn, 46. There are several authors
who explicitly reject this type of reading of the biblical text; see David T. Tsumura, 190; Claus
Westermann, 104ff. For readings of Egypt’s and Babylon’s myths in this same manner see H. and H.A.
Frankfort, “Myth and Reality,” in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man: An Essay on Speculative
Thought in the Ancient Near East (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 10; Thorkild
Jacobsen, “Mesopotamia: The Cosmos as a State,” in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man: An Essay
on Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press,
1977), 175; Karl Löning and Erich Zenger, 13.
41
See, e.g., Arnold Benz, 167, n. 4; Timothy Beal, 14; Luis Stadelmann, 18. Some authors who are
developing their own ideas of “chaos” see it as acting in this way; see, e.g., Timothy Beal, 6, 9; Catherine
Keller, 186.
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creation.42 On the other extreme it can be seen as being generative, something that
capacitates beginning or self-organization.43 Some even see its function as being a
reservoir of all possibilities, potentiality, or novelty.44 With many authors’ positions,
however, it is nonsensical to talk about the activity of “chaos.” It is simply an inert
stuff,45 or the term is a description of a disordered or formless condition.46 It is
challenging to locate the positions of some authors because they use “chaos” as a noun or
an adjective depending on the context. Even more drastic in the conversation—given the
recent trends—are those who choose a more original Greek meaning for the term and
speak of “chaos” in the biblical text as a void / nothingness or gap / abyss.47

42

This is a common interpretation of the biblical imagery; see Bernhard Anderson, “The Persistence of
Chaos in God’s Creation,” 44; Peter Bouteneff, 3; Andrew Hahn, 29, 45; Karl Löning and Erich Zenger,
10; Nahum Sarna, 6. Others speak in these polarities of chaos and order (creation) in nature; Arnold Benz,
132; Enda McDonagh, 5; John Polkinghorne, Quarks, Chaos and Christianity (New York: Crossroads Pub,
2005), 84. Theologians have either adopted this type of juxtaposition—see James Hutchingson, 97ff; Hans
Küng, 1—or, as Stuart Chandler points out (471), taken a theological position against “chaos”—see Karl
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 33-34; Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I.187-99; Karl Barth,
Church Dogmatics, Vol. 3, Part 3, 209-368.
43
See, e.g., Timothy Beal, 14f; William P. Brown, “Divine Act and the Art of Persuasion in Genesis 1,” 32;
Chandler, 468. Some theologians have taken up this suggestion; see James Hutchingson, 101; Catherine
Keller, 123, 166, 188, 190, 194, 213. For a look at Egypt’s view of generative waters see H. and H.A.
Frankfort, 10; John A. Wilson, 51f. William P. Brown tracks the role of waters in creation in Classical,
ANE, and biblical traditions (Structure, Role, and Ideology, 165-192).
44
See, e.g., Beatrice Bruteau, 85; Stuart Chandler, 468; John Haught, 189; James Hutchingson, 98, 101,
109; Morris Inch, 4, 71, 90; Catherine Keller, 12, 80, 115, 122f, 169, 191; John Polkinghorne, 84.
45
See, e.g., Douglas Knight, 139; Stuart Chandler, 468; Copan and Craig, 33; Hans Küng, 115; Jon D.
Levenson, 122; Nahum Sarna, 6; Luis Stadelmann, 12, 14.
46
For views that believe this is part of the biblical worldview, see Catherine Keller, 5; Enda McDonagh, 4;
Jose Morales, 15; Nahum Sarna, 6; Luis Stadelmann, 12. Arnold Benz believes this facet of the biblical
worldview fits well with science (132). It is presumed by Stuart Chandler that this view is the JudeoChristian view (467). Claus Westermann contends this, however, saying that “Both formulations, that God
created the world out of nothing and that there was a formless matter before creation, first occur where
Judaism has come under the influence of Greek thought” (110); this is not part of the canonical worldview
even though many important Christian thinkers, like Augustine, wrote as though it was (110); cf. Rebecca
Watson, 16. For more information on the Greek notion of khora see William Brown, “Divine Act and the
Art of Persuasion in Genesis 1,” 19ff and Catherine Keller, 166.
47
Those who talk about this as the more original meaning of the term in Greek include Andrew Hahn, 45;
Hans Küng, 142; Rebecca Watson, 13; Claus Westermann, 103f. Westermann’s treatment is the most
extensive as it relates to Genesis 1.
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Given the divergence of views about the place of chaos within creation, what
happens with “chaos” at the eschaton also varies widely. Some think it is eliminated48
and others think it is forever part of reality.49 Some authors feel it is fully and finally
brought under God’s control50 while others claim that everything returns to “chaos” in
order for new creation to emerge.51
9) God’s relationship toward “chaos” is quite varied among authors. Most
commonly God is believed to have an adversarial relationship with “chaos.”52 For others,
however, God’s relationship with “chaos” is positive,53 or God is mixed up with “chaos”
in varying ways, perhaps it is even part of divinity or God’s shadow side.54 There are a
few examples in which God is said to wield “chaos” as a weapon or use it to execute
judgment.55 Some metaphors that are helpful for describing other positions are that God
is a craftsman who uses “chaos” as a tool (means) in creation,56 or God uses it as an
artistic medium (substance).57 Lastly, God can be viewed as a healer from “chaos”
understood as an ailment.58

48

Jon D. Levenson is quite adamant about this position; cf. Karl Löning and Erich Zenger, 20.
See, e.g., Stuart Chandler, 467; Catherine Keller, 168ff.
50
See, e.g., Douglass Knight, 136; Andrew Angel, 200-206; Bernard Batto, 3.
51
See, e.g., Timothy Beal, 15.
52
See, e.g., Herman Gunkel, Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton, 81f; Douglass
Knight, 136; Andrew Angel, 1; Bernard Batto, 3, 48, 76, 84ff, 213, n. 19; Timothy Beal, 6; Stuart Chandler,
467; Andrew Hahn, 40f, 64; Jon D. Levenson, 47; Luis Stadelmann, 17f. Authors who oppose this position
include David T. Tsumura, 190; Rebecca Watson, 3; Claus Westermann, 31, 106.
53
See, e.g., William Brown, Structure, Role, and Ideology, 77; Morris Inch, 71, 77; Catherine Keller, 115,
122ff, 135, 181.
54
See, e.g., James Hutchingson, 105, 109, 116, 151; Catherine Keller, 142, 191, 226, 231; Beatrice
Bruteau, 9.
55
See, e.g., Andrew Hahn, 64; Jon D. Levenson, 76; Peter Bouteneff, 13; cf. David T. Tsumura, 152ff.
56
See, e.g., Bernhard Anderson, “The Persistence of Chaos in God’s Creation,” 44; Peter Bouteneff, 13;
Morris Inch, 3f, 78.
57
See, e.g., Bernard Batto, 76; Timothy Beal, 14; Arnold Benz, 132; James Hutchingson, 151; Morris Inch,
71, 77; Hans Küng, 115; Jon D. Levenson, 122; Enda McDonagh, 4; Nahum Sarna, 6.
58
See, e.g., Enda McDonagh, 51; this is the closest use of the term in the literature to what is being
proposed in this project: “Consideration of Jewish-Christian reconciliation should reveal the depths of the
chaos, psychological, social and theological, in which we find ourselves and indicate the radical character
of the new creation required of humanity and offered by God” (McDonagh, 51).
49
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10) Depending on one’s view of God’s relationship to “chaos,” there are various
options proposed for what God does relative to it. It is common since Herman Gunkel to
talk about God subduing, mastering, or combating “chaos” (i.e., Chaoskampf).59 Related
to this theme are those who still view “chaos” as dangerous but talk less in terms of direct
divine engagement with it; God’s activity is that of limiting, containing, or giving
boundaries to “chaos.”60 On the other side, a common, less-adversarial position includes
language of God engaging “chaos” but God’s engagement is constructive; God’s work is
to structure, order, or fashion “chaos.”61 In a related vein are authors who do not
necessarily see God’s relationship as antagonistic, but write of God’s interaction with
“chaos” as separating, dividing, and distinguishing it.62
From across the spectrum there are some whose ideas of God’s activity toward
“chaos” explicitly talk of reducing “chaos” or eliminating it from reality;63 there are
representatives, either who view “chaos” as a force or substantively, who talk about its
elimination at the eschaton. However, others who simply view it as an adjective for a
state of affairs and not the stuff itself will also talk about God being in the business of
eliminating “chaos.” One group stands out among the others; they suggest that God

59

See, e.g., Herman Gunkel, Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton, 81f; Douglas
Knight, 136; Andrew Angel, 1, 18; Bernard Batto, 3, 76, 84; Stuart Chandler, 467; Andrew Hahn, 40f, 64;
Jon D. Levenson, 47. This position is challenged by Luis Stadelmann, 14, 17f; David T. Tsumura, 190;
Rebecca Watson, 3; Claus Westermann, 31, 33f, 106.
60
See, e.g., Stuart Chandler, 467; Andrew Hahn, 64; Jon D. Levenson, 14, 17; Ruth Page, 19.
61
See, e.g., Douglass Knight, 139; Bernard Batto, 84; Peter Bouteneff, 13; Andrew Hahn, 51; James
Hutchingson, 151; Hans Kung, 115; John D. Levenson, 17; Enda McDonagh, 4; Ruth Page, 19. David T.
Tsumura cautions against such a reading of the ANE and biblical traditions; “Because the idea of creation
as establishing ‘order out of chaos’ cannot be demonstrated as a general feature even in extrabiblical
materials, we should be extremely careful not to impose foreign ideas on any biblical text without first
placing the text in its immediate literary context and considering the possibility of metaphorical devices”
(151).
62
See, e.g., Karl Löning and Erich Zenger, 18; Ruth Page, 19; Claus Westermann, 33f.
63
See, e.g., Andrew Hahn, 46; Jose Morales, 16f; Nahum Sarna, 6.
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coaxes or persuades “chaos” or in creating elicits its “virtual forms.”64 God does not act
on, or over and against “chaos,” but interpersonally with it. Some of these authors avoid
talking about the elimination of “chaos.”
There is no clearly established definition for “chaos” or agreement on what
notions that have been placed under the heading of “chaos” are represented in Scripture.
Even so, there is no shortage of work that argues for Israel’s adoption and use of “chaos”
imagery in its scriptures from a common (equally ambiguous) ANE set of terms and
images, as well as Israel adopting the notion of God combating “chaos” and/or holding it
at bay.
The above group of scholars is content to use “chaos” in various ways and for
various purposes. On the other hand, there is a growing number of scholars who are
raising cautions about past conclusions and the presuppositions, methods, and logic at
work in arriving at them.65 These dissenters present a very different paradigm for
interpreting Israel’s theology in its scriptures, a paradigm in which using the term
“chaos” is avoided altogether. They would rather drop the term from biblical studies or
explanatory frameworks that appeal to Scripture. In her research, for example, Rebecca
Watson challenges the soundness of “chaos” being used in respect to any ANE

64

The phrase “elicit its virtual forms” comes from Catherine Keller; cf. 38, 115, 161, 169, 181. Others who
feel similarly include William P. Brown, “Divine Act and the Art of Persuasion in Genesis 1,” 21f, 32;
James Hutchingson, 101; Morris Inch, 3.
65
Questions are not only arising about placing Israel’s literary images in a continuum with its neighbors’,
but also the narrative is being questioned about how in Israel “chaos” themes were de-mythologized from a
primordial setting into historical settings only later to be projected into an eschatological setting. In his
dissertation, Andrew Angel tracked how “chaos” imagery is used in Israel’s writings in the centuries
following the writing of its now canonical books and found that the images remain historical in a vast
majority of instances. He states, “Thus these late post-exilic texts used the [imagery] to refer to the
establishment of political order within history, the establishment of justice both in history and after death
and the creation of the world. Therefore, the idea that a creation mythology was historicized and then
eschatologized must be questioned” (205). Few, if any, of the long-presumed-to-be-fact and often repeated
frameworks for placing Israel’s writings within the broader ANE have remained unquestionable under
recent investigation.
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cosmologies. Given the vastly different ways it is used, the common lack of a detailed
definition of it, a lack of justification for how it is used, the imprecise practice of
grouping disparate terms and images under this catchall category, and the many nonSemitic ideas that have come to accompany this Greek term, Watson believes it leads the
current discussions away from a closer understanding of the ANE perspectives. She
seeks in her Chaos Uncreated: a Reassessment of the Theme of “Chaos” in the Hebrew
Bible to show the inappropriateness of the term and an alternative way of reading the
images. David T. Tsumura also does a close study of the terminology, word groupings,
and images in Genesis 1 and 2, as well as other biblical texts. His study challenges the
suitability of “chaos” as a descriptor for the primal conditions. These recent studies are
part of a long-developing trend by some prominent figures in the field who have been
taking more cautious stances toward comparative claims. These figures include
Alexander Heidel, W. G. Lambert, Claus Westermann, H.W.F. Saggs, and Richard
Clifford.66
Even with strong, ongoing dissent, the conclusions of “chaos”-proponents have
been presumed to be fact and been repeated as fact in scholarship, at more popular levels,
taken up into science-theology dialogues, and used as a foundation for the work of some
66

There are several helpful summaries available on this cooling trend within scholarship toward old
assumed relationships within the field of ANE comparative studies. See Rebecca Watson’s introduction in
Chaos Uncreated, 1-30; John Seo discusses some of this debate as it relates specifically to Genesis 1, 122136; Richard S. Hess has a very helpful history of comparative studies and the lessons in methodology that
have been learned along the way in his essay “On Hundred Fifty Years of Comparative Studies on Genesis
1—11: An Overview,” in I Studied Inscriptions from Before the Flood: Ancient Near Eastern, Literary,
and Linguistic Approaches to Genesis 1—11, edited by Richard S. Hess and David Toshio Tsumura
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1994), 3-26. In Hess’ study, there have been dissenting voices at least
since the 1920’s. In 1924 W. F. Albright concluded that the Hebrew cosmology was written in opposition
to the Mesopotamian tradition, not in a line with it (8). B. Landsberger in 1926 raised doubts that any
comparisons can be assumed between the Western Hebrew tradition and the Eastern Babylonian tradition
in language, worldview, literary forms, and ideas; any comparisons between the traditions or filling in the
blanks of the Hebrew texts with ideas from other ANE texts he believed was projection (9f.). These
tensions led to the separation of Assyriology as an independent discipline from biblical studies in this postWWI period (8ff.).
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systematic theologians. This broader context in biblical studies comes into sharp focus in
the contrast between Jon D. Levenson’s Creation and the Persistence of Evil: the Jewish
Drama of Divine Omnipotence and David Tsumura’s Creation and Destruction: a
Reappraisal of the Chaoskampf Theme in the Old Testament—a revision and expansion
of his 1989 book67—in how they interpret Genesis 1, especially 1:1-2.
In systematic theology, especially among theologians who are listening to the
perspectives of science, work is being done to give an account of creation in ways
intelligible within a broader cultural context. Many of these theologians are using
“chaos” frameworks of biblical scholars, such as Levenson, as impetus and warrant for
their account of creation. Catherine Keller’s reading of Genesis 1, for example, is
influenced by appeals such as Levenson’s to an ANE “chaos” framework and undergirds
how she builds her creation theology in Face of the Deep: a Theology of Becoming. In
tracking the broader intellectual developments leading to where we stand, and with the
popularity of talk about “chaos” in biblical and theological accounts of the beginning, it
is still an open question of what is the place of “chaos” language in articulating the
relationship of God and creation when speaking about in the beginning.

B. The Place of this Dissertation in the Conversation

1. What this Dissertation Hopes to Accomplish Relative to the Problem

The question this dissertation seeks to answer is what is the place of “chaos”
language in articulating the relationship of God and creation when speaking of God’s
creative activity. In answering this question, first of all, a way will be suggested of
67
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speaking about a theology of creation during this time in church history where the
broader intellectual context has shifted yet there is not yet consensus on how to talk about
God’s creative activity and relationship to creation in this new context. Some theologians
are venturing suggestions of varying merit, but the conversation is still far from
equilibrium. It is hoped that the framework proposed in this dissertation, with others of
related thought, can provide a viable and attractive point around which conversation can
amass.
Second, in the proposals offered thus far, the language of “chaos”—governing
many different notions—has commonly made appearances. The language of “chaos” is
powerful; it is quite gripping for the imagination; it elicits feelings of being
overwhelmed, in danger, disoriented, and helpless. Perhaps its popularity is due to the
manner in which it reflects the pulse of how many people are feeling in this point in
history. Yet to this point, many of the proposals employing “chaos” have dabbled in
notions akin to some from which the tradition has long shied away. Even in a new
context, differently-rendered manifestations of old dismissed ideas may not be a viable
option. In seeking to find a viable and attractive theology of creation for moving
forward, this dissertation seeks to follow in the wisdom of the tradition; thus, “chaos”
will be employed in a manner that utilizes the forcefulness of its connotation while being
careful to avoid suggestions that would be conversation ending for tradition-loyal people
who are in search of context-appropriate grammar about creation. The timeliness of this
project could not be more fitting both for the unsettled condition of creation theology and
the relative youth of the re-emergence of “chaos” language within recent theological
discourse.
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2. Approach

The language of “chaos” is typically used both in biblical studies and theology in
the arena of creation theology. As a starting point for this project, in the following
chapter, the history of creation theology in Christianity will be examined in order to show
major themes and developments up to the present context. It has been suggested that
there have been shifts in how Christians have conceptualized God’s creative activity and
God’s relationship to creation through the centuries in step with changes in the broader
cultural-intellectual context. A sketch of this history will be offered. This will highlight
some differences in this context versus those in which traditional articulation of creation
theology were developed. It will also give some context of why some theologians have
been venturing different ways of speaking about creation. This portion of the dissertation
will serve the purpose of providing background and context for the current theological
milieu in which the posed question will need to be answered.
Several scholarly investigations have already been done on key parts of that
history; their work will be utilized in presenting this important background. For example,
Gerhard May has presented the early journey of creatio ex nihilo becoming the orthodox
position in Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of "Creation Out of Nothing" in Early
Christian Thought. Christopher Kaiser has tracked the shifts in creation theology through
the various changes in thinking over the centuries in Creational Theology and the History
of Physical science: The Creationist Tradition from Basil to Bohr. Kaiser’s framing of
the history is especially helpful to this study because he tracks developments in thinking
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within natural science along with corresponding shifts in thinking about creation
theology.
This provides excellent background for not only the current work being done in
creation theology, but also the rise of certain notions of “chaos” in science. Since the
language of “chaos” in science is a significant influence on the use of this language in
theology these scientific notions will be examined as part of this historical background.
By looking at the background of “chaos” language in science, and later in biblical studies,
the strength or validity of their choice of terms (i.e., their construal of the world) given
the data about which they are speaking will be examined. Another key component to the
change in context in which creation theology is being done today is the way in which the
function of the Bible for theology has changed. This will also be noted in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 will address the use of “chaos” in biblical studies. Since the proposals
of George Smith and Herman Gunkel, much has been written about “chaos” in biblical
and ANE comparative studies. Smith’s and Gunkel’s initial focus was on the relation of
Genesis 1 to Enuma elish. Since their proposals, the number of alleged references to
“chaos” within the Bible has multiplied. In an effort to be comprehensive there have
been several scholars who have sought to examine each supposed reference to “chaos” in
Scripture with far differing outcomes.68
This study will focus almost exclusively on Genesis 1 within these broader
comparative discussions. Among all the possible texts within Scripture that are
undisputedly about creation, this cosmology stands apart. It is a complete literary unit
that is highly developed in its artistry, structure, and theology. Also, the Priestly
68
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cosmology was given primacy in its canonical position. Furthermore, this text provides
an excellent case study for how differently the message of a text can be viewed based on
what background is presumed for the text. For those who believe it fits within a tradition
of “chaos” references in the Bible its message sounds very different than those who
question this now-common way of reading these references.
The goal is to show this contrast in interpretation of the Priestly message. The
goal is not to prove that one side is conclusively correct, but to show that extreme caution
is warranted in repeating long-accepted positions within ANE comparative studies in
light of recent investigations into the available data upon which they were built.69 This
will indirectly show that theologians who build their creation theology on many of those
“chaos” notions are at best building on shaky-ground. There are other available
interpretations of the biblical text that offer a more compelling account of the text.
Moreover, these chaos-free interpretations offer a better foundation upon which to
develop a theology of creation in our context.
In order to show the contrast in readings between those who affirm “chaos”
notions and those who reject them, a representative position from each side will be
examined. Jon D. Levenson’s Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama
of Divine Omnipotence has been chosen as a representative work in which Genesis 1 and
the Priestly tradition as a whole is read against a “chaos” background.70 David T.
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Tsumura’s Creation and Destruction: A Reappraisal of the Chaoskampf Theory in the
Old Testament will be used as a representative of an anti-“chaos” reading of the text.71
Even though both works address other biblical passages, they both have extensive
treatments of Genesis 1 in relation to the broader ANE milieu. This helps in having a
balance between the extensiveness of the Genesis 1 treatments in the two texts. Also,
both authors are trying to instruct their readers on how to read the terms and images of
Scripture. This is helpful in placing them in dialogue.
Levenson’s and Tsumura’s approaches also demonstrate a difference in
methodology that is, for the most part, representative of others from their sides of the
debate. This difference will factor significantly in evaluating their claims. According to
Richard S. Hess, there is a need for the union of literary approaches “with their concern
for context and/or contextualization” with comparative approaches in examining specific
terms, images, and texts.72 Contextual and comparative studies done together on both
biblical and non-biblical ANE texts are Hess’ recommendation toward the fullest and
soundest understanding of the texts.
In evaluating opposing arguments within biblical studies, weight will be given to
conclusions supported with detailed examination of texts in their literary contexts and to
comparisons that are made when the contextual evidence provides warrant. This method
71
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first presupposes the unique voice of each text; it seeks to find that voice and preserve the
integrity of it while understanding it further through placing it beside other ANE voices.
As Richard J. Clifford states, “If comparison with other cosmogonies does not prove
dependence, it does reveal the emphases in Genesis.”73 In sum, the concern of Chapter 3
is 1) to evaluate “chaos” language in biblical studies, particularly as it relates to the
interpretation of Genesis 1, 2) to outline representative positions from the two sides of the
biblical studies debate over “chaos” and ANE comparative studies, especially where it
concerns Genesis 1, and 3) to track a way of reading Genesis 1 that holds promise for
doing creation theology.
The fourth chapter investigates a growing phenomenon in systematic theology in
the use of “chaos.” Within the world of systematic theology, there is certainly a growing
wave of scholars who are dialoguing with science and biblical studies on their use of
“chaos.” Nevertheless, there are others who are making proposals about “chaos” in the
realm of creation theology that move beyond simply dialogue with science and biblical
studies. Among these theologians who are making notions of “chaos” more central in
their creation theology,74 Catherine Keller’s proposal in Face of the Deep: A Theology of
Becoming stands out above others in its sophistication, coherence, comprehensibility,
insightfulness, and sensitivity to the contemporary intellectual, philosophical context.
She pays attention to philosophy's turn to language. She does not ask objectively what
the Genesis text meant and then try to apply that for today; rather she listens to the way
the text reverberates in her world. Her work is commendable in that she tries to give an
account of the faith for today. Important as well to this project, she interacts extensively
73
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with Genesis 1 in her work. As one who works within the framework of process thought,
her approach to “chaos” represents a distinct position from those who more simply
interact with biblical studies’ or science’s discussions of “chaos.” By examining her
position on “chaos,” this third approach to the language of “chaos” will be evaluated and
critiqued.75 Even though her framework and use of “chaos” will not be supported, Keller
has great sensitivity to the present intellectual context and thus makes some useful
suggestions.
The goal of examining the use of “chaos” in science-theology dialogue, biblical
studies, and theologians such as Keller is to show the questionability of their starting
points. By examining these positions and raising questions about them, it is hoped that a
different theological account of God’s creative activity and relationship to creation can be
offered in which the term “chaos” can be employed differently than it has been. Chapter
5 offers a theology of creation that builds upon the work of Lyle Dabney on
pneumatology. It is within that framework of God’s relationship to creation in God’s
creative activity that “chaos” will be defined. The goal of this proposal is to remain
faithful to the spirit of Scripture and the Christian tradition while finding a way to
articulate this mystery of our faith in and for the present context.
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There are some topics that have a close connection with the investigation being
proposed. The focus of this research is the theological use of “chaos” in speaking of
God’s relation to creation in God’s creative activity. Metaphysical concerns are key
among the connected topics. These concerns are certainly relevant and worthy of
investigation. However, the purpose of this project is to address an ongoing trend in
using “chaos”; it suggests doing so from a different perspective than has been represented
thus far. Examining and developing answers to the metaphysical issues surrounding this
conversation would need to be taken up in subsequent works.

3. Cases that Will be Made

This dissertation does not stand alone in asserting that we have moved into a new,
different context that demands that theologians find fresh ways to articulate creation
theology; some have already been engaging in that work.76 Biblical scholars have
suggestions for interpreting Genesis 1 that are viable and rich for building a theology of
creation. Scientists seem to be making suggestions that are ready-made for entry into this
theological discussion. Some theologians have already begun using these fertile
possibilities from both sides for dialogue. Their frameworks may not all be palatable for
those looking for more traditional-sounding proposals, but this does not mean that their
work should not be given a careful audience in order to glean their useful insights. It is
the goal of this project to listen to the various voices of biblical studies, science-theology
dialogue, and theology to freshly articulate a way to use the language of “chaos” in a
tradition-honoring creation theology.
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In answering the question about the place of “chaos” in describing God’s relation
to creation, the following thesis will be developed: “chaos” should not be used to refer to
conditions before or at the start of God’s creative activity; rather, chaos is introduced
within creation as discordant expressions of any part of creation to God and others. In
the framework that will be constructed chaos will be understood as instances when any
part of creation (organic or inorganic) holds its breath and/or is out of tune with the
inseparably operating Spirit and Word, who would have something more beautiful,
abundantly life affirming, and rightly related for the whole community. In the creative
activity of the Spirit and the Son according to the Father, the Spirit operates transjectivly
as the Possibility of God for the other and the Son operates transcarnately as the Call of
God to and for the other.77
This framework speaks about God’s creative activity outside of the traditional
grammar of primary causation (being)—as opposed to secondary causation. The
metaphysical implications will be left for future investigation. Nevertheless, the
grammar of creation being proposed honors creation out of nothing because no preexistent other is presupposed; at the same time it views the event of creation
synergistically such that it is both Triune operation and the divinely-gifted selfexpression of non-preexisting others.
It should also be noted that the ambitions of this project take the role of theology
one step beyond making sense of our faith in a given context. It is assumed herein that
theology should take a seat at the table in wrestling with how to speak about and frame
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the data of the various disciplines. For example, during the seventeenth-century, thinkers
were sensitive to the fact that their accounts of reality through the exposition of physics
had theological implications.78 Data is neither self-collecting nor self-interpreting. It is
sought, named, and given meaning through being placed in a linguistic framework.
Whether acknowledged or not, theological considerations are at stake when deciding
what to name and how to frame the findings of any discipline, biblical studies as well as
science. Even if the other disciplines do not listen to the theological implications of their
linguistic construals, theologians need to keep assessing these frameworks and
challenging the theology that is implicitly being stated. The methodology employed in
this study engages in some of that work. It is hoped that the proposals being made can
help provide a framework on which our experiences of the world can be hung.

4. Relation of these Positions to Others Previous

There are few positions concerning the activity of “creation” that do not speak of
it as solely an activity of God; for most theologians creation is by divine fiat—period.
However, defining “creation” in terms of being has been common for quite some time.
In that paradigm, it is inconceivable to speak about being ultimately having any other
source than God; God was defined in terms of primary causation, as Being. In the
paradigm being proposed, God’s activity of “creation” is not defined in the framework of
primary causation in the classical sense. As will be described later, God’s creative
activity includes within it the response of the non-preexistent other; God’s creative
activity is intrinsically synergistic with the very other being created. This changes the
78
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way creatio ex nihilo is articulated while avoiding the dualism some theologians have
opted for in their incorporation of “chaos” language.
Some thinkers have suggested that in creating God overcomes chaos, transforms
chaos, makes a chaos (raw material), or that chaos is intrinsic to the design of the creation
God has made. Instead of these types of suggestions, “chaos” will be defined as
something that comes into being in the event of creation; but, since creation is not
something God does by fiat or monergistically, “chaos” does not have to be, nor should it
be, attributed to God. Unlike nearly every instance of the use of “chaos” by other
scholars, “chaos” is improper response embodied in the coming to be of the other that is
being created. The other being created can be anything from the smallest of particles to
living organisms to the largest systems. More will be said in the coming chapters both
about the proposals being made and their merits over other positions; but for now, it will
simply be noted that the positions being put forth concerning creation and chaos have
advantages over others both in issues of theodicy but more importantly in the claims
about God’s relationship to creation in and through God’s creative activity.
Some important benefits that will become apparent as “chaos” is defined in
greater detail is that the problem creation faces can be defined uniformly for material
creation and for living beings. The definition of “chaos” also functions for both
individuals and communities or systems. Much of this is due to the way in which the
chaos of improper response is defined relationally, in a dynamic and historical way.
Improper responses establish and/or change relationships that are ever in dynamic flux.
This way of speaking in this context affirms Christianity’s concern about the deep seated
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affects of original sin; it simply speaks differently than in past contexts where the fall was
talked about as a one time, once upon a time, deforming change in creation.
The problem of chaos is an issue arising in the response of becoming; thus, the
manner in which creation’s predicament is defined, it takes embodiment and materiality
seriously. Matter is not the problem, but rather the manner of response in coming to be is
the problem. Lastly, the notion of chaos as improper response will circumvent debates
about intentionality or willfulness.79 Regardless of why the coming-to-be-other
responded improperly, the reality of chaos is a serious problem from which repentance
and recapitulation is needed.
The benefits of this way of speaking about chaos also make God’s response to
rectify creation’s problem uniform, whether it is for material creation or for living beings.
It is significant to note that the theme of salvation for all creation—which progressively
dwindled away in Christian writing80—is once again being recovered. Salvation is not
narrowly for humanity alone. Salvation is also not about escape from materiality, but
about its being made new and being fulfilled in the Glory of God. The aim of this project
is focused toward talking about the problem of chaos within the context of God’s
relationship to creation in God’s creative activity. Nevertheless, it is hoped that, in brief,
the soteriological trajectory of the proposed paradigm will be seen enough that the
relational dynamic between God and creation in the activity of creation, full of dynamism
and synergism, is the same dynamic at work in God’s saving activity.
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II. SHIFTING CONTEXTS: INVESTIGATING THE HISTORY
OF CREATION THEOLOGY, SCRIPTURE’S ROLE IN THE
CONVERSATION, AND SCIENCE'S USE OF “CHAOS”
A. Introduction

The concern of this project is the myriad of ways “chaos” is used in current
theology and in its place to suggest a specific application for the term. Most often
reflections about the beginning—protology—and the relationship of God and creation lie
at the center of current uses of “chaos.” Notions of chaos are not foreign to these
theological foci at various times in the church’s history—or within certain Classic
philosophical schools. The term is once again in vogue. In this chapter the rise of the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in church tradition and the theology of creation through the
church’s history will be presented in a series of brief glimpses. The goal is by no means
to be comprehensive; rather, the goal is to provide context for the current project. Within
the history of creation theology, a sketch of the development of a scientific worldview in
the West will be presented. Next there will also be an evaluation of “chaos” language in
present day science and theology that is based on that use. This glimpse of present day
science also will help illuminate part of the broader conceptual context with which
theology must dialogue in seeking to express the faith. Lastly, a glimpse will be
presented of how the role of Scripture in current theological discourse has changed in
recent centuries from what it had been; this has had an affect currently on the openendedness of theological reflection on creation.
Numerous works of historical theology have been written examining the doctrine
of creation and God’s relationship to creation either at specific points in the tradition or in
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the writings of certain figures; others look at the relationship of a past worldview to
concurrent theological positions (e.g., the relationship of various conceptualizations of
creation theology to technology or science). These types of works will be utilized in this
chapter instead of retracing the steps of others’ scholarship. Along with the work of
Gerhard May on the rise of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo,1 one helpful reading of the
tradition that will be used extensively in tracking creation theology through history is
Christopher Kaiser’s Creational Theology and the History of Physical Science: The
Creationist Tradition from Basil to Bohr.2

B. The Creationist Tradition

1. Key Components of the Creationist Tradition

There are several basic presuppositions in the creationist tradition which
Christopher Kaiser claims can be tracked throughout the Christian tradition even though
they have taken form in many ways at various times in that history.3 The three main
points are: 1) the comprehensibility of creation, including its finitude in space and
duration,4 2) the unity or non-duality of heaven and earth,5 and 3) the relative autonomy

1
Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of "Creation Out of Nothing" in Early Christian Thought
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994).
2
Studies in the History of Christian Thought 78, ed. by Heiko A. Oberman (Leiden; New York; Köln:
Brill, 1997).
3
The term “creationist” is Kaiser’s. It is simply the tradition that affirms God as the creator, who, with the
creation of the universe, established a code of law within that universe (19). Remi Brague affirms a similar
type of heritage passed into Christianity; “The world of the Old Testament was produced with wisdom
(hokhmah), but that wisdom did not belong to man. There was indeed a wisdom of the world, but its subject
was God, not man” (The Wisdom of the World: The Human Experience of the Universe in Western Thought
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003], 48). That divine wisdom, or God’s Word, is more stable and
enduring than heaven and earth, which will pass away (53).
4
Ibid., 21, 25. The finitude of creation’s duration has never quite been settled; it has been subject to debate
at various points throughout Christianity’s history: the early church, the scholasticism of the thirteenthcentury, and current science-theology dialogues being notable times (cf. Kaiser, 26).
5
Ibid., 21, 28.
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of nature.6 Kaiser tracks a fourth thread, the ministry of healing and restoration. The
presupposition in this thread is that things can change.7
Kaiser’s interest in the relationship of scientific development and creation
theology influences his own interest in this fourth thread. His work in this area is helpful
in tracking the changes from the early church in which healing was seen as God working
through nature toward the Middle Ages belief in the ordinary operation of God’s power
(potentia ordinate) in sustaining the functions of nature.8 The healing ministry became
more about humans understanding and using the workings of nature.9 With this shift in
thinking begun during the eleventh- and twelfth-centuries there began to be a split
between earthly and heavenly callings—those who focused on earthly workings and
those who focused on spiritual matters.10
The first thread, the belief in the comprehensibility of creation, comes from the
belief that humans are created in the image of the same Logos at work in the creation of
the world.11 Even though it is the same Logos at work in the world and in human reason,
thus making the world intelligible to humans, there has always been hesitancy, as seen in
much of the Old Testament, in claiming that all mysteries can be overcome; there are
times, places, and knowledge within the world inaccessible to humans.12 In general, the
notions of limited spatial extent and duration of the visible world have been part of the
creation tradition, but were never fully a settled issue—especially the notion of finite
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duration.13 Through the first half of the second century, Christian theologians were
comfortable in affirming the Platonist assertions of the eternality of matter.14 Debate
over the lack of a certain beginning arose again in certain schools in the twelfth-century
and in the scholasticism of the thirteenth-century. It was re-raised in the Enlightenment
onward.
The notion of the unity between heaven and earth, the second thread, is a
Christian affirmation in contrast to some of its pagan counterparts.15 Christians deanimated the heavens. The heavens and the earth were both equally created by God
according to the same logic/logos.16 Eventually their underlying belief in the unity of
heaven and earth (e.g., in the way they function) manifested itself in mathematical
demonstrations of the similarities between what is seen in the heavens and on earth. It is
not until the work of Isaac Newton, however, that such mathematisation comes of age.17
Lastly, the affirmation of the relative autonomy of nature has perhaps been the
most chameleon-like of the three as the faith has been articulated in various philosophical
contexts and in light of an ever growing body of observations about the natural world. In
Kaiser’s treatment, he summarizes this creationist notion as follows; “The autonomy of
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nature is thus ‘relative’ in the sense of being relational (to God), as well as in the sense of
not being self-originated or entirely self-determined.”18 In seeking to find an appropriate
place for “chaos” to be used in the relationship between God and creation in this current
project, this third thread of the creation tradition is of greatest interest and will be the
primary focus as the history of the creation tradition is traced in the following sections.

2. Jewish Heritage

Within the OT, God’s initial work of creation is seen to be continuing (or
recurring) wherever God acts mightily on behalf of creation.19 Nature’s order is
dependent upon God’s regular ratification and it is alterable for the sake of fulfilling a
good. Thus, nature does not drift into the background of the drama of history or its
resolution.20 “It is neither impersonal nor amoral; hence it is not to be set over against the
freedom and responsibility humans experience in everyday life (Pss. 19; 93; 104).”21 The
primary conceptualization is of God as divine king and “the cosmos as subject to divinely
ordained laws.”22 It is not until the intertestamental period when Judaism was in dialogue
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with Greek natural philosophy that Judaism developed a more philosophically nuanced
idea of the relative autonomy of nature.23
Judaism gave to Christianity the notions of God’s omnipotence and God being
creator.24 It also passed on the formula “out of nothing” (ex nihilo); however, Judaism
did not arrive at the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo until after Christianity. This was due in
part to the fact that they were not engaging philosophical ideas in the way that it became
necessary for Christians in the later second-century to do so in the midst of tensions with
gnostic thinkers. Also, their association of Genesis’ early verses with chaos did not give
them an urgency to reject Platonic notions of world-formation.25 Thus, the formula “out
of nothing” preceded the doctrinal thoughts with which it would later come to
designate.26

3. Earliest Church

Like in the OT tradition, for the early Christians creation is not yet separate from
history and the story of salvation.27 Furthermore, the origins of the cosmos, or the “how”
of creation, was not yet a problem. It was not until the second half of the second-century
that these questions arose.28 Until then, Christians did not confront the Platonic ideas
concerning the eternality of matter and the formation of the world from formless matter
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(khora/chaos).29 Even into the third-century, among the philosophically educated
Christians the notion of world formation from pre-existent matter was held.30
Appropriating classical philosophy was not conceptually problematic early on.31
There were indeed claims made about Christianity being the true philosophy in contrast
to other philosophies.32 But even so, attempts were made at melding Christianity with
Plato’s Timaeus as early as Justin Martyr.33 For these early thinkers, there was not a
problem in saying both that everything came into being through God and that God
formed the world from pre-existent matter.34 To a certain extent the latter affirmation
qualifies what is meant by the former.

4. Earliest Doctrine of Creatio Ex Nihilo

One group of thinkers who was interested in the “how” of creation was the
gnostics.35 The writings of Basilides, a gnostic, contain the earliest example of a
theology of creation that says God created out of non-being/nothing.36 Even though the
formula “out of nothing” had been used before, Basilides was the first to employ such a
formula as a conscious rejection of creation as both emanation from God and the
formation of preexisting material.37 The purpose was to emphasize the absolute
transcendence of God (of whom, for Basilides, there can be no analogies) and the
29
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supremacy of God.38 Regardless of Basilides being the first of whom there is record of
having a version of creatio ex nihilo, it is not apparent that his ideas had any lasting
historical effect.39
For Christians, through Justin and Hermogenes, God’s creative activity was
viewed in line with Platonism: as world-formation.40 Hermogenes went the furthest in
synthesizing Christianity with philosophy by saying God is eternally lord over matter and
by interpreting Genesis 1:2 as a chaotic state.41
Tatian was the first Christian to say that God produced matter.42 Then,
Theophilus of Antioch added the formula “out of nothing” to the idea of the production
of matter. He also contrasted the limitations of the matter-forming demiurge in the
Timaeus with the omnipotent freedom of a God who creates ex nihilo.43 This gave a new
theological sense to the formula “out of nothing.” Also, “creation” came to include the
production of stuff as well as the development of the world.44
The final components of creatio ex nihilo were basically completed in Irenaeus.
Irenaeus relied heavily on Theophilus’ work. He kept and developed the notion that
God’s creative activity is free and unconditioned by a pre-existent substance.45 The
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world has a beginning in time.46 Even so, Irenaeus is less concerned with the “how” of
creation than the “who.”47 Creation is a gift (not of necessity) that is self-expressive of
God’s goodness, which became fully manifest in the incarnation. The goodness of God,
in which creation can participate, is the telos of creation.48
The three basic components of Irenaeus’ creation theology are that: 1) creation is
purposeful and aimed at a telos, with the incarnation being the framework;49 2) creation
was begun in infancy and undergoes a process of maturation;50 and 3) protology must be
understood in terms of eschatology, and vice versa.51 Even though Irenaeus relies on
Theophilus, and himself believes in a process of maturation for creation, Irenaeus rejects
Theophilus’ idea of the creation of a material substratum that is then formed by God into
the world.52 Each thing is created ex nihilo; there are as many acts of creation as there
are things. God took from himself the pattern, stuff, and form of creation.53 Creation is
at once both generative and formative.54 The difference between Theophilus and
Irenaeus can be seen methodologically in that Theophilus uses Genesis 1:6-25 (days 2-5)
extensively and Irenaeus never uses those verses.55 Irenaeus wanted to remove any hint
46
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of a plurality in the event of creation; “God must be self-sufficient in the accomplishment
of his own creative designs.”56 There is immediacy in the creative work of God by his
hands.57 Not only does Irenaeus eliminate anything being beyond or before God, nothing
acts cooperatively with God in his creative activity, because it would, “by their activity,
reveal a want in God himself and thereby set up a situation of his inferiority.”58

5. Middle Ages

The thread in the creationist tradition concerning the relative autonomy of the
world had several forms even before the Middle Ages. In the OT and even into the early
church, God was viewed as a king who, in response to circumstances, decreed laws of
operation;59 the world was seen as a participant/respondent in history and salvation under
its Lord. Certain interactions of God with the world and its inhabitants in history,
particularly salvific interventions, were depicted as creation events. With Irenaeus,
relative autonomy was a matter of ontology in terms of being created distinct from God—
a created substance gifted with life. As early as Basil of Caesarea and Augustine, there
was another change. Whereas God’s activity relative to creation had been viewed
primarily as a continual impressed force, there became a greater emphasis on the original,
originating act.60 Basil wrote of an impulse given by the first command.61 He likened the
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command to an initial push that sends a ball rolling down a hill.62 Thus the commands in
Genesis 1 for the earth to bring forth both vegetation (v. 11) and living creatures (v. 24) is
God giving to the earth a natural and permanent law; from the act of creation, the power
to cause germination is present in nature, residing in the element earth.63 Augustine also
had a high view of the beginning. He believed all seminal causes were implanted at
creation;64 they have their effects at predetermined sequences. This is what he considered
to be God’s continual creative activity.65
By the eight-century, for the first time in the West, the relative autonomy of
creation—as that autonomy had come to be understood—was seen as a threat to ecclesial
authority.66 There was a concern about intellectual inquiry into the world being pitted
against or challenging moral and/or spiritual matters.67 The unity of creation, heaven and
earth—Kaiser’s second theme—needed to be reasserted for the church to be seen as
presiding over all matters. Nevertheless, by the eleventh- and twelfth-centuries, there
was a much stronger dichotomy between natural and supernatural.68 Most strongly this
appears in the twelfth-century in the writings of the Chartrians. With their rhetorical
theory of integumentum (wrapping), they sought to peal away outward coverings to find
the underlying content, the kernel of truth.69 They sought to dissect the universe as they
would a book to reveal its kernel of truth and then to show the compatibility of its kernel
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with that of Scripture and Christian doctrine.70 For example, Theirry of Chartres wrote a
two part work in which, in the first part, he describes the physical generation of
creation.71 He does this in such a way that natural processes are nearly mechanical; the
events of the six days of creation can be explained according to the principles of physics,
“in terms of the natural properties of the four material elements (earth, water, air, and
fire).”72 “Once God made the initial step of creating the four elements, all ingredients
were basically in place for creation to unfold from its central principles.”73 Cosmogony
was withdrawn from the realm of the miraculous.74 It is not until the second part of
Theirry’s work, when he describes creation according to the letter of Genesis 1, that he
speaks of the activity of the Spirit in creation.75
During the eleventh- and twelfth-centuries two wings emerged within the creation
tradition. The Chartrians represented the left wing which “gradually abandoned its
theological orientation.”76 Those reacting to what would become the left’s stress on the
regular power (potentia ordinata) of God in the world would come to stress “the potentia
absoluta (‘absolute power’) of God to alter the course, or even the existing state, of
nature.”77 This right wing within the tradition “eventually lost its interest in science.”78
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It was not until the scholastics after Anselm and Peter Lombard that there was made a
systematic distinction between the potentia ordinata and the potentia absoluta of God.79
However, already in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the normal
sequences of nature were viewed as due to a power delegated to nature by
God, and the distinction became an opposition that was quite foreign to
the sense of Scripture. In place of a relative autonomy of nature based on
the efficacy of God’s creative Word, one was forced to make a choice:
either an autonomous world, created by God but virtually independent of
God’s continued presence and power; or else a world so utterly dependent
on God’s will moment by moment that all rational, scientific investigation
became impossible.80
These centuries mark the beginning of the dissolution of the creationist tradition from
within. The process took seven centuries to complete.81 Unfortunately, as attempts to
demonstrate the coherence of Scripture and nature dissipated in the dichotomization
between them (along with the dichotomization of God’s absolute and ordinary
operations) so too did any emphasis in the tradition on the scriptural themes of natural or
cosmic salvation dissipate; the scriptural theme of human salvation became more and
more prominent.82 Thus, a significant soteriological theme within the Bible faded in
emphasis within the tradition.
The work of God became set over and against the natural order.83 The natural
order, natural law, became increasingly inflexible and impersonal.84 Order was not as
much “upheld by God (through his word, will or power)” or seen as the work or vocation
of God—as in the works of Aristobulus and Augustine; rather, any employment of God’s
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potentia absoluta was seen as upsetting or abolishing that order—an unlikely event.85
William of Conches viewed the ordering of nature to be due to the inherent properties of
the elements; nature is “self-ordering and self-perpetuating.”86 It brings forth like from
like.87 At the end of the twelfth-century the creationist tradition was fraying within the
predominantly-Platonic paradigms in which it had developed to that point.
With the importation of Aristotle’s works into the West in the thirteenth-century,
Christians were forced to once again defend the faith since it was intolerable to them to
have multiple truths. Theologians “had to defend their faith as being true in a thoughtworld in which their right to specify the criteria for truth was no longer uncontested.”88
Among other things, adaptations were made both in understanding the relationship of
revelation to reason and in the conceptualization of God.
In seeking to forge a synthesis between the two bodies of knowledge—the
broader heritage of the West and the newly imported Aristotelianism—the popular
analogy was used of two books. The Aristotelian methods including observation,
abstraction, and reason were placed beside Christianity’s emphasis on revelation,
illumination, and faith.89 In terms of truth, it was claimed that these showed two sides of
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the same coin. As had already been seen in the eleventh- and twelfth-centuries, however,
the distinction between nature and Scripture could backfire. The autonomy of science
based on natural reason could be asserted.90 “In that case, Scripture might be viewed as
superfluous or even inferior to human reason.”91 In the attempt to hold the two sides
together, it unwittingly placed theology within the province of reason. For example, the
claim that God the Father is ‘maker of heaven and earth’ became a matter of inquiry in
natural science.92 This had numerous effects on the concept of theology and its method.93
Thirteenth-century theologians sought to transcend the differences that had
developed between the two creationist wings, which stressed either the potentia absoluta
or “the autonomy of nature as created and ordained by God (potentia ordinate).”94 Even
with the efforts of many thirteenth-century theologians, the naturalism of Aristotelianism
was intensifying the underlying problems in the tradition. Strong reactions developed
against Aristotelianism. For example, in the 1270s, a strong reaction to certain aspects of
Aristotelian science surfaced from the supernaturalistic/right wing of the creationist
tradition.95 Also, Aristotelianism once again brought into debate the early church’s
debates on the eternality of the world; the regularity and lawfulness of creation under
Aristotelianism made a beginning impossible to discover. The possibility of an eternal
universe (according to reason) could only be curtailed by an appeal to revelation.
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The most significant change through interacting with Aristotelianism was in the
conceptualization of God and God’s relationship to creation. Within Aristotelianism,
God is the First Mover located at the boundary of the outermost sphere. God’s “very
presence was enough to activate the rotation of the outermost sphere of the cosmos.”96
That outermost sphere is “the only object with which God was in any kind of immediate
relationship…Inner spheres were moved by virtue of their proximity to outer ones.”97 By
giving an account of Christianity within such a model, Christians were able to combine
“the best insights of both science and theology.”98 However, in working with the notion
of spheres “a spatial gap threatened to open up between the regular activity of God and
events on earth.”99 God’s providence seemed very remote and God’s influence on
everyday people was thought to be only in the enlightenment of the soul and infusing
grace through the seven sacraments.100 Either way, God’s activity was mediated either

96

Ibid., 102.
Ibid. Matter was considered to be purely passive in itself and cause was completely external to the body.
One difference between the medieval theology that arose in response to Aristotle and both biblical and
patristic theology is that “in the biblical and patristic literature, the seemingly perpetual motions of nature
had their origin in the word or command of God rather than in a mechanical thrust” (Kaiser, 128f). Collin
Gunton sees personal agency as key in the earlier notion of cause that is changed in the
mechanical/physical framework of primary and secondary causation (“The End of Causality? The
Reformers and their Predecessors,” in The Doctrine of Creation: Essays in Dogmatics, History and
Philosophy [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997], 63, 67; cf. T. F. Torrance concerning the First Cause
“inertially” determining the cosmic order, “Contingence and Disorder,” in Divine and Contingent Order:
Nihil constat de contingentia nisi ex revelatione [Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1981], 86f.).
Thus, “On the one hand, considerations of God’s normal exercise of providence through second causes led
to a replacement of the biblical image of God as cosmic legislator by the idea of God as first Mover (the
sense of the latter shifting meanwhile from formal to efficient cause of motion)” (Kaiser, 132). God set the
cosmos in motion once and for all. On the other hand, however, there was a conservative reaction to the
medieval synthesis with Aristotelianism that “led to a renewed emphasis on God’s absolute power both in
establishing the normal course of nature and in superseding it at any time” (132). It was the conservatives
who tried to develop a unified mechanics for heaven and earth to show where indeed God intercedes.
98
Ibid., 103.
99
Ibid., 104. Both Kaiser and Willemien Otten (“Nature and Scripture,” 282) credit Aquinas with his
efforts in preventing “the separation of nature and grace from becoming definitive just yet” (Otten, 282).
However, they both recognize that the split between God and world was already set in unstoppable motion
in the twelfth-century and Thomas’ (and even Bonaventure’s) holding together of the two sides still rested
upon a framework where there are two distinct sides needing to be held together (cf. Kaiser, 93f.).
100
Ibid., 105. Kaiser proposes that the dichotomy of nature and grace in high medieval thought can be seen
partially as an indirect result of Aristotelian science (105f.).

97

48
through the hierarchy of celestial spheres or through the hierarchy of the church. With
the development of mechanical clocks in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries, a new analogy of God as clockmaker was available for use beside God as
sphere-mover.101
With each instantiation of the creationist tradition in a new context, the basic
notion of regularity in the cycles of nature endured; but how those cycles were
understood changed, as well as notions of God and God’s relation to creation.
From the ancient Near Eastern ideal of divine kingship to the Neoplatonic
and Augustinian concept of transcendent Being, to the Aristotelian First
Mover, to the late medieval Clockmaker, the idea of God’s normal activity
became gradually less immediate to the events of the world, leaving the
relatively autonomous cycles of nature to take on the appearance of a
completely autonomous mechanism.102
Kaiser does not believe the adoption of Aristotelianism, in which God’s activity was
made more remote, could have happened had there not already developed in the eleventhand twelfth-centuries a clear distinction between God’s normal and miraculous activity.
“Christians of the thirteenth century could assimilate the naturalism of Aristotle precisely
because there was always the possibility of reverting to God’s absolute power when the
ideas of the potential eternity of the world and the hierarchy of natural causes threatened
to compromise the sovereignty and freedom of God.”103 Even so, during the Middle
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Ages the cosmos became mechanical and it was largely believed that “God’s direct action
and the normal causal connections of nature were mutually exclusive.”104

6. The Renaissance Forward

On the one hand, the concepts and methods of the developing natural sciences
were largely shaped by the theological tradition out of which they came, even if they
became separated from theological reflection.105 On the other hand, natural science, in
turn, was at times a helpful aid to theology. Science helped establish the possibility of a
void, which aided in deconstructing the dominant Aristotelian cosmology.106 Science
provided alternative models to the geocentrism of Aristotelian cosmography. And
science showed, through mathematical laws and physical models, the unity of earthly and
celestial bodies, a connection affirmed in the creationist tradition but made virtually
impossible within an Aristotelian worldview.107 Unfortunately, however, where in the
earlier developments of science it was possible to appeal to God’s direct action (potentia
absoluta) where gaps in the natural order presented themselves, it only took about four
centuries for mathematics and physics to develop “to the point where there would no
longer appear to be room for God’s direct action in nature.”108 Even in dissolving the
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dominant Aristotelian cosmology and once again eliminating any perceived gap between
God and the world, God again seemed equally remote from the mechanistic workings of
the heavens and the earth.109
The transitions brought about within Copernicus’ model of the universe were
significant. Already before Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543) there were groups who had
been dissatisfied with both Ptolemy and hierarchical views of the cosmos.110 For
example, the Florentine Perspectivists had ceased representing things from a
transcendental perspective, in a hierarchical arrangement, which gave spatial location and
magnitude to objects based on their intrinsic value. The Perspectivists had a uniform
conception of space and portrayed things as they appear from the vantage point of the
landscape.111 Like them, Copernicus was interested in appearances. Also, Copernicus
was convinced of the rationality of the world. Without explicitly referring to God or the

data themselves, any more than were the earlier arguments in favour of the existence of God” (346). Many
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idea of creation he sought to find the laws of nature that had been infused therein.112 In
opposition to Aristotle’s notion that all things (inherently passive) have natural places to
which they will go when outside forces cease to act on them, Copernicus believed laws of
nature “are imposed or infused by God in such a way that they appear to operate
automatically.”113 The laws are not intrinsic to creation, but given to it.
In this time period scientists became less interested in the world in an undisturbed,
at-rest state, what had been considered to be things in their “natural places” or “contexts.”
Rather, measurements and observations of things and their parts, as they occur, were
made and tables of data were created.114 The structure and functions of bodies relative to
other bodies were examined. “These contributions encouraged a new, more
experimental, kind of science in which humans understood nature in terms of the ways
they could influence it, rather than in terms of what it was in its undisturbed state.”115
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The scholastics had developed their theology within an Aristotelian worldview in
which: 1) the earth was stationary, 2) the universe was finite, and 3) “the planetary
spheres were moved by their desire to match the eternity of God.”116 During the
Renaissance and Reformation, there were developments away from the Aristotelian
model even though it was still used extensively by the Reformers.
With the adoption of Copernicus’s model of the universe, however, the
consistent structure of the scholastic framework crumbled, and in its place
there emerged a paradox: all things were now in motion, even the earth,
but there was no general mechanism for generating this motion
comparable to the role of the primum mobile (the outermost celestial
sphere) in Aristotle. The entire question of the relation of God to matter
and motion had to be rethought.117
During the seventeenth century, many of the themes of the creationist tradition survived.
However, the themes were used in drastically different ways among various groups.
“Historically it is no longer possible for us to treat the creationist tradition as a unified
whole, or even as a spectrum with different wings (as in the Middle Ages). Instead, it
must be subdivided into derivative, more specialized traditions that define themselves
over against each other as much as in terms of traditional themes.”118
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Kaiser categorizes the seventeenth-century thinkers into separate, competing
groups: the “spiritualist,” “mechanist,” and “Platonic” traditions. Mechanical
philosophy, as seen in Descartes, Gassendi, and Boyle, replaced Aristotelianism in the
sciences. The spiritualist approach to nature directly competed against the mechanist. As
a middle course the Platonic tradition, centered at Cambridge University, led to the work
of Isaac Newton.119
The spiritualists integrated to varying degrees matter and spirit(s)/energies.120 It
was difficult to keep a balance in that union. Too little integration could make matter
seemingly autonomous and leave little place for the spiritual. Too much integration
“could lead to a naturalistic explanation of the spiritual and encourage pantheism or even
outright atheism.”121 Joan Baptista van Helmont (1579-1644) and Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz (1645-1716) are two of the most significant figures in the spiritualist tradition.
For Helmont, ‘nature’ is simply the effect of God’s creative decree; God’s Spirit, by an
absolute force, gave powers to things to move both themselves and/or others.122 Leibniz
affirmed the perfection of God’s initial creative act. All matter, from the initial divine
decree, “was invested with an energy that would continue indefinitely and undiminished
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in quantity.”123 All creation is active in that it receives commands and executes them
“flawlessly in concert with one another.”124
Leading up to the mechanist tradition—after “the Council of Trent (1545-63)
declared the modified Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas normative for all
Catholics”125—Francesco Suarez, a neoscholastic, tried to get around the seemingly
independent operation of the laws of nature (a spin-off of potentia ordinata) by saying
that the laws were not imposed on creation but were imposed by God on himself.126
Nature was completely passive and dependent on God’s self-ordered activity.
René Descartes (1596-1650), as a mechanist, followed in this line even though he
did not follow Aristotelianism. Rather, “Descartes was the first to offer a consistent
system of natural philosophy to replace that of Aristotle.”127 Matter, for Descartes, was
incapable of following God’s laws; at every moment, matter was dependent on God for
its continued existence. “Each instant of time was a new creation.”128 There is no causal
relation among events, only passive “material bodies in relative motion sustained by
God’s continual recreation.”129 The “laws of nature”—Descartes being the one who
started the modern version of that idea—were actually an expression of God’s
attributes.130 Descartes speculated ways the present world could have evolved out of an
original chaos based on the laws of nature: based solely on potentia ordinata.
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The view of God within this mechanist line transitioned from the medieval view
of God being the Prime Mover and Desire of all things to God being the Designer and
Lawgiver.131 When all references to God were eventually eliminated in this tradition, the
laws were considered to be “possessed by nature rather than prescribed for nature by
God.”132 Mechanism became the dominant paradigm in Western science and was a
helpful framework in which to construct a program for understanding and controlling
nature.133 It was extremely easy to bracket out the spiritual—including the aesthetic and
moral—from the material or natural; in many ways mechanism was intentionally
designed to make a clear delineation between the two, leaving the later solely under the
jurisdiction of science.134 This was at least the second notable time in the tradition that
spiritual/theological claims were placed under a criteria of truth outside the church’s
province—the re-introduction of Aristotelianism into the West being the other.
The Platonist tradition—Kaiser’s third group—was a reworking of Neoplatonism
in response to mechanical philosophy, and yet was a different option from spiritualism.135
Unlike the spiritualists, the Platonists did not believe motion was inherent in matter.
Instead, spirit—which has extension like matter does—can permeate and influence
matter; it functions like the Neoplatonic world soul.136 Space came to be understood as
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absolute; matter and God are within it. In the writings of Barrow, for example, he
reasoned that space had to be infinite: “or else God would be nowhere…space and time
were a mathematical representation of the divine omnipresence and eternity.”137 What
the Platonist tradition added that was lacking in the mechanist tradition of Descartes—
even though it too affirmed the passivity of matter—were the notions of absolute space
and universal active principles operative between individual entities in ways Descartes’
occasionalism ignored.
In the universe, more forces were at work than simply inertial motion and the
collision of material bodies. Newton sought to explain “inanimate phenomena like
gravitation, the diffraction of light, and cohesion.”138 Newton recognized the dangers—
and its unbiblical nature—in the spirit-matter dualism of mechanistic philosophy.139 He
saw that it could lead to deism or even atheism. Newton, examining alternatives, saw in
traditional portrayals of God an utterly transcendent God who was “static and uninvolved
in history.”140 Thus, his God—as unbiblical as his opponents’—operated within nature
via supramechanical, active principles and in supernatural interventions.141 Even so, the
more the supramechanical principles were studied and summarized mathematically, the
more mechanical they appeared: once again leaving little need for God’s continued
activity. Nature was no longer viewed as relatively autonomous; it became entirely
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autonomous.142 As early as a generation after Newton, some even suggested that a nature
that functioned independently from God could also have formed independently of God.143
Newton’s physics had a profound, even if unforeseen, consequence. “The
philosophical effect of Newton’s idea was to undermine the very foundation of
mechanism and materialism, the notion of the primacy of matter in physics.”144 Two
branches formed after him: those minimalizing matter and those emphasizing it. The
undermining of traditional notions of and focus on matter within physics is quite
interesting given its importance through the centuries philosophically and theologically.
This shift happened relatively soon after Newton. For example, in the work of Boscovich
(e.g., 1745, 1758), he hypothesized that “atoms were merely mathematical points and that
all interactions, even seeming collisions, were the result of forces acting at a distance
between those points. In complete contrast to what the Cartesians held, there was no
such thing as extension in the material sense: there were only forces acting between
dimensionless point-masses.”145 All phenomena of physics and chemistry, he thought,
“could be reduced to a single, unified force law as Newton himself had once
suggested.”146
In spite of the drastic, rapid changes in these centuries, much of what happened
through the eighteenth-century in physics was connected to theological reflection.
Theologically, the progression was from a clear matter-spirit dualism
(Descartes), to matter-spirit symbiosis (Newton), to matter-spirit identity
(the later Maupertius and Diderot). The corresponding shift in physics
was from a science restricted to geometric quantities (Descartes), to a
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more comprehensive one of dynamic quantities (Newton), to a science so
comprehensive that it could not be quantified at all (Diderot).147
The cosmological conversations in these centuries were still happening among people
literate in both theology and the natural sciences. These thinkers were conscious that
their ideas in the sciences entailed changes to existing theological accounts of the world.
After the eighteenth century, theology still played a role in the natural sciences.
“The main difference from earlier periods was that there was less orthodoxy and more
variety—ranging from orthodox trinitarianism to monistic materialism—in the
theological stances assumed.”148 The first half of the nineteenth century was the last time
that it was commonplace for some members of the Royal Society of London to be
clergy.149 As terms such as “scientist” and “physicist” began to be employed, and the
professionalization of each respective field developed, science and theology were further
distanced from each other. From the nineteenth-century onward it became expected that
scientists would suppress personal convictions in their professional work for the sake of
objectivity.

7. A Glimpse of the Present

It is difficult, if not impossible, to track the mutual influences of a single
dominant (Western) worldview and theology on one another after the Enlightenment.
There is neither a homogonous worldview nor unity in theology. Furthermore, after the
Enlightenment, with the specialization of each field, science and theology proceeded in a
relatively autonomous manner from one another. It cannot even be claimed that one
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discipline provides the language for secular discourse (even about nature itself) and the
other discipline provides language concerning the divine and sacred. Each discipline has
become so specialized and technical that they function seemingly independent of the
broader cultural milieu; the disciplines not only have languages and perspectives distinct
from each other, but also from everyday speech and worldviews of ‘laypeople’.150
Giving an account of the faith in this context is no longer doing so within the
philosophical paradigms of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Cartesianism, etc. It is not a
matter of taking into account the cosmography of Copernicus, Newton, or Einstein—not
that it ever was as simple as being confronted with one philosophical or scientific
paradigm at a time. There is no single predominant thinker or worldview at this time for
Christianity to engage; rather, there are kaleidoscopic views with themes and variations.
In each era of the Western Christian tradition there were those who initially met
incoming paradigms with harsh criticism. Yet, the Church has managed to endure while
adapting to its ever-new surroundings, learning to speak its faith in contexts which raise
different questions about familiar issues and new questions about different issues than
had ever been in the foreground (or conceived of at all).151
Giving an account of God’s creative activity and relation to creation at this time in
history is challenging. The creationist tradition, especially as it had developed in its
150
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conceptualizations, fractured both from within and from external attacks. The past three
centuries have been especially taxing on the tradition. As early as the late seventeenthcentury, the radical-Enlightenment thinkers systematically sought to remove all religious
“superstitions” within Western culture—perpetuated as they saw it by the power-hungry
priestly class. Through reason, they cleared away the theological foundations upon
which much of Western culture had once rested and provided new foundations for the
newly emerging social structures. They labored to show that there is a reasonable
explanation for everything.152 Prior foundations were replaced with ones deduced from
universal natural reason.153
Under the scrutiny of reason and empirical investigation, many traditional
articulations of Christian doctrines suffered.154 This scrutiny was not simply thrust upon
the church by unbelieving radicals; the push toward reasonableness became part of the
culture. It became the aim of “every intelligent man to rethink even his most cherished
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beliefs solely in terms of the available evidence.”155 The result was that “many
fundamental ideas which had been long accepted on traditional authority, ecclesiastical or
scriptural, were subjected to the cold light of critical reason for really the first time by
ordinary Christian laymen.”156 In this intellectual climate, due to the presence of evil in
the world, the reasonableness of the belief in creation was one of the first ideas to be
questioned.157
Since the Enlightenment, however, there has been a crumbling of confidence in
human reason. As early as human reason began being used as the standard, it came under
attack. This can be seen in the works of Bayle, Hume, and Sade. These Enlightenment
philosophers delighted in embarrassing human reason, if not ‘torturing it in its folly’.158
After the warfare of the twentieth-century, notions of the reasonableness of humanity lay
fractured.159 That which was used to unravel many of the doctrinal formulas in which the
Christian faith had been articulated was undone.
From the seventeenth-century onward, theological claims were evaluated by and
Western society was built upon an appeal to a universal natural reason that itself has been
elusive; this reason has failed to transcend context. This does not mean, however, that we
can revert to theological language and societal foundations that pre-date the
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Enlightenment. Those things are no less marked by their context. What this suggests is
that the task of reflecting on matters of the faith must be taken up in every context; those
reflections should be applied to efforts to reason about societal relations, etc. At the table
of human inquiry theology should not be excluded out of hand as archaic superstition
from a bygone era. Every area of inquiry undergoes changes over time. We all can
dialogue together to work out articulations to our deep questions in humility about our
finitude. There is much that can be gained in dialogue among the humanities and
sciences in seeking to venture answers in this time to pressing human questions. One aim
of this project is to be sensitive to some of the emerging views of the world within the
sciences when offering a theological account concerning the relationship of God to
creation in God’s creative activity and an appropriate place for “chaos” language therein.

a. Listening to Some Shifts in Science’s View

Since science parted ways with theology there have been significant shifts in the
perspectives of science. The first of these is a change in the optimism of scientific
certainty that was based on beliefs in the linearity and simplicity of the universe.160 It
was once thought that if the laws of nature could be calculated, future events could be
predicted because everything would proceed in a deterministic manner toward that
calculated result.161 Since the nineteenth-century, the universe is not thought to be so
wholly predictable; rather there is more humility about the “impossibility of a detailed
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prognosis.”162 There are several factors that have led to this position. First, it is not
possible to know with exact precision all the initial conditions (e.g., the positions of
objects relative to one another). Thus, the inaccuracies in the data entered into formulas
will be increased exponentially in the calculations produced.163 One example: even if the
earth’s position relative to the sun can be determined within 15 centimeters, the earth’s
location in its orbit around the sun cannot be known 120 million years from now.164
Second, it is not just the accuracy of the data that stands in the way of certainty.
The complexity of the universe continues to be multiplied in ways that stupefy science. It
was once hoped within classical science that a fundamental simplicity would be unveiled
from beneath the apparent complexity.165 However, in something so seemingly simple as
calculating the orbits of three bodies that attract one another, the equations are so
complex that they cannot be solved.166 Only linear systems in equilibrium can be
calculated with any degree of certainty; they are “the only ones for which a precise
description is possible, since they are limited to states of thermodynamic equilibrium and
it is only for such states that the bulk parameters are well defined.”167 In nature,
however, these are rare, if not non-existent;168 laboratory settings are typically where we
can create and observe systems in, or close to equilibrium. Finding the key to a universe,
once believed to be a determined automaton, is now believed to be a false hope. Notions
of simplicity and singularity have been exchanged for complexity and plurality; the idea
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of a single operating nature has fractured into an array of innumerable, unique
participants. Thus, there is a breakdown in the earlier hopes of a controllable order.
Clockwork, mechanistic views of the universe have been replaced with notions of
“nonlinear mutual interactions.”169 It is not so much that the parts of the clock are
believed to be far greater in number and far smaller in size than once thought. It is that
observations about the interactions among parts are not consistent with past views of
linear relations of cause and effect.170 First, the smallest event (e.g., a butterfly flapping
its wings) could have enormous, unintended consequences later on. There is a lack of
proportionality or total predictability on how various factors will affect a system. This is
due to a second factor of recent interest in science: “communication.” “Communication”
among entities, especially over distances, is far more complex and mysterious than once
imagined. Simply put, “billiard-ball physics has no basis in reality.”171 A few reasons
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are that, first, to a degree, one of Aristotle’s thoughts lives on; the materiality of
something “intervenes” in processes; the character of something factors in on how it is
shaped by forces and shapes forces. There is “an ingredient of self-determination by a
material nature that impresses its own identity on whatever processes proceed through
it.”172 Second, things and events cannot be separated or abstracted from their context.
“One cannot derive ordered phenomena, the units of individuality, from blind
motions…they are always conditioned or informed by macroscopic context.”173 In other
words, instead of “chance coming-together of brute (i.e., exteriorized) matter,” there are
now notions of “interdependency of sensation, self-activity, and physical law.”174 Thus,
beginnings are not as important as once thought. Initial conditions are “not of unique
import, for a slight disturbance at any later moment can also alter the path and produce a
significantly different outcome.”175 Also, the beginning does not dictate all that follows;
the various contexts and participants therein appear to shape outcomes. There are no
gears that can simply be turned back. Complex, context-specific, irreversible interactions
are the norm.176
Non-linearity and randomness seem to be the rules in nature. Thus, science is
now focusing less on substance than on relation, communication, and time.177 “On every
scale self-organization, complexity, and time play a new and unexpected role.”178 Farfrom-equilibrium systems may become organized; “New dynamic states of matter may
172
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originate, states that reflect the interaction of a given system with its surroundings.”179
Systems close to equilibrium generally follow universal laws in a repetitive way. Outside
of equilibrium, it is as though there are mechanisms of communication that can bring the
system to various types of structures.
This new view of the world and of time demonstrates differences in inquiry
between the Middle Ages and the present. Where the nature of a thing was once studied
in an at-rest, out of context state, a new viewpoint is operative in which accidents—in a
medieval philosophical meaning—are not added to an enduring existing thing. Currently:
A system is characterized by more than its present state; the path taken also
counts, the process is part of the product…This world is one where nature is
inherently historical, where matter at even the inanimate level displays an
indelible sense of evolution…The character of the present is dependent on
the path from the past: although ‘all roads lead to Rome,’ the actual journey
influences the quality of arrival. It is a world in fluctuation, filled with
novelty.180
Things have changed since Newton and the optimism of the reversibility of time. “In
thermodynamics, as time passes the world changes irreversibly; nothing can be done to
ever quite recover the way things were, and nothing can be done to condition entirely the
way things will be next.”181
Due to these kinds of observations in nature, time is no longer seen as completely
reversible. When natural laws were seen to be deterministic and thus predictors of the
future, it was believed that one could look backward and forward using that same
formula. Essentially, at what time and in what place something took place was irrelevant;
179
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processes were believed to follow laws irrespective of context-specific factors. Science
has moved beyond a pure mechanistic perspective within a generic, absolute space.182
There is uniqueness to events. Each point in time is not equivalent to another. Thus,
time is irreversible (cannot be duplicated). Certainly there are periods of relative
equilibrium within systems when they seem to follow laws in a linear, deterministic
fashion. However, any fluctuations may lead to bifurcation points (far-from-equilibrium
points) where their behavior is unpredictable. There are many possible paths those
systems can take at those points and it is unpredictable which it will be.183 Nature may
not be a “self” or “selves” that are doing the “self-organizing.” However, nature is far
from a dead, determined singularity. Within it there is a great deal of complex activity
and “actors.”
There are some positive implications for these new views. The older mechanistic
views of the universe placed a dichotomy between humans and nature. Nature was
viewed atemporally and summarized in universals.184 “The great founders of Western
science stressed the universality and the eternal character of natural laws. They set out to
formulate general schemes that would coincide with the very ideal of rationality.”185
When humans engaged nature in science, at first what they encountered seemed to be
dead and silent, thus isolating humans from nature.186 The rationality they thought they
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could uncover in nature—in this dead and silent realm—excluded much in which humans
have a vested interest—for example: life, destiny, freedom, and spontaneity.187 With the
notions of fundamental simplicity, singularity, and linear-determinism dissolving in
science, humans are once again being united with their world.

b. Addressing Uses of “Chaos” in Science

As the field of physics shifted in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
from the vision of Newton, of a universe with precise calculable laws, progressively there
was a notion of ‘chaos’ that became a regular part of the thinking of scientists. With both
the contributions of Einstein’s theory of relativity and the introduction of quantum
mechanics “the immediate realism, determinism, and reductionism” of previous
generations of science was replaced.188 “Here it became clear that physics by no means

how that hope was dashed. Thus, ethics could no longer be seen to have either a cosmological or
anthropological foundation; however, “what is more serious is rather the opposite; that, if we may say so,
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simply describes the world in itself, independently of the standpoint of the observer, as
Newton presupposed.”189
The pioneering work of Heisenberg in quantum theory unsettled prior thinking, as
did theories of relativity and a dynamic, expanding universe. In quantum mechanics
relationships are “fuzzy or indeterminate.”190 For example, the Heisenberg principle
entails that “If we know where an electron is (position), we cannot know what it is doing
(momentum).”191 When measuring one, measurements of the other become blurry. Far
from the past certainty about the mechanical workings of the universe, scientists are left
with statistical probabilities; “The consequence is that if it is impossible precisely to
measure the present state of an object (in the classical sense), its future cannot be
precisely predicted either.”192 This is precisely where “chaos” gets used in science in a
technical way. “In present-day terms, a process of physics is termed “chaotic” if its
long-term course is not predictable.”193 For example, since the location of the earth
relative to the sun cannot be precisely determined at any one moment, its location tens of
millions of years from now cannot be known. That makes the earth’s orbit
deterministically chaotic.194
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This incalculable quality of many natural phenomena has changed the course of
some of the past claims of “objectivity,” “exactness,” or “precision” that was common in
some nineteenth-century schools such as the positivists.195 The inability of science to
empirically verify its statements about circumstances has come to the fore; what has been
shown in the last century is “the hypothetical character of its laws” and the need not to
absolutize its results.196 “Scientists should reflect that subject and object, method and
object, are interwoven, and thus a distinction must be made between the phenomena that
can be grasped by science and reality as a whole.”197
This distinction is rarely kept. It is hard for scientists to ward off of the tendency
toward realism. John Polkinghorne admits that “Scientists are realists; they believe that
what we know, or what we can’t know, shows us what things are really like.”198 In jest
his wife bought him a sweatshirt with the motto on it: “Epistemology Models Ontology.”
The manner in which “chaos” is used in science is an excellent example of this pattern.
Observable phenomena in nature most often thwart the certainty that mathematical
calculation can provide were it within a deterministic linear system. As unsettling as this
may be for those seeking definitive answers, the confounding of their ambitions by
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systems in nature does not mean that these systems are “chaos.” Rather, it suggests that,
as far as we can tell at this point, systems in nature typically do not exhibit linear,
determined characteristics that were once believed to be definitive of a mechanical
universe.
Relationships are far more complex than once thought. In a framework of
thermodynamics, relativity, and quantum mechanics the world is not believed to be as
simple as particles acting externally on one another in space and in time. Rather, “nature
is found not to be ultimately divided up like that but, all its particulate properties
notwithstanding, is dynamically continuous in space and time, in such a way that all
things are what they are through unbroken internal relations with other things, while
those inter-relations help to make them what they actually are or become.”199 Things
cannot be abstracted from “their natural cohesions in the constituent matter and energy of
the universe.”200 In the discovery of the complexity of relationships, new notions of
communication, the sensitivity of systems to influence from other systems, and so on, it
is no wonder that the world seems chaotic in a field that developed under quite different
presuppositions of mechanistic determinism. Nevertheless, indeterminacy and statistical
probability are not necessarily things that warrant calling systems chaotic.201 The
limitations of verifiability on such a label warrant caution in making such a label an
absolute statement about the nature of reality.
It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that there is much about “chaotic” systems that is
not chaotic and that this label is being questioned as a result because it is misleading
concerning the characteristics that are known about these systems. Thus, it may be
199
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convention to use the term “chaos” concerning unpredictable systems. However, based
on a theological perspective, which concerns itself with the implications of the language
we use about the world, this use of the term should be reconsidered. A more appropriate
use for it should be defined.
It is not just the impossibility of calculating the future of these systems that earns
the label of “chaos.” Along with using “chaos” in the context of mathematical
probability instead of certainty, “chaos” also gets used more casually in science as a
synonym for “entropy.” For example, one use of “entropy” is for “the thermal motion of
molecules or density fluctuations in gases…[this] concept of chaos denotes the muddle of
immeasurably numerous particles which, on the microscopic level, move in constantly
varying interactions and collisions.”202 Essentially the term is being used as it is in more
popular conversation as a synonym for “confusion.” By linking “chaos” with “entropy,”
or systems with a high degree of entropy, it again leads to the same problems of language
and meaning as the first, more technical use of “chaos” in science. It shows the bias
toward entropy of the speaker and can color future reflections as much as it accurately
describes with certainty the nature of reality.
Philip Hefner states that “We can discern at least five different kinds of
experience to which scientists have attached the concepts associated with the second law
of thermodynamics, with different meanings resulting in each case.”203 These include:
“Dissipation of energy—running down,” “Change and alternation of a previous order—
degeneracy,” “The experience of ‘one-time-ness’—time’s irreversible arrow,” “Mixed-
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up-ness and chaotic disorderliness,” and “Alterations that make for possibility.”204 His
point is that four out of these five experiences and the meanings attached with them show
the dominant (Platonic) Western tradition at work, which dislikes entropy.205 This antientropy/chaos view that pits God against entropy is not the only one; Hefner points to a
minority view manifest in Berdyaev that sees these experiences positively.206 For some
within this minority tradition, entropy and God are not in conflict. Rather, entropy is a
facet of divinity; it is within God.207
Cultural presuppositions about entropy color the meaning given to it; these
presuppositions make it quite natural to affix the pejorative label of “chaos” to it. This in
turn has influenced theological reflection about it. For example, Sjoerd Bonting connects
entropy with chaos and claims that God decreases entropy over the course of the cosmos’
evolution. Entropy/chaos was maximal at the big bang and God has been decreasing it
since; at the end of time it will be abolished.208
This whole framework of demonizing entropy, whether in science or theology,
needs to be reconsidered—especially if in theology it leads to the idea that God works
against entropy. There is a rule within the second law of thermodynamics that “tells us
that all natural processes take place in such a way as to increase the entropy of the whole,
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that is, the system plus its environment.”209 In fact, in a closed system entropy never
decreases;210 entropy can only decrease in a system if it is part of a larger system into
which its entropy can be transferred. Even then, the level of entropy in the larger system
does not decrease; entropy has only been shifted around.
If entropy is evil (or an antinomy to God’s creative activity), thermodynamic
processes themselves are increasing the amount of evil/non-creation within creation and
are working against God’s ordering of creation. Our own continued existence would be
an evil to God’s creative endeavors; “Not only individual life, but evolution itself, is like
a plague devouring the order of the world; and humankind through its complicated
civilization is the most insatiable consumer of all…Even the universe in its global
expansion seems to grow at the expense of greater entropy.”211 Associating entropy with
evil, chaos, or non-creation must be reconsidered given the nature of actual (creative,
sustaining) processes within the universe.212 “Chaos” is a label that colors conceptions of
entropic systems and certain outcomes of thermodynamic processes in ways that are not
necessarily self-evident. Adopting this way that science uses the term “chaos” should be
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avoided because of some of the theological implications that have tended to accompany
it.

C. The Relationship of the Doctrine of Creation to the Presiding Philosophy or
Worldview of the Day

The topics under this section have been mentioned in the treatment on the history
of the creationist tradition. Thus, the purpose of this section is simply to bring explicit
attention to these issues, not to give full treatment of them. This is important in
understanding the nature of the theological task at hand in this project, as well as showing
that there is a precedent in the church’s history of adjusting the grammar of creation
theology so that it is comprehensible in ever-new contexts.

1. Dependence

One of the primary theses in Gerhard May’s Creatio Ex Nihilo is that the
Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo arose from Christianity’s own presuppositions
about God’s sovereignty and unlimited freedom. The concept as developed by the
Christians, nevertheless, “can only be articulated within the latter’s [the Greeks’ world
formation] frame of reference and by using its terms.”213 Christians used the categories
and terminology of the philosophical perspective(s) of the time. According to the thesis
of Michael Buckley in The Origins of Modern Atheism, an exactly backward
phenomenon took place during the Enlightenment. The atheistic positions were
developed according to the categories and terminology of Christianity; their positions
were parasitic in many ways.
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Christopher Kaiser’s examination of the creationist tradition through history
showed this same trend as May’s work. When the philosophical landscape or presiding
scientific model changed, Christians found themselves articulating their faith anew in the
face of the new paradigm. In just one example: “As in the case of the reception of
Aristotle in the thirteenth century, the remarkable thing about the church was not so much
its initial resistance to new scientific ideas as its ability to reevaluate and assimilate them
in keeping with the historic creationist tradition.”214 Even though many of the same
underlying presuppositions remained consistent, these transitions to new contexts rarely
came without changes in the way God, God’s activity relative to creation, and creation
itself are understood.

2. Polemical or Reactionary Articulation of the Creationist Tradition

In May’s tracking of the development of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, he
demonstrates not only that Christians worked within the frame of reference of their
broader philosophical context, but also that the doctrine itself was formulated as an
antithesis to that frame of reference.215 Christians in the second century, such as Justin
Martyr, initially harmonized their theology with the cosmology of Plato’s Timaeus.
However, as new questions arose, bringing out inconsistencies in such harmonization, the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo was developed as an ontological statement highlighting “the
omnipotence, freedom, and uniqueness of God.”216 Other developments, such as
affirming God’s potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta, arose as a way of still affirming
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Christian presuppositions against, yet from within, worldviews that were contradictory to
those presuppositions; potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta developed within this
context beyond what they had been as a substitute for the Aristotelian worldview of
primum mobile being the source of world’s dynamism.217
In the midst of the Western theological tradition, many of the catalysts for
response have come from within: whether from heretical movements or between parallel
wings of the tradition. The point being emphasized, however, is that one’s interlocutors
contribute significantly to the shape of one’s statements and emphases. The way in
which doctrines have been articulated within the tradition to a certain degree are molded
around both the contexts in which they were developed and that to which they were
developed in response. Their forms bear the marks of their history as much as that to
which they bear witness.218
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3. Transitions in Conceptualizations of God and God’s Relationship to Creation

As has been mentioned, Christianity’s transitions into new frameworks has not
happened without adjustments in the analogies it employs concerning God and God’s
relationship to creation: e.g., King, transcendent Being, First Mover, Clockmaker,
Designer, Lawgiver, etc.219 In the transitions through history in the broader intellectual
context and the dominant analogy(ies) employed therein, God was conceived as ever
more removed from creation and its ongoing operations. The world, in turn, was viewed
as ever more life-less and mechanical; its parts were certainly not viewed as subjects to
be addressed in the way they were in Scripture. Kaiser’s work ends with the mechanistic
worldview in which God is seen as the Designer and Lawgiver.220 In such a worldview,
it is in relation to the beginning, in which everything is set in motion along linear,
deterministic laws, that God has significance and according to which God is named; there
is less room for the ongoing activity of God.
There are still theologians engaging in dialogue with the sciences and the
picture(s) of the cosmos they paint.221 There are also theologians seeking to articulate the
faith in the face of certain philosophical paradigms, such as process thought. The number
of various articulations of divine creation and God’s relationship to creation is staggering.
Each one is in its own way trying to give an account of the faith in the present. Some try
to argue for the reasonableness of traditional creationist themes or linguistic formulas in
the present—for example, that creatio ex nihilo should not be dismissed as an irrelevant
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mythological notion.222 Some take the liberty of finding new, creative approaches to
cosmology. Others look for options that had been jettisoned within the tradition that may
at this juncture be of use.223 Thus, at present there are suggestions about the nature of
God’s creative activity everywhere from strict instantaneous creatio ex nihilo to
emanationism to world formation. In the aftermath of the creationist tradition’s
fracturing, little that was once held as regulative seems to have that force within
intellectual inquiry even if it still does ecclesially.

D. The Relationship of Biblical Interpretation and the Doctrine of Creation

Even though the relationship between biblical interpretation and the church’s
teachings on creation has not been highlighted to this point, it is, nevertheless, a
significant component to the current situation. In Willemien Otten’s reading of the
tradition, there was a quick transition early in the church from establishing which texts
were divinely inspired to concern for the theological content of those texts; a link was
established “between biblical interpretation and sound doctrine.”224 Following
Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, biblical exegesis became the focus “in most
intellectual endeavors.”225 By the early medieval period, “theology was on the whole co-
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extensive with biblical interpretation.”226 In the twelfth-century, nevertheless, there were
some changes taking place in the Christian-Platonic worldview.
Firstly, the concept of creation was taking on a more dogmatic status as an
important locus in the budding genre of early scholastic theology…
Secondly, the focus of studying Genesis was shifting. In the twelfth
century the primary purpose of reading Genesis was to test and exemplify
ideas that one had developed otherwise, serving more as a meta-physical
end-goal than a biblical starting-point.227
Other sources, such as the Timaeus, were starting to “encroach on the reading of
Genesis.”228
The relationship of the Bible to extra-biblical literature was being pushed in the
twelfth-century. At the same time, it was believed that there was “correspondence
between the Book of Nature and the Book of Scripture.”229 This century was the high
point of this belief.230 The poetic language in which the themes of the two books were
united at times “eclipsed” the scriptural connotations.231 Eventually the framework for
this relationship was eroded from both sides.232 Both became objects of study in their
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own right, progressively distanced from theology, instead of bearers of truth about God
and/or the nature of reality. Even with authors such as Hugh of St. Victor, for whom the
Bible remained authoritative, the goal of exegesis became more narrowly focused on
explaining the mysteries of the faith; knowledge of creation took second place.233
The relationship between the Bible and cosmology (science) was also divided in a
context in which theology and the liberal arts were going their separate ways.234 “With
the ongoing development of science along Aristotelian lines in the thirteenth century, not
only do we see how the tension between science and exegesis results in separation, but
also how the isolation of theology becomes a fact, as it severed not just its intrinsic ties
with science, but especially its organic ties with myth.”235
Baldner and Carroll lay much of the blame for the current methods of biblical
studies on the beginning of the sixteenth-century when the Reformation controversies led
to literalistic readings of biblical texts as propositions.236 This undermined reading
Scripture as a unified whole. Looking only at the literalistic signification of words in a
historical fashion, and not the unity of the whole, “leads many to question whether the
opening line of Genesis can really support the doctrine of creation out of nothing.”237
On the one hand, there were trends in motion long before the Reformation that
were dissolving the place of Scripture in reflecting on the nature of the world. Also, there
is question whether it was the voice of Scripture that was being heard prior to the
Reformation or whether Scripture was being read less-critically through the lens of the
current worldview—not that we can ever be rid of this phenomenon. On the other hand,
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the historical critical methods under which Scripture is scrutinized today, may have had
seeds in the work of the Humanists and the Reformers, but are largely an outflow of
developments in the early Enlightenment. As the Thirty Years War was finally coming
to a close—not before devastating much of Europe—there was “a generally perceived
need in the 1650s to revise and adjust the relationship between theology, philosophy, and
science.”238 It was broadly felt in intellectual circles that religion had contributed to far
too much bloodshed and heartache. There were definite changes that arose in response to
the perceived problems; “With the philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza, it became clear
that what was being overturned, at least potentially, was all forms of authority and
tradition, even Scripture and Man’s essentially theological view of the universe itself.”239
The early thinkers leading into the radical Enlightenment, such as Spinoza and
LeClerc, became extremely critical of the Humanists and their handling of texts.
“Humanists,…were judged largely oblivious to the need to reconstruct the context of
beliefs and ideas ancient texts embody and elucidate the assumptions, superstitions, and
fears which shaped them, as well as ill equipped to develop the kind of historically based
exegesis indispensable for achieving such goals.”240 The aim of the radicals in the 1660s
and 1670s was not innocent. For Spinoza, he believed that “the ‘true’ meaning of biblical
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as of other texts, and ‘truth of fact’, had generally been ‘confused’.”241 Thus, his method
was created to keep meanings of texts separate from truth. “Broadly, understanding a
text, for Spinoza, is not a question of ascertaining what is ‘true’ in it or searching for
what is authoritative, but rather a historical-critical and linguistic exercise anchored in a
wider naturalistic philosophical standpoint.”242 All texts, sacred or otherwise, were
subjected to the new techniques. The sacred was secularized.243
Theological issues were certainly at the forefront in the century following the
Thirty Years War; however, with the changes in science, geography, philosophy, etc., it
became increasingly difficult to reconcile the old with the new in theological terms.
Finally, there was “by the 1740s, the apparent collapse of all efforts to forge a new
general synthesis of theology, philosophy, politics, and science, which destabilized
religious belief and values, causing the wholly unprecedented crisis of faith driving the
secularization of the modern West.”244 Faith and reason were finally and fully divided, if
not seen to be opposed, and the Bible was sidelined in its significance for matters of
contemporary theology.
These methods of Bible study, with some of their accompanying consequences,
have been passed along to today. With the rise of historical-critical methods, “The
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scepter of authority passed from the ecclesiastical to the academic hierarchy.”245 Biblical
hermeneutics became in the Enlightenment primarily a matter of “accuracy in historical
reconstruction,”246 rather than having a “theological role as source of transcendent
meaning”247 or “contributing to wider theological debates.”248
These changes in methodology and conceptualization of Scripture within the
academy have been troublesome. At the same time in history that the creationist tradition
was fracturing and all doctrines were being subjected to empirical verification and
rational scrutiny, Scripture too was under siege. The union between biblical exegesis and
theology had long been dissolving. However, where appeals to the voice of Scripture and
its authority may have been helpful to save what was left of the creationist tradition as the
presiding general worldview, the church and Scripture were being stripped of being
bearers of truth.249 Natural human reason was given authority. The church and Scripture
were being accused of brokering in enslaving-superstitions. Even worse, as Baldner and
Carroll suggest, as the biblical texts were subjected to historical-critical investigation,
disparities arose between what the texts meant in their contexts and the various
formulations of the church’s doctrines through the centuries. The scriptural texts were no
longer viewed to say all that had come to be affirmed in the tradition.250 The current
spectrum in theological positions being taken in regard to creation is to a certain extent a
245

Otten, “Nature and Scripture,” 258.
Ibid., 259.
247
Ibid., 258.
248
Ibid., 259. Where there are theological claims made based on Scripture, they are often connected to
issues of human salvation (Otten, 259). The “universal referentiality of scripture has been narrowed”
within this method (259).
249
Even centuries before, their reach had begun to be limited to the realms of morality and spirituality.
250
This issue will come up again in later chapters. However, part of the dilemma is a dilemma of the age in
which the problem arose. Where the concerns were epistemology, the biblical texts were treated as an
object to be measured and mastered. However, a new era in first questions has arrived: that of language.
One of the new approaches to Scripture (or any text) is intertextuality, not empirical accuracy. In this
approach, texts are treated more like an “other” than an object; they become a conversation partner more
than specimen.
246

85
symptom of both the division between biblical and theological studies—which for
centuries had supported one another—and the subsequent undermining of each one of
them.

E. Common Difficulties within the Creationist Tradition

There are two difficulties within the creationist tradition that have been recurring
through the centuries in various manifestations; both have to do with the relationship
between God and the world; both fall within Kaiser’s category of “relative autonomy.”
The first has been how to navigate between the distinction of God and creation while
affirming creation’s contingency and dependence upon God for either its initial or
continuing existence and/or growth. The second is the ability to give an account of the
respective activities or powers of God and creation.
Both issues arose early on and have been manifest in various forms as Christianity
adapted to new intellectual circumstances. The first issue of ontology arose as a question
in the second century, first among the gnostics and then among their Christian
respondents. Basilides was the first to use the formula creatio ex nihilo as a theological
statement to avoid the emanation and world-formation models so common at the time; it
kept God utterly transcendent and distinct from creation while providing a framework to
explain how the world came to exist.251 On the Christian side, Kaiser claims that in itself
the creationist tradition does not entail…a gulf between God and the world
or a de-animation or mechanization of nature in the modern sense. Such
an emphasis did begin to enter the tradition with Augustine’s separation of
the seminal causes from God’s consubstantial Word and Spirit, but it was
not essential to the tradition itself. The idea of the complete autonomy, or
even mechanicity, of nature did not enter until the gulf opened by
Augustine widened to the point of suggesting a dichotomy between God’s
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ordering of nature and his absolute power, or even between nature itself
and God.252
Kaiser defends the biblical and patristic traditions from containing what later became
problematic; it is only a distortion of those traditions that opened the way toward
“determinism, reductionism, and atheism.”253
Kaiser’s reading of the “patristic” tradition, however, may be more charitable than
warranted. As soon as the implications of classical metaphysics became a critical issue in
the mid-second-century and Christians utilized the formula creatio ex nihilo in response,
a clear ontic distinction between God and creation was made. Where emanation, worldformation (dualism), or ex nihilo were the available options for understanding the
relationship between God and creation, Christians opted for the distinction of ex nihilo.
When the world comes into being distinct from God, defining the ongoing relationship,
or dependency, of creation with God becomes an issue. The question about God’s
activity of creation at the time was ontology; that was answered with creatio ex nihilo.
In other contexts with other questions about divine creation, the issue becomes about
more than the beginning point, more than about the giving of being. That places a
subsequent burden on creatio ex nihilo it was not developed to address. In the current
scientific view, for example, the history of something is as significant to it as its
beginning; this historical view of becoming lies in tension with creation being defined
narrowly in terms of a thing coming into being at a beginning point ex nihilo. In today’s
view, it is always being created, but not necessarily ex nihilo.
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With the distinction between God and the world, there was also a distinction
between God’s and creation’s activity. As can be seen in Irenaeus’ theology: since the
act of creating became a matter of giving being—where it had once been a matter of
forming, establishing, and/or giving life—creating became an activity for God alone,
unmediated.254 Everything having to do with the act of creation, so understood, was
God’s activity. Any cooperative activity between God and another, even creation itself,
“would, by their activity, reveal a want in God himself and thereby set up a situation of
his inferiority.”255 Creative activity became a zero-sum notion. Activity had to be placed
on one side of the balance sheet or the other. What was given to one party meant the
other party could not have that activity. Irenaeus never quotes any part of Genesis 1:6-25
for that reason;256 nothing but God could be seen to be participating in the creative
process, as he understood it.
Even after notions of God’s creative activity expanded beyond the scope of
beginnings, zero-sum notions were still in play. Whatever was attributed to creation in
the unfolding of creation through history was seen as taking away from God—at the least
it had to be explained how it was not taking away from God’s perfection. Again Kaiser
dates the rise of the zero-sum conundrum much later in history when he writes: “The
tendency to define the powers of God and matter as mutually exclusive alternatives, as
we have seen, dated from at least the twelfth century and had been reinforced by the
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mechanical philosophers and the Newtonians.”257 As God and world were distinguished
in being, it became difficult to give an account of a world that was “relatively
autonomous” in activity. Eventually that tension was eased when science parted ways
with the theological tradition(s) under which it had earlier developed; “in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, a long-range tendency to view the active role of God and the
innate properties of matter as alternative modes of explanation gained credence to the
extent that the ideals needed for the furtherance of science could not so readily be
sustained by positive Christian commitment.”258
In chapter 5 these issues will be at the forefront as a framework for understanding
God’s relationship to creation is laid out in which the language of “chaos” can find an
appropriate and useful application. At that time the usefulness of Lyle Dabney’s work on
pneumatology to move beyond some of these classic tensions will be shown. He has
developed the language of the Spirit being the Possibility of God for the other and
operating as transject—neither objectifying the other nor becoming the other’s
subjectivity. In that same chapter a second helpful notion will be developed in speaking
about the Word’s relationship to creation and operation relative to creation being
transcarnate. Hopefully this grammar will provide a framework wherein the either/or (or
both/and) between God and creation in the tradition will be bypassed.

F. Summary

One aim of this chapter was to show briefly the history of the doctrine of creation
in Christianity. In establishing a framework in which to use the language of “chaos,” a
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significant part of that framework will be God’s relationship to creation. However, as has
been shown, there was within the West a near total (if not total) breakdown in the ways
God and creation had traditionally been understood to be in relation. At the same time,
new methods in textual criticism have shifted some of the traditional notions of the
Bible’s import and/or relevancy for current theological discussion; it became an object of
the past rather than a dialogue partner and beacon for the present.
As much as the church has made its home in different milieus in the past, it is still
working on that process currently. At each major shift in Christianity’s context (or shift
in interlocutors) changes occurred in how God was conceptualized and understood in
relationship to creation. New ideas and categories were formulated to navigate the new
issues and questions facing the church. That process of adaptation and navigating issues
has always entailed dialogue within the faith community. The current dialogue is
certainly robust, with many widely divergent options being put forward. Nevertheless,
some proposals remain stuck on old hurdles; others have not fully transitioned in order to
address the questions of the current context; and others are undesirable or perilous
proposals—in other words, too compromising on traditional Christian concerns.
In the next chapter an example of how this dialogue is unfolding in biblical
studies will be given. It was chosen for its relevancy not only to the constructive task at
hand, but also on the status concerning language of “chaos” in biblical studies.
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III. GROWING DEBATE AROUND “CHAOS” LANGUAGE
IN BIBLICAL STUDIES: CONTRASTING POSITIONS
BETWEEN JON D. LEVENSON AND
DAVID T. TSUMURA
A. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, this chapter shows the contrast in
opinions on whether “chaos” is appropriate language to use in reference to biblical terms,
images, or themes, especially in relation to Genesis 1. Jon D. Levenson is one scholar
among many who is in favor of using the term in biblical studies. As with many who use
it, he then believes that there are a number of recurring symbols in Scripture that fall
within the category of chaos. In contrast, the position of David T. Tsumura will be given.
He is among a growing chorus of scholars challenging the use of “chaos,” with
accompanying notions of God combating chaos in Scripture.1 Second, the positions of
these two scholars give a glimpse of the divergence of interpretations within biblical
studies of divine creation in Genesis 1. In their respective positions they represent two
options within the creation tradition. Levenson’s position affirms matter as being
uncreated, while Tsumura—even though he says Genesis is inconclusive—uses language
more commonly associated with creatio ex nihilo. Thus, by engaging these two biblical
scholars, many of the issues in the creationist tradition can be seen as they are played out
in current biblical studies. These two authors also bring together the two primary
concerns of this project: establishing a framework for understanding God’s relationship
1
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to creation and establishing an appropriate use of “chaos.” Lastly, the interpretation of
Genesis 1 that will be used in this project will be laid out.

B. Jon D. Levenson’s Creation and the Persistence of Evil: the Jewish Drama of
Divine Omnipotence

In the following treatment of Jon D. Levenson’s Creation and the Persistence of
Evil: the Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence his aims, methods, and conclusions will
be outlined before being evaluated. In outlining and evaluating Levenson’s position it
will be shown that some of his aims and observations are insightful and helpful; however,
methods such as his have come under fire and recent scholarship has brought his
conclusions and the framework in which he works into question.

1. Levenson’s Reasons for Writing Creation and the Persistence of Evil

Levenson states three primary reasons for writing his book. The first and primary
reason is his conviction that there is no creatio ex nihilo in the Hebrew Bible (HB).2
There is also no concept of a static creation that God made in the past and has continued
to exist ever since. Rather, Levenson sees within the HB a drama between God’s
omnipotence and “the formidability and resilience of the forces counteracting creation.”3
His other two reasons for writing are to examine some connections that become apparent
in this drama that Levenson reads within the HB. First, the links between the Genesis 1
account of creation and the Priestly cult need to be explored: how the Priestly cult
functions relative to humanity’s role described in Genesis 1 “in forming and sustaining
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the world order.”4 Second, he sees a connection between God as creator and God as lord
(in covenant) that needs to be explored.5 God the creator/suzerain is dependent upon
human beings to ratify God’s royal claim; this ratification is the role of humans.
Levenson laments both the need for sophisticated theological reflection on the
recent discoveries within biblical scholarship—discoveries based on comparing other
ancient Near Eastern (ANE) texts with the Bible—as well as the tendency to miss the
continuity between the HB and the writings from Rabbinic Judaism.6 While addressing
his first three concerns, he seeks to show the continuity of biblical and rabbinic
perspectives. More importantly he seeks to develop the theological implications of the
creation drama. It is this latter aim that is of great interest and relevance to the current
project.

2. Levenson’s Presuppositions and Stated Method

Levenson is interested in the historical development of notions concerning
creation in the ANE. Dating the various ANE cosmological texts, however, is highly
uncertain. This makes any chronologies of texts questionable. Even so, Levenson does
not take a completely a-historical approach to biblical and other ANE texts.7 At points he
makes arguments about texts based on their sequence, which he determines based on
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either internal features—for example, whether they use a certain name or not8—or based
on whether one text appears to have another as a source.9 The constructed sequence of
texts and the supposed relations of texts in that sequence do play a role in his
observations and claims.
One of his foundational beliefs is that there is a progression from Enuma elish, in
which the themes of combat and creation are linked,10 to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo
in the Abrahamic faiths. The cosmologies in the HB, Levenson believes, represent stages
in that progression from creation as Chaoskampf to creation out of nothing. Their place
in this supposed progression can be seen in the following way. Levenson says that “the
Bible offers no connected narrative of primordial divine combat”; there are only
“allusions” or “poetic snippets.”11 Because we have literature from other languages, such
as Ugaritic and Akkadian, which do have full accounts of combat, it is possible “to get a
sense of the full dimensions of the old myth and its continuing vitality in Israel—as well
as the failed efforts of some circles to suppress it.”12
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Because we know of those older traditions, we should not assume in the HB that
“the real theology, the essential theology, is one of serene, divine supremacy, only
temporarily and inconsequentially interrupted by a revolt of underlings of benign
origin.”13 For example, the HB has texts that do not speak about the creation of God’s
“aquatic adversaries.” These texts should not be harmonized with texts that highlight
“the creatureliness and subordination of the monstrous adversaries to YHWH.”14 Rather,
to do that would be “to doom ourselves to miss the rich interplay of theologies and the
historical dynamics behind the biblical text.”15 This line of reasoning rests upon the
sequence of texts and the influence of one ANE worldview and its texts on a neighboring
culture and its texts.
Levenson’s approach to comparative studies also relies upon his typological or
phenomenological method. There are many symbols that he tracks within the HB and
other ANE traditions: waters, darkness, death, wilderness, etc. Wherever they appear,
Levenson investigates it as a reference to “chaos.” As the reasoning in Levenson’s above
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Gordon Preece [Hindmarsh, Australia: Australian Theological Forum Inc., 2001], 87). Looking at Genesis
1 as a teaching, Brown sees P’s conceptual world—in both creation and tabernacle construction—“is
preeminently one of harmonious collaboration. P is convinced that only such a ‘social’ ordering can result
in perfect…work and order” (225f.). At times the results are better than expected (e.g., Ex 36:5-6); “Such
is the unwavering trust of the priestly writer in his conceptual, if not utopian, world” (226). Background
(Gunkel) and contextual motivation (Wellhausen) can often cloud the teaching of Genesis 1 as much as it
can illuminate it.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid. Levenson believes that Kaufmann, an influential HB scholar, does this.
15
Ibid. There is no doubt that Levenson is right to speak of theologies in the Bible’s traditions. What still
is under examination is whether the images Levenson points out in the HB function as he says they do in
the biblical texts and, thus, if they should be read 1) in conjunction with older combat myths from other
cultures, 2) as polemical statements against those other myths, or, rather, 3) in a different framework
altogether.

95
statement entails, the later occurrence of these images can be understood against their
oldest known appearance in the old ANE combat myth from which they are thought to
descend. In whatever stage of demythologization or historicization the images appear,
they still represent the primal enemy “chaos.”16 As will be shown, Levenson’s view
about an historical progression and his typological method play a significant role in how
he moves in the argument of the book from examining ANE texts outside of Genesis 1
back to interpreting Genesis 1.

3. Levenson’s Outline and Claims

The three sections of Creation and the Persistence of Evil correspond to the three
purposes for which Levenson wrote. In the first section he outlines the drama of God’s
mastery over chaos and the fragility of the resultant state. In this first section he works
primarily with non-Genesis texts in the HB.17 In the second section Levenson examines

16

In his own words: “My point is that Leviathan, Amalek, Gag, and the like are symbols from different
traditionary complexes for the same theological concept: the ancient and enduring opposition to the full
realization of God’s mastery, the opposition destined to be eliminated at the turn of the aeon” (Levenson,
38). A contrasting presupposition shows up in H. and H.A. Frankfort; they state that the ancients “are
likely to present various descriptions of identical phenomena side by side even though they are mutually
exclusive…the ancients’ conception of a phenomenon differed according to their approach to it” (“Myth
and Reality,” in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man: An Essay on Speculative Thought in the
Ancient Near East [Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1977], 19; cf. Clifford on the
ancients’ ability to have multiple creation accounts simultaneously, Creation Accounts in the Ancient Near
East and the Bible, The Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Monograph Series 26 [Washington, D.C: Catholic
Biblical Association, 1994], 199). Since an identical phenomenon, term, or image can function in multiple
ways for various explanatory purposes—e.g., a cow being used as a symbol for fertility or as a very strong
animal that lifts the sun to the heaven (19)—attention to specific contexts is crucial; “the procedure of the
mythopoeic mind in expressing a phenomenon by manifold images corresponding to unconnected avenues
of approach clearly leads away from, rather than toward, our postulate of causality which seeks to discover
identical causes for identical effects throughout the phenomenal world” (20). Rebecca Watson seeks in her
work to look specifically at how images are being used in various contexts in Israel’s scriptures (see Chaos
Uncreated); it shows the diversity and particularity in the manner and contexts in which specific images
were employed.
17
Interestingly the outline of Levenson’s book to some degree mirrors Gunkel’s Schöpfung und Chaos in
Urzeit und Endzeit, Göttingen (1895). When Westermann outlines Gunkel’s work he points out that
“Gunkel’s starting point is the thesis: ‘Gen 1 is not a free construction of the author’ (4-16). ‘The very
ancient elements handed down in Gen 1 demonstrate . . . that Gen 1 goes back to a very ancient tradition’
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Genesis 1:1—2:3 against the drama outlined in the first section and he examines the
relationship of the Genesis account, as he interprets it, and the Priestly cult—as it would
function given such a rendering of Genesis 1. In the final section he argues for the close
connection between the notions of creation and covenant in the relational dynamic
between God and his creatures.

a. Levenson’s Framework for Understanding Creation
Levenson rejects claims for a clear notion of creation out of nothing in the HB.18
In building his framework, Levenson begins in Genesis 1. The scene in Genesis 1 opens
with the primordial, uncreated water.19 The only way to interpret creation out of nothing
within Genesis 1:1-2 is to choose the translation “In the beginning God created the
heavens and the earth.”20 This translation, he claims, has been doubted since the Middle
Ages and has fallen out of favor with scholars.21 Thus, he reads in the opening verses of

(6-14). ‘Certain elements (chaos, stars) point to the Babylonian origin of the tradition’ (15f.)” (Genesis 1—
11: A Commentary, trans. by John J. Scullion, S.J. [Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1984], 29).
After doing a few comparisons between the traditions, in Gunkel’s work (as Levenson does) “a long section
has been added entitled ‘References to the Myth of the Struggle of Marduk with Tiamat in the Old
Testament apart from Gen 1’ (29-114)” (Westermann, 29); cf. Herman Gunkel, Creation and Chaos in the
Primeval Era and the Eschaton: A Religio-Historical Study of Genesis 1 and Revelation 12, trans. by K.
William Whitney, Jr. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 13-77.
18
He is not alone in doing this. Cf., e.g., the positions of David Tsumura, Andrew Hahn, and William
Brown.
19
Ibid., 5.
20
This verse would then have to be interpreted as a statement about God’s creative activity that comes
before v. 2.
21
Ibid. Here Levenson is making reference to the early second millennium interpretation of Rashi and the
trend since E. A. Speiser’s translation in his 1964 commentary, which favors Rashi’s grammatical points:
“When God set about to create heaven and earth—the world being a formless waste, with darkness over the
seas and only an awesome wind sweeping over the water—God said, ‘Let there be light.’” (157, n. 12; cf.
Speiser, Genesis in The Anchor Bible, vol. 1 [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964], 3). Levenson picks this
approach over Westermann’s (158, n. 12) or other more traditional interpretations of the grammar. He does
not argue his position in detail. Rather, he shows that there is uncertainty about the traditional English
translation and that a new translation is in vogue. Levenson himself says that it is probably impossible to
resolve the grammatical controversy (158, n. 12), as does Hahn ("Tohu Va-Vohu: Matter, Nothingness and
Non-being in Jewish Creation Theology," Ph.D. [Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2002], 35ff.).
The choice among translations and interpretations of Genesis 1:1-3 must be made among several
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the HB the introduction of both the God of Israel—with no myth of origin or origin to his
mastery22—and the primordial, uncreated waters. From this starting point, Levenson
moves in the rest of Part I to other texts within the HB to explain the drama of combat
between God and chaos in creation.
As Levenson claims at the start, the waters, a symbol of chaos, have no beginning
narrated. They are “the ancient and enduring opposition to the full realization of God’s
mastery, the opposition destined to be eliminated at the turn of the aeon.”23 Chaos is
anarchy;24 it challenges God’s supremacy.25 This opponent is a real force—or
power(s)—that is always a continuing possibility. Chaos is dark, ungodly,26 malign,27
and evil.28 To some of the symbols for chaos Levenson adds descriptors such as roiling29
and violent.30 He even adds personifications such as sinister,31 hostile,32 angry, 33
rebellion,34 and defection.35

grammatically possible options; the biblical grammar alone is not conclusive. One’s own views on
theology, as well as one’s views on what the theology and worldview of the Priestly writer(s) was, will
influence the interpretation chosen.
22
Ibid., 6. There is no myth of God rising out of the primal elements as there is in the Babylonian Enuma
elish and the Egyptian myths (e.g., Atum rises out of the primal waters; H. and H.A. Frankfort, 9). God
does not call the waters “mother” as the gods do in Enuma elish (e.g., III.23).
23
Ibid., 38.
24
Ibid., 47.
25
Ibid., 135.
26
Ibid., 127. Levenson describes the terms of Genesis 1:2 as “the dark, ungodly forces.”
27
Ibid., 46.
28
Ibid., 19, 24f, 36, 39, 40, 44, 47, 50, 90, 99, 127, 156. Many of these uses of “evil” (including the book
title itself) show that Levenson uses “evil” synonymously with “chaos.” Levenson offers no justification
for equating those two terms whose definitions are not necessarily mutually inclusive.
29
Ibid., 106, 135. Levenson describes the waters in Psalm 89:10, which he quotes as “You rule the swelling
of the sea (yām): when its waves surge, You still them” (105), as angry and roiling. He also uses Psalm
93:3-4 as an example of angry, roiling waters (175, n. 17): “The floods have lifted up, O LORD, the floods
have lifted up their voice; the floods lift up their roaring. More majestic than the thunders of mighty
waters, more majestic than the waves of the sea, majestic on high is the LORD!” (NRSV). It is not selfevident from these texts that the waters are angry. E.g., in the second, there is a comparison by way of
analogy between the magnitude of a known/experienced natural phenomenon and the might of God; the
text does not attribute a motivation or emotion of anger to the waters. Such attribution does not seem
fitting or congruent with the purpose for which the mighty waters are placed in comparison to God.
30
Ibid., 75. Levenson uses Exodus 15:1-19 to talk of “YHWH’s ferocious combat against the Pharaonic
army at the violent waters.”
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In one word Levenson defines God’s action in creating: mastery.36 Creation is the
“defeating of the forces that interrupt order,”37 making the chaos into order.38 God
confines these forces in creating, but does not eliminate them.39 They are subdued and
ordered, but they still persist as chaos/evil. It is the establishment of boundaries by which
order is created and it is the maintenance of those boundaries by which it is kept.40
Since the chaos-forces are ordered and not eliminated in creation, chaos is
inherent in the cosmos, history, and in human beings.41 There are various symbols used
for the manifestation of chaos in these respective realms. “Leviathan is to creation as
Amalek is to history and as the Evil Impulse is to the Good in Rabbinic psychology.
Each is an ancient or even innate impediment to reality as God, the potentially
omnipotent, wishes it to be. Each can be suppressed for the nonce, but will disappear only

31

Ibid., 16. Levenson describes the waters of the Flood as “sinister forces of chaos” that would surge forth
again if God’s command for them to stay back were rescinded. He compares this relation between God and
the “sinister forces of chaos” to the situation described in Psalm 104:6-9 and Job 38:8-11.
32
Ibid., 48. “Hostile” is used by Levenson in reference to the forces represented by the symbol of
Leviathan.
33
Ibid., 106, 108. See n. 29.
34
Ibid., 10, 136.
35
Ibid., 135.
36
Ibid., 3. “The creation narratives, whatever their length, form, or context, are best seen as dramatic
visualizations of the uncompromised mastery of YHWH, God of Israel, over all else” (3). Catherine
Keller’s critique and deconstruction of this type of paradigm should at the least be given an audience before
adopting Levenson’s position for theological purposes; see Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming
(London and New York: Routledge, 2003).
37
Ibid., 12.
38
Ibid., 22. In Levenson’s account, Israel had a comparable cosmogony with others in the ANE in which
there is “a decisive instance of the victory of the forces of order (which are necessarily social and political)
over potent opposition: what emerges from creation is a secure and ordered community whose center of
authority is unchallenged, effective, and just” (69). Cf. Clifford, 7-9.
39
Ibid., 17.
40
See ibid., 65. “Order is now a matter of the maintenance of boundaries, and even when the forces of
chaos pose no threat to the creator, they still persist, and their persistence qualifies—and defines—his
world mastery” (65; emphasis original).
41
Given that Levenson claims God creates out of the primal chaos, it is unclear, then, how our materiality
should not be viewed as evil since the material of creation is simply ordered chaos/evil plotting to reassert
itself.
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in the eschatological reversal.”42 With the ever present reality of these forces “The world
is not inherently safe; it is inherently unsafe.”43 Until the day God completely conquers
chaos/evil, there exists an unsafe tension between creation/life established by God’s
creative mastery and the forces of chaos/death which threaten God’s mastery, and thus,
creation/life.44
The created world is not a static, secure world; God’s activity of creation is not a
confined, once-upon-a-time idea.45 The positive order of creation is not “intrinsically
irreversible.”46 It is not God’s act of creation/mastery that is the ground of security to
creation/life against the very real forces of chaos/death. Rather, it is God’s covenant
faithfulness to keep order that is the only safeguard against the forces of evil. God’s
covenant faithfulness is the ground of creation’s security.47 God must faithfully continue
to act and keep the boundaries since the setting of the boundaries is not permanently
effective.
There are times that, in the face of the reality of evil, it appears as though evil is
unchecked and/or triumphant.48 Even so, Israel’s liturgy confirms the hope that God
indeed is sovereign and it calls out for God, in God’s faithfulness, to close the gap

42
Ibid., 41. He says further, “As evil did not originate with history, neither will it disappear altogether in
history, but rather beyond it, at the inauguration of the coming world” (50; emphasis original). This claim
would make for an interesting comparison with the views of many Enlightenment/Modern thinkers who
thought that evil arose in history and could/would be solved in history: e.g., Rousseau and Hegel.
43
Ibid., 17. Levenson uses the imagery of the persistence of the sea after God’s “combat” with it in texts
such as Psalm 104:6-9 and Job 38:8-11 in support of his position. This argument works only if “chaos” is
employed as a noun and not an adjective which describes a situation.
44
Ibid.
45
Cf. ibid., xiii.
46
Ibid., 12.
47
Ibid., 48. Levenson uses Genesis 9:1-17 and Job 41:4—“Will it [Leviathan] make a covenant with you
to be taken as your servant forever?” (NRSV)—to say that God has pledged an eternal covenant for
creation’s endurance and that God “has, also in an eternal covenant, compelled the obeisance of his great
adversary” (17).
48
Ibid., 19, 23, 90.
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between that hope in his sovereignty and their experience of reality.49 The ultimate hope,
nevertheless, is in the forthcoming decisive battle between God and chaos. This will
result in a transformation, a process of purgation and eradication, which will establish a
new cosmogony, a new creation.50

b. Levenson’s Interpretation of Genesis 1

In the first part of his book, Genesis is first examined in comparison and contrast
with Enuma elish.51 By way of contrast between the two texts, the gods who remain at
the end of Enuma elish are not primordial—they come into existence—and those god-like
beings who were primordial “fail to transcend nature” and become some of the matter out
of which creation was formed.52 Second, Marduk does not have inherent mastery, but is
given his authority by the pantheon of gods. By way of comparison between the two
texts, the waters of Genesis 1 “are most likely primordial” as were Apsu and Tiamat.53
Also, Levenson reads the “Let us make” in v. 26 as an indication that there were other
primordial divine beings beside God; there was some type of council.54 Nevertheless,
Genesis 1 affirms that God has no origin and has always been supreme ruler.55
In the second part of the book, Levenson returns to his interpretation of Genesis 1
by comparing and contrasting it with the cosmology he developed in Part I based on older
49

Ibid., 19-25. Levenson appeals to Psalm 74; Isaiah 51:9-11; 54:7-11 to make his point. “The psalmist
refuses to deny the evidence of his senses in the name of faith…But he also refuses to abandon the
affirmation of God’s world-ordering mastery” (19).
50
Ibid., 12, 29, 32, 44.
51
Ibid., 3ff.
52
Ibid., 4.
53
Ibid., 5. All the things listed in v. 2 he believes are primordial.
54
Ibid. Levenson says that the text does not give us any indicators of the relationship between God and
these other alleged beings. Thus, it does not help us know if God’s authority is given to him by these
others as Marduk’s was. Based on other HB texts, it is God who always has the final say so these divine
beings are “subordinate and not very individualized” (5).
55
Ibid., 6.
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texts in the HB.56 Levenson recognizes that the placement of the Genesis 1 creation
account has theological significance. However, it is not the only creation story in the HB
and its significance is not “as the quintessence of ancient Hebrew theology.”57 He takes
an approach that does not subordinate the alleged presence of a combat myth in the HB to
the theology of Genesis 1.58 Harmonizing other HB cosmologies with Genesis 1 “does
violence to the plain sense of the text.”59 The character of Genesis 1 serves as one point
along the progression “that runs from the ancient Near Eastern combat myth to the
developed creation theology of the Abrahamic faiths”—in other words, runs to the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.60 Here there is a distinction in methodologies and
investigative interests between, on the one hand, those who give Genesis 1 pride of place
in Scripture and subordinate the other biblical cosmologies to it by reading them through
the lens of Genesis 1’s theology and, on the other hand, those who, like Levenson, try to
track the progression of creation theology from sample texts through history.61

56

I use the term “cosmology” as Remi Brague does in The Wisdom of the World: the Human Experience of
the Universe in Western Thought, translated by Teresa Lavender Fagan (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 2003) where he defines it as “an account of the world in which a reflection on the nature of
the world as a world must be expressed” (4). “Cosmography” is “the drawing or description (graphein) of
the world as it appears at a given moment, with regard to its structure, its possible division into levels,
regions, and so on” (3). “Cosmogony” is “the story of the emergence of things” (3).
57
Levenson, 5f.
58
Ibid., 53.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid. His framing of the material in terms of a repression of or moving away from the old myth is very
different from Rebecca Watson who argues that Israel was very conscious, deliberate, and consistent in the
specific contexts and manner in which it employed certain types of grammar that had long extra-biblical
histories; see, e.g., 259ff. It is still an open question of whether Israel needed to repress syncretism in its
scriptures or whether Israel deliberately tolerated the adoption-with-adaptations of specific images in
specific contexts for their own purposes. Were there unwanted, undesirable traditions that the Israelites
were unable to fully expunge from their canon or did they intend/desire to say precisely what they said?
61
If the issue is, as Levenson suggests, which method does more violence to the plain sense of the biblical
texts, he has not convincingly demonstrated that using a lens from other ANE cultures, which posits the
existence of primordial chaos/evil, an ontology of animosity between the gods and the other, and open
combat between the gods and the other, does less violence to the biblical text than assuming a text such as
Genesis 1, even though a later text, is a culmination of what had been the creation theology of Israel all
along. Levenson’s method is not free of a lens through which to interpret the grammar and images of the
biblical texts. It does not seek to find the plain sense of texts without already assuming a background for
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Levenson uses Psalm 104 as the step in the historical progression just before
Genesis 1.62 In Psalm 104 the sea monster is said to be created and is God’s toy.63
Genesis 1 goes a step further in demythologizing the sea monster(s) because they are not
created until the fifth day.64 Levenson suspects this is for polemical reasons; it eliminates
the monsters’ proximity to divinity and their role in the creation narrative.65 “Leviathan
is now only one member of a whole species of marine animals, a species that God not
only creates, but pronounces good, blesses, and charges ‘to be fertile and increase.’”66
Levenson also interprets patterns in Genesis 1 such as the light being created on the first
day and the sun not being made until the fourth day as an instance of demythologization

the significance and function of the terms and images in that passage. His method undermines his endeavor
to find the plain sense of the biblical cosmologies and his claim not to be violating them. The contrasting
accounts by scholars such as Rebecca Watson, David Tsumura, and William Brown of many of the same
texts used by Levenson show how different the meanings of those texts and their images look when not
read through a combative lens.
62
Levenson justifies the chronology of the two texts based on the fact that Psalm 104 names Leviathan like
many Bronze Age texts would have done and Genesis 1 does not use the specific name. Also, since Psalm
104 does not have the heptatic structures, it does not show dependency upon the Genesis 1 text (59). If
Levenson claims that Psalm 104 is adapted from an Egyptian hymn (61, 63) and if Genesis 1 is a next step
in thought from Psalm 104, why does Levenson use Babylonian theology to compare and contrast with
these biblical texts and not Egyptian? The Egyptians and other ANE cultures had different views of the
primordial waters than represented in Enuma elish. Also, the Egyptians and Babylonians had very different
experiences of the waters in their rivers. It is only speculation how geography and natural phenomenon
influenced their myths; however, they do appear to have views of water that reflect either the predictability
of the Nile or the unpredictability of the Tigris and Euphrates (cf. H. and H.A. Frankfort, “The
Emancipation of Thought from Myth,” in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man [Chicago; London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1977], 364f.; cf. Thorkild Jacobsen, “Mesopotamia: The Cosmos as a
State,” in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man [Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press,
1977], 171f.). Even if there were multiple “sources” behind Genesis 1, why does Levenson not at least
consider the possibility that Egyptian cosmography stands behind Genesis 1:2 instead of Babylon’s combat
myth?
63
Ibid., 54.
64
Levenson’s use of terms such as “demythologized” and “depersonalized” show his presupposition that
Israel’s texts are in a line of tradition with an old combat myth. Saying that the waters, darkness, sun, or
sea-monsters are “not mythologized” or “not personalized” is a different observation with different
presuppositions about the possible relationship between Israel’s texts and those of its neighbors.
65
Ibid., 54, 55. Cf. H.W.E. Saggs’ thesis about Genesis 1 being polemical against Enuma elish—The
Encounter with the Divine in Mesopotamia and Israel (London: Athlone, 1978).
66
Ibid., 54.
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of the sun. 67 In other words, this is one step further away from the combat myth and
cosmography of Enuma elish.68
The terms and images within Genesis 1 have analogues in the broader ANE and
thus this text resonates within that context. Levenson makes an argument that even the
heptatic structures in Genesis 1, unique among all ANE cosmologies, should not be
understood as being completely discontinuous with either its cultural background or the
raw material from which the author(s) drew.69 He traces, for example, the possible cultic
influences of the Babylonian akītu festival that was a several-days-long New Year’s
festival in which Enuma elish was read on the fourth day. Levenson writes that “As
conjectural as any reconstruction of the akītu and its meaning must be, its relevance to
biblical Israel is even murkier.”70 He is only trying to say that it must not be assumed
that the idea of creation across several days within Genesis 1 came about ex nihilo.71
Discussion of this issue of possible inspirations for the heptatic structures in the broader
cultural milieu helps serve as a segue for Levenson for discussing the importance of not
separating the interpretation of texts from their setting in the cult.
Levenson does not believe that Psalm 104 or Genesis 1 represent a full
demythologization of the waters or the darkness; neither text explicitly states that the

67

Ibid., 65.
In a later section of this chapter I suggest another way of interpreting the subsequent creation of lightgiving bodies in Genesis 1.
69
Ibid., 68.
70
Ibid., 69.
71
His strongest arguments for cultural antecedents is in the link between cosmos and temple in the ANE
(see Levenson’s seventh chapter; also see his Sinai & Zion: An Entry into the Jewish Bible [San Francisco:
Harper & Row, 1987], 138ff.). Since there is a connection between cosmos and temple and since Israel’s
temple was built in seven years and was dedicated in the seventh month, during the seven-day long festival
of Tabernacles, there are precedents for linking the number seven with creation. There are possible
antecedents in the Canaanite tradition since Baal’s temple was built in seven days (78). Even so, Levenson
does need to nuance his claims about some heptatic structures in the Priestly account in light of Brown’s
subsequent findings that some of them were added later; some do not appear until the MT (Brown,
Structure, Role, and Ideology, 136).
68
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waters or darkness were created. In Psalm 104 God only made boundaries for the waters
that Leviathan once personified.72 Likewise, the Genesis 1 account has no explicit
statement that the waters or darkness were created. Genesis 1:2 “describes the ‘world,’ if
we may call it that, just before the cosmogony began.”73
Genesis 1:1-2 shows parallels to Enuma elish. The two texts have similar
introductory statements. Enuma elish begins: “When above [enuma eliš] the heaven had
not [yet] been named, [and] below the earth had not [yet] been called by a name…”74
Genesis 1:1—“When God set about to create heaven and earth…” Second, both texts
contain uncreated waters. And third, Marduk uses winds to overcome Tiamat just as a
wind from God sweeps over the primordial waters in 1:2.75
The two texts are different in two important ways. First, there is no opposition to
God’s creative activity since the primordial matter is inert. And second, “Genesis 1:1—
2:3 begins near the point when the Babylonian poem ends its action, with the primordial
waters neutralized and the victorious and unchallengeable deity about to undertake the
work of cosmogony.”76
72

Ibid., 65. Levenson summarizes: “Order is now a matter of the maintenance of boundaries, and even
when the forces of chaos pose no threat to the creator, they still persist, and their persistence qualifies—and
defines—his world mastery” (65).
73
Ibid., 121.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid. It is at this point that Levenson states: “In spite of some variations, it should now be clear that
Genesis 1:1—2:3 is quite close to Enuma elish” (121). In Levenson’s eighth chapter he also makes an
argument that God’s rest at the end of the Genesis 1 creation narrative has precedents in other biblical texts
and ANE texts—e.g., Enuma elish and the Egyptian Memphite Theology (107). Since creation is an act of
victory and liberation over chaotic forces by God (a philanthropic act), the Sabbath represents “a regular
and unending implementation of the philanthropic attitude within the domain of ordinary human
affairs…creation is a paradigm of God’s gracious and perdurable will to save the defenseless” (106).
Sabbath is a rest from toil in creation (107).
76
Ibid., 122. Levenson never gives an argument for his readers about how the combat between Marduk
and Tiamat by which the primordial waters are “neutralized” is connected within Enuma elish to Marduk’s
eventual return to Tiamat’s corpse and his subsequent world formation. Thus, it is not clear how Marduk’s
later formation of the cosmos out of neutralized water is linked with or should be conceptualized in terms
of the notion of mastery that marks the earlier narration of the combat. In other words, the question
remains: in this old myth does it narrate that creation equals mastery?
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In Levenson’s comparing and contrasting of Genesis with Enuma elish, he makes
a crucial switch from talking about “inert matter” in Genesis 1 to talking about “dark,
inert chaos.”77 This is not just a change between synonymous terms. It is a change in
concepts. He offers no justification for this transition. By making the switch, however,
he is able to continue his comparisons between the two documents; “One thing that this
primordial chaos shares with Tiamat is that it does not disappear, but rather is
transformed during the act of creation.”78 Order and form are imposed on the chaos.
This transition between vocabulary and concepts brings continuity between
Levenson’s interpretation of other HB cosmologies and how he interprets Genesis 1.
Switching the concepts in the P creation account also colors his depiction of the Priestly
cult. It brings Israel’s cult into tighter parallel with the cults of its pagan neighbors. In
Levenson’s chaos-framework, the Priestly cult becomes humanity’s kingly participation
with God in the building and maintaining of order.79
Among the many messages of Gen 1:1—2:3 is this: it is through the cult
that we are enabled to cope with evil, for it is the cult that builds and
maintains order, transforms chaos into creation, ennobles humanity, and
realizes the kingship of God who has ordained the cult and commanded
that it be guarded and practiced. It is through obedience to the directives
of the divine master that his good world comes into existence.80
Levenson’s transition in concepts introduced into his treatment of the text an antagonistic
relationship between God and the raw stuff of creation. It introduced the notion that
God’s interaction with it in Genesis 1 was about the mastery and control of God’s other.
Lastly, it introduced the idea that humanity’s relationship to creation in general, but more

77

Ibid.
Ibid.
79
Ibid., 127.
80
Ibid.
78
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specifically in the cult, entailed this same relationship of animosity and the need to secure
control of the other.81

81

These ideas of primordial or innate chaos/evil in creation and the function of the Priestly cult are
irreconcilable with the observations of other scholars such as Jacob Milgrom in (Leviticus 1—16: A New
Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible, Vol. 3 [New York: Doubleday, 1991],
42f.; Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics, Continental Commentaries [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
2004], 8f.). Milgrom pieces together his view of the Priestly worldview and cult from studying the book of
Leviticus. At nearly every point, he shows the contrast between Israel’s cult and the cults of its neighbors.
Milgrom claims that the Priestly cult did not include notions of demonic or evil forces that had to be
guarded against or warded off. Rather, the cult itself served to repair the stains of human sin and to rightly
order the life of the community. In the contrast between pagan cults and Israel’s Milgrom says: “The basic
premises of pagan religion are (1) that its deities are themselves dependent on and influenced by a
metadivine realm, (2) that this realm spawns a multitude of malevolent and benevolent entities, and (3) that
if humans can tap into this realm they can acquire the magical power to coerce the gods to do their will.
The eminent Assyriologist W. G. Lambert has stated, ‘The impression is gained that everyday religion [in
Mesopotamia] was dominated by fear of evil powers and black magic rather than a positive worship of the
gods. . . the world was conceived to be full of evil demons who might cause trouble in any sphere of life. If
they had attacked, the right ritual should effect the cure. . . . Humans, as well as devils, might work evil
against a person by the black arts, and here too the appropriate ritual was required’ [Lambert 1959: 194].
The Priestly theology negates these premises. It posits the existence of one supreme God who contends
neither with a higher realm nor with competing peers. The world of demons is abolished; there is no
struggle with autonomous foes, because there are none. With the demise of the demons, only one creature
remains with ‘demonic’ power—the human being. Endowed with free will, human power is greater than
any attributed to humans by pagan society. Not only can one defy God but, in Priestly imagery, one can
drive God out of his sanctuary. In this respect, humans have replaced demons” (Leviticus 1—16, 42f;
Leviticus, 8f.). In the pagan world, the cult secured the temple “against incursions by malevolent forces
from the supernal and infernal worlds” through magic (Leviticus 1—16, 43; Leviticus, 9). In contrast, “The
Priestly theologians make use of the same imagery, except that the demons are replaced by humans.
Humans can drive God out of the sanctuary by polluting it with their moral and ritual sins. All that the
priests can do is periodically purge the sanctuary of its impurities and influence the people to atone for their
wrongs” (Leviticus 1—16, 43; Leviticus, 9); cf. Leviticus 1—16, 44ff. Impurity itself was thus harmless in
the Priestly cult, except in regard to the sancta; “The sanctuary symbolized the presence of God; impurity
represented the wrongdoing of persons. If persons unremittingly polluted the sanctuary they forced God out
of his sanctuary and out of their lives” (Leviticus 1—16, 43). Impurity was not a sinister force lying below
the surface; it was something to be washed away. The importance of washing is not only to keep God’s
presence in the Temple; rather, impurity is to death as holiness is to life. Thus, “Because the quintessential
source of holiness resides with God, Israel is enjoined to control the occurrence of impurity lest it impinge
on his realm (see below). The forces pitted against each other in a cosmic struggle are no longer the
benevolent and the demonic deities who populate the mythologies of Israel’s neighbors, but the forces of
life and death set loose by man himself through his obedience to or defiance of God’s commandments”
(47). The objective of the Priestly theology with its purity laws was “to sever impurity from the demonic
and to reinterpret it as a symbolic system reminding Israel of the divine imperative to reject death and
choose life” (47). (This is echoed in the theology of J in Genesis 2 in the command to eat not from the tree
of the knowledge of good and evil, but from the tree of life.) If one were to work backward in the canon to
construct the cosmography of the Priestly tradition—following scholarship such as Milgrom’s—
Levenson’s importation of his notion of chaos into Genesis 1:2 would be indefensible.
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c. Levenson’s Link Between Creation and Covenant

Levenson’s observations about the link between creation and covenant were
mentioned earlier. In short: in the tension that exists within creation between God’s
mastery and the chaotic forces that challenge God’s mastery, it is only God’s covenant
faithfulness to maintain his ordering mastery that is the foundation of creation’s security
and not God’s mastering/creating activity.
Levenson further develops the connection between creation and covenant in the
third part of his book by comparing Israel’s faith with Enuma elish. In Enuma elish there
is a movement from plurality to unity, from democracy among the gods to the monarchy
of Marduk.82 Thus, there was no longer a need within the pantheon to deliberate about a
course of action. The only resolution before the gods was “whether to accept Marduk’s
offer, whether to make him king.”83 The alternative was death. There was a suzerain
treaty between Marduk and the gods whom he saved from the threat of Tiamat.
Likewise, YHWH saved Israel from Egypt and Israel was then expected to ratify
God’s resolutions. Because of both God’s combat on their behalf and a covenant
between God and Israel, now there was to be in Israel “the exclusive enthronement of
YHWH and the radical and uncompromising commitment of the House of Israel to
carrying out his commands.”84 The only other option would be defection to another god.
Israel’s monotheism did not necessarily affirm that only one god exists; rather, they were
to live in total allegiance to YHWH. “By and large, the texts in the Hebrew Bible that
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Ibid., 131f. Interestingly Brown argues for an exact opposite movement in the Priestly tradition. Instead
of all others being subjected to God’s mastery, God invites others to participate with him and decentralizes
power as the social order increases in complexity throughout Genesis 1.
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Ibid., 132. Levenson sees echoes of this type of subordination of a pantheon to YHWH in the HB (133).
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Ibid., 135.
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show the most affinities with the suzerainty treaties also regard the other gods as extant,
real, and potent.”85 Thus, there is fragility to YHWH’s covenantal lordship.
Consequently, with God, there was “nervousness and defensiveness with the presence of
an alternative to him and his cult.”86 In Levenson’s assessment, God needs the witness of
Israel and their recognition of his lordship to realize his divinity, to actualize his full
potential.87
Because Israel must choose between obedience to God and death, Levenson
finishes his book with discussing the need to frame humans’ relationship to God in terms
other than autonomy or heteronomy. Humans cannot be enslaved to the point of
becoming inanimate objects (utter heteronomy). That would not grant mastery to God.
For there to be divine mastery, human subjectivity cannot be assumed by God.88 They
must, rather, be subjects under him, able to choose. On the other hand, there is only one
legitimate choice that would not lead to their destruction.89 Complete autonomy does not
define humans’ relationship before God. Therefore, neither heteronomy nor autonomy
are suitable to describe the covenant relationship among God and Israel/humans.90
“Only when the opposition of dichotomy yields to the subtlety of dialectic can we
begin to grasp the Jewish dynamics of lordship and submission.”91 Concerning this
subtlety of dialectic, Levenson writes:
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actualization of the full potential of creation, its full realization of its potential for/with God, which is at
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witness.
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Israel at Sinai is not “equally free to assent and dissent,” but already owes
her freedom and her life to the God with whom she has always been in an
eternal covenant that was only announced and never negotiated… those
who stand under covenantal obligation by nature and necessity are
continually called upon to adopt that relationship by free decision. Chosen
for service, they must choose to serve.92
With a Creator who commands, the “spiritual politics of the Hebrew Bible begins with
duties, not rights.”93 Even so, humans are neither mindless in living in their duties, nor
should their thoughts replace the commands of the inscrutable God.94 There is a balance
between argument and obedience for humans. Even more insightful is Levenson’s
observation that this relationship is significant not only in covenant, but also in creation.
“The presence of variations of this spiritual dialectic in narrative, covenantal, and
cosmogonic texts suggests its centrality and its depth of rootage in the Israelite religious
consciousness.”95

4. An Evaluation and Critique of Levenson

a. Presuppositions in Framing the Material

Finding the best explanatory framework in which to give an account of the
available data is much of what the scholarly task is about. As history has shown,
changing the framework changes how the reality of the same data is understood. When
the sun was thought to revolve around the earth, the phenomena of the sun’s rising and
setting was interpreted one way—that the sun moves around the earth. When the
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explanatory framework changed to the earth spinning as it orbits the sun, interpretations
about the same observed phenomena changed.
When George Smith and Herman Gunkel first published their comparative studies
on Enuma elish and biblical creation texts, they thought that Enuma elish had been used
as a source by the biblical authors. In George Smith’s view, the more ancient Babylonian
text supplied details for us that are missing in Genesis 1.96 This type of explanatory
framework for the data has undergone revisions and refinements in the subsequent
decades.97 Traces of Smith and Gunkel can be seen in Levenson’s work when he writes
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Cf. Dobson, 382, n. 147. Smith was not schooled as an Assyriologist; he was an engraver hired by the
British Museum to repair cuneiform tablets. In his work on ancient documents at the museum he
“discovered” and translated the Epic of Gilgamesh in 1872 and Enuma elish in 1875. Smith first suggested
about the Epic of Gilgamesh in 1872: “On reviewing the evidence it is apparent that the events of the Flood
narrated in the Bible and the Inscriptions are the same, and occur in the same order” (quoted by Dobson,
39). He suggested when he published Enuma elish that “When Genesis was copied from ‘the primitive
account,’ it omits some details, which are included in the Cuneiform narrative” (Hess, 5; cf. Watson, 15).
Smith made suggestions about chaos being in both texts. Gunkel continued in a similar fashion claiming
that Genesis 1—11 “displayed extensive dependence on the mythological tradition in Babylonia” (Hess, 7).
New with Gunkel was that he was the first to bring combat into the discussion of chaos in the Bible
(Watson, 16). The notion of chaos and especially connecting it with creation in the Bible were both
immediately challenged (18).
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Cf. Richard S. Hess, “One Hundred Fifty Years of Comparative Studies on Genesis 1—11: An
Overview,” in "I Studied Inscriptions before the Flood” (Winona Lake, IN; Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion
Publications; Eisenbrauns, 1994), 3-26. K. A. Kitchen decades ago criticized biblical scholars for the
manner in which they hold on to their theories as though they are doctrinal matters. No matter how
appealing the theories may be given one’s convictions or how long it has been the accepted model (e.g., the
documentary hypothesis), Kitchen encouraged biblical scholars to hold them loosely and let them go freely,
as Assyriologists must do when new evidence contradicts their prized theories (Ancient Orient and Old
Testament [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1966], 18-20, 26-28). It is a growing sentiment that it
is time to lay aside making any connections between Enuma elish and Genesis 1. Richard Clifford
concludes in his studies that “Though its prefatory function is paralleled in Mesopotamia, attempts to show
that Genesis 1 is directly dependent on Enuma elish cannot be judged successful” (Creation Accounts in the
Ancient Near East and the Bible, The Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Monograph Series 26 [Washington, D.C:
Catholic Biblical Association, 1994], 140). A. Heidel’s chart of a shared sequence of events between
Enuma elish and Genesis 1 has been borrowed by Speiser and others as evidence for dependency, even
though Heidel “concluded that the parallels were so inexact that the question of actual literary dependency
must remain inconclusive” (Bernard Batto, Slaying the Dragon: Mythmaking in the Biblical Tradition
[Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992], 77). Clifford concurs: “Unfortunately, the
similarities are misleading” (140). They “do not take into account the different structures of the two
works…The worlds of the two texts are altogether different, in fact” (140, 141). Nevertheless, Genesis 1
does have some parallels with other ANE texts; “Given our present knowledge, however, it is difficult to
prove that any single work is the source of Genesis 1. The text may well be eclectic” (141). A very helpful
account of the development of the various ANE cultures and their myths can be found in Geoffrey
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that Ugaritic or Akkadian texts help to give us the full sense of the old myth of which the
Bible only has allusions and snippets.98 Thus Levenson works out of the framework he
inherited which presupposes some type of continuum from the old myths of Israel’s
neighbors through Israel’s borrowing of them and demythologizing them to Israel’s
eventual progression to the doctrine of creation out of nothing. By examining biblical
texts as though their use of certain images is in keeping with their use in the old myth
(with varying degrees of distance), Levenson believes he is doing the least violence to the
biblical text and its meaning.99
There is now, however, more than one explanatory framework available through
which to give an account of the data within extant ANE texts. Those who have
developed these variant explanatory frameworks often have done so in reaction to stated
weaknesses in methodology of those operating within the older framework. When a
progression from old myth to creatio ex nihilo is not assumed, and when the meaning of
biblical images and their function are determined first by their scriptural context and only
then compared and contrasted with those of foreign texts, then a radically different
picture of Israel’s thinking emerges that demands a new framework to explain the
relationship of Israel’s texts to its neighbors’. Most significantly, in one alternate
reading, there is no combat found in Scripture between God and a part of nature; far too
often theophany is mistaken for combat. There is no depiction of the seas as being angry,
rebellious, or evil.100 No part of creation is innately hostile to God, nor does God meet

Dobson’s A Chaos of Delight: Science, Religion and Myth and the Shaping of Western Thought (London:
Equinox, 2005).
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Levenson, 8.
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See Watson’s list of scholars who have been challenging the notion of “chaos” in Genesis 1:2 (16, n. 27).
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Watson, 4 and 259ff. In relation to Genesis 1:2 specifically B. Alster concludes: “Although attempts
have been made to find traces in the OT of a combat between God and an alleged monster like Tiāmat
(Rahab and Leviathan), there is no evidence that tĕhôm ever was such a personal mythological character. In
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any part of creation with automatic hostility. Instead, “God’s actions toward creation are
governed by his good purpose, not automatic hostility to some of its components.”101
The point here is not to reproduce all of the arguments against Levenson’s
framework. Rather, the point is that the framework in which one operates is extremely
influential in how the data is interpreted. The idea of a mythic evolution out of which
Levenson works has been adapted and nuanced over the decades in response to various
criticisms against it. Even in its adjusted form, it is still under attack. New readings of
the biblical texts and ongoing scholarship in ANE studies challenge the claims made
about the biblical texts by Levenson and undermine the adequacy of the framework he
uses to explain the data. This will be seen further in the sections that follow.

b. An ANE Combat-as-Creation Myth or Distinct Combat Myths and
Creation Myths in the ANE?

In the work of Rebecca Watson, she claims that in Babylonian sources there is no
intrinsic connection between Chaoskampf and creation.102 Even in Enuma elish, where
the two themes of combat and world formation appear on the same tablet, any connection
is of minor or passing concern. Almost without exception—Enuma elish being that one
possible exception—combat myths “are not concerned with cosmic origins but with
theomachic conflicts and the battle for supremacy among the gods.”103 Within these

the relevant passages, tĕhôm refers to the waters of the Reed Sea, and the separation of the waters refers to
the Exodus rather than to the creation of the world. The scene is Israel’s crossing the sea after God had
separated its waters (Isa 27:1; 51:9-10; Ps 74:12-17; 89:9-12; Job 9:13-14; 26:12-13)” (1638).
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Watson, 73; cf. 374.
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Ibid., 20. She cites N. Forsyth’s The Old Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth in which he too claims
that combat is not linked with creation. In the Ugaritic myths of Baal versus Yam or Mot, the battle is at
most a struggle for control of the world and its organization; nevertheless, is it El who is the creator, not
Baal (Watson, 21). This is in keeping with the scholarly contributions of McCarthy.
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Ibid., 21. Watson concludes that “a survey of relevant scholarship indicates that, at the least, a causal
connection between combat and creation can no longer be presupposed” (24).
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myths the greatness of the struggle is emphasized. There is also a genuine possibility of
defeat for both sides.104 In fact, in many of the myths the champion (or winning side) is
defeated in an initial combat before victory is accomplished in the main battle.105 This
can be seen in Enuma elish where both Ea and Anu were sent on failed missions to
subdue Tiamat before Marduk prevailed.106
There are problems in finding a single combat myth tradition. In looking closely
at the examples in Ugaritic and Babylonian texts, there are both similarities and glaring
differences between them.107 Presuppositions have often clouded comparative studies in
harmonizing these texts.108 Harmonization also happens between biblical and nonbiblical texts. In the biblical examples often cited as combat against chaos, dependence is
often assumed more than demonstrated. Thus, differences are overlooked; missing
components of ANE combat myths are not highlighted. For example, in Israel’s writings
waters may flee and dragons may be slain, but there are never two parties in the Scripture
locked in combat;109 “there is no mention of the issuing of a challenge, of any attempt to
assault God, or even of acts of self-defiance by these agents. Their active opposition to
God is nowhere unequivocally stated; nor is there any indication that God’s destruction
or ‘ordering’ of them is a reaction to their behavior.”110 The actual dynamics at work in
the biblical texts have been clouded by presupposed “combat” themes.
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Thus, in the entire ANE there is one extant text in which a combat has a
connection with creation. Even then, the connection has more to do with proximity in the
text than with an intentional conceptual integration of the two events. As a general rule,
there are distinct combat myths and creation myths in the ANE. Second, the dependence
of certain of Israel’s writings on the combat myths of its neighbors is commonly
assumed. However, even in piecing together all of the biblical texts used as examples,
collectively they lack important components of combat myths. Most importantly they
lack an opponent fighting against God. Levenson’s framework, in which creation is
mastery, rests upon a tradition within scholarship that views creation in the ANE as
combative. However, as that creation as combat tradition is being examined, the
evidence once cited in support has been found to be built upon assumptions more than
reality. For Levenson to keep his interpretation of Scripture, he would need to rebuild the
ANE background and its connections to Scripture from the ground up.

c. Looking Again at the Dynamics in the Narrative of Enuma elish

This section could be considered an excursus. However, since there are many
claims made based on Enuma elish, it is worth looking at that text itself. Its interpretation
is key to Levenson’s framework. Reading through the narrative brings to the surface
several points of disconnect between the text and how its characters and plot have been
depicted. These features of the text bring into question how it has been commonly used.
At the start of Enuma elish, the masculine Apsu intermingles with the feminine
Tiamat.111 It is commonly said that Apsu is the subterranean fresh water and Tiamat is
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mythic character in Babylonian mythology (1637).
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salt water in Enuma elish. However, the text does not say this. In V.52-66 the text says
Tiamat is the source of all fresh water.112 Apsu, thus, maintains in the text his more
traditional place as the “lower part of the cosmos” IV.144-145. The contrast utilized
between Apsu and Tiamat is between masculine and feminine—a generative union—
more than between salt water and fresh.113
Talking about the initial conditions in Enuma elish between Apsu, Tiamat, and the
mysterious Mummu as “chaos” or “chaotic” is not necessarily in keeping with the tone of
Tablet I. In their intermingling “the verb does not even indirectly suggest the initial state
of the primordial oceans as ‘chaotic.’ According to Lambert (oral communication), this
‘intermingling’ of these two waters was orderly in itself, that is, ‘as one’ (istenis).”114 It
was also positive in that it resulted in the generation of the gods. Generation through
male-female intermingling (not violence) is the first and most primal mode of creation
depicted in Enuma elish.115
In the movement of Enuma elish’s narrative the raw, primal material—which
generates the gods and is formed into the creation—exists with no assigned place,
established dwelling, or designated purpose. For example, Apsu, the lower part of the
cosmos, is one with Tiamat; the traditional layers in Mesopotamian cosmology were not
yet established/created. Likewise, the gods when they are birthed have no assigned
places or purposes either. Those had not yet been designated for them. They had not yet
been called by their names and their destinies had not yet been fixed.116
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How the young gods are initially related to their primordial parents is ambiguous.
The spatial relationships are unclear; in some regards the gods are still enmeshed in their
parents. As a result, the aimless gods and the primordial stuff do nothing but disturb one
another. The gods act like juvenile delinquents stirring their parents. The gods’ motions
make ripples in their parents, disturbing them, and their parents’ motions in turn disturb
the gods.117 It is only until Apsu is killed and bars are set for his place and Marduk rises
in the assembly, kills Tiamat, and makes a world that the gods and world-stuff are given
places. When the primal (now dead) materials are divided up and arranged,118 the gods
are appointed to various realms and given roles. They are given dwellings in which to
rest at night—a solution to their disturbing, all-hours antics. Stars are made and put in
places, gates and locks ensure the stability of their places.
The angst in the narrative up until the gods and the primordial stuff are assigned
places and purposes is deeply felt. The gods seem enmeshed with Tiamat. It had not
been established in the relationship between the gods and the primordial stuff, of who
controlled whom and who should control the destinies. That was sorted out through
combats. Until that hierarchy is established, Tiamat is giving the destinies to her general
Kingu and the gods are giving destinies to Marduk. When Marduk defeats Tiamat and
Kingu, he is the only one left holding destinies. One major uncertainty in the narrative is
resolved.
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The young gods were created “within” Apsu and Tiamat (I.9). The gathering together of the divine
brothers—their moving and running about in the divine abode (I.24)—disturbed the inner parts of Tiamat
(I.23; Heidel, 19). This was painful to Tiamat and Apsu (I.27); they couldn’t sleep (I.38). When Marduk
was born, “he caused waves and disturbed Tiamat” (I.107; Heidel, 22). The gods accused Tiamat’s interior
of being disturbed so that they cannot rest (I.115).
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Along with the use of Apsu as a mythical entity and the combining of a combat myth and a creation
myth, which both have been noted already, the formation of the sky and earth out of two halves of the
corpse of a slain monster within Enuma elish is also new to Mesopotamian cosmology (Alster, 1636f.).
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It is not Tiamat who was “chaos” or “chaotic” by nature; it is not Tiamat who is
disorder. It is the purposeless gods who stir her up who are as much the problem as
Tiamat is by nature or character; after all, it is she who cried out to Apsu in response to
his plan to put an end to the gods that she and Apsu should endure the pain inflicted upon
them by their offspring “good-naturedly.”119 Mummu is the one who prods Apsu to go
on with his plan to kill his offspring, the plan Ea understood causing Ea to kill Apsu and
bind Mummu. Furthermore, it is the gods who scheme for their own benefit to convince
Tiamat to avenge Apsu. After Apsu is killed and placed, and right after the birth of
Marduk, the text says:
Then Anu begot winds and brought them from the four quarters, to be the
van and to command the ranks; and he brought the tornado, a wild surf to
worry Tiamat. But now the other gods had no rest any more, tormented by
storms, they conspired in their secret hearts and brought to Tiamat the
matter of their plot. To their own mother they said, “When they killed
Apsu you did not stir, you brought no help to him, your husband. Now
Anu has called up from the four quarters this abomination of winds to rage
in your guts, and we cannot rest for the pain; Remember Apsu in your
heart, your husband, remember Mummu who was defeated; now you are
all alone, and thrash around in desolation, and we have lost your love, our
eyes ache and we long for sleep. Rouse up, our Mother! Pay them back
and make them empty like the wind.” Tiamat approved it…120
In order that they could rest, the young gods convinced Tiamat to fight the major gods on
their behalf by pressing her on her personal misery and on her sensibilities as a wife and
mother. Tiamat’s downfall was in becoming a pawn in the not-yet-destined politics
among the gods. Neither Tiamat nor Apsu were chaos in themselves. The not-yethaving-social-order situation among the gods and between the gods and the
primal/parental stuff is where the tension lies in the narrative. Thus, saying that there
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was initially creation out of “chaos” or out of “chaotic” beings/substances itself is in need
of justification based on the text.
It is the entire picture that elicits uncertainty. As the narrative unfolds further, its
overall effect gives assurance that it is not the world’s matter, the primordial stuff, that
controls the destinies but the gods—specifically, Babylon’s god Marduk. The
arrangements and courses of the cosmic-polis are established by the gods, and not by the
stuff of the world. In fact, it gives assurance that there are destinies at all. In the present
order of things there is not directionless or purposeless generation. The gods themselves
are not purposeless but have places and courses. Humans too have places and courses in
the grand picture under the gods. Before this balance is established, there is infancy—
literally, newly birthed gods. It is not “disorder” or “anti-order” because no order or
purpose has yet been uttered for it. If any social arrangements were conceived, no one
had the recognized authority or power/ability to override the plurality of voices. There is
aimlessness—juvenile mixing. There is that which can be cosmos, but it lacks the
designs and dictates of Marduk, who violently claimed dominance and to whom it is
gifted to be the rightful holder of the destinies.

d. Framing the Reading of Images

i. Choosing an Interpretive Lens

Levenson does not always make arguments based on the text for why he
characterizes the images in the HB in the way that he does in the specific texts he cites: as
evil, angry, rebellious, etc. For example, he speaks about the sea in Job 38:8-11 as being
a reference to “a somewhat sinister force that, left to its own, would submerge the world

119
and forestall the ordered reality we call creation.”121 The translation he uses of the text
is:
Who closed the sea behind doors
When it gushed forth out of the womb,
When I clothed it in clouds,
Swaddled it in dense clouds,
When I made breakers My limit for it,
And set up its bars and doors,
And said, “You may come so far and no farther;
Here your surging waves will stop”?
Levenson comments that the only thing to prevent the sinister sea from being left to its
own devices is the “mastery of YHWH, whose blast and thunder or whose craftsmanship
and commanding word force the Sea into its proper place, apparently without a
struggle.”122 Levenson does not justify why he ignores the metaphor in the passage of the
sea being birthed, clothed, and swaddled.123 In the metaphor, the baby gushed out of the
womb. Instead of being left naked to spill out all over the place, it was given clothing
and a container. Without assuming ahead of time that waters represent a sinister force
and that God’s action in the text should be understood as opposition to the sea, this
passage sounds grace-full and is a touching image of God’s parenting of a child—though
be it a large, mighty child.
The significance of references to bars and doors should not automatically be
assumed to be an antagonistic relationship. It is possible to find a background for that
popular interpretation by looking narrowly at two places in Enuma elish. The first is
where Ea killed Apsu and then took Mummu124 and “shut in (and) barred (the door)
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against him.”125 Narrowly, this can be understood as an overpowering and limiting of
Mummu. In the metaphor in this context, nevertheless, Marduk domesticates Mummu;
Marduk puts him in a holding pen, places a ring in his nose, and then leads him around.
The whole work viewed widely narrates a movement from there being no
structure and purposes among the gods and the primal elements to every element having a
place, as well as the gods having assigned places and roles. This reference to Mummu
being limited and no longer being anyplace (or everyplace) can be understood as a mythic
explanation both for how and why the cosmos is as it is and for the gods’ lordly
relationship to the stuff of the cosmos.
The second reference in Enuma elish to hardware such as bars, gates, or doors is
on Tablet IV lines 137-140 and is in a similar category to the first. After Marduk killed
Tiamat, he “vanquished (and) subdued” his other enemies.126 He then came back to her
dead body, smashed her skull and severed her arteries. All the gods rejoiced, Marduk
received gifts, and he rested. Finally he decided “to create ingenious things” out of the
carnage:127 “He split her like a shellfish into two parts: half of her he set up and ceiled it
as the sky, pulled down the bar and posted guards. He bade them to allow not her waters
to escape.”128 Here the metaphor is one of a prison.129 However, just as with Apsu after
he was killed, Tiamat’s corpse was made into a recognizable part of the cosmos. She—or
rather, her matter—finally was assigned to a place instead of having no place (or
everyplace). There is also a transition here, as there was with Apsu, that she is now
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talked about less as a character, but as water, a component of the cosmos. It is her waters
that the guards are not to allow to leak, not her.130 The concern is the maintenance of the
place of her waters in the cosmos being newly established. The purpose and place toward
which Marduk decided to use half of her corpse is as the sky. He put up a bar and guards
to make sure his cosmos stays as he places it. Notice that no bar or guards are posted for
the half of Tiamat’s corpse left below.
The security of the upper waters is good news for the readers of the myth who
know that a huge volume of water is suspended over their heads. This was also good
news in that Anu, Enlil, and Ea now had their corresponding fixed residences, or
stations.131 The fourth tablet starts with Marduk being given a throne among the gods as
their lord in a time when no hierarchy of the gods over matter had yet been established.
That lack of established hierarchy is resolved when Marduk slays Tiamat and takes the
destinies away from Tiamat’s general Kingu. The tablet ends with not only the first lack
being addressed (no hierarchy) but also with Marduk having formed the beginnings of a
cosmos, thereby establishing residences and stations for the other three great-gods.
The last significant reference to containing hardware in Enuma elish is on Tablet
V in which Marduk has created stations for the great-gods and is setting up the
astrological entities as their likenesses. Marduk “opened gates on both sides, and made
130
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strong lock(s) to the left and to the right. In the very center thereof he fixed the
zenith.”132 The point of the tablet is the assurance that the gods and their likenesses, the
stars, all have duties and places, and that “none might go wrong (and) be remiss.”133
The point of looking at these three references in Enuma elish is only to show that
all references to gates and/or bars in the ANE do not necessarily designate an adversarial
relationship, especially not an ongoing one. In two of the references they do elicit
notions of either a pen or prison that holds in what had been Marduk’s adversary. In a
third reference they keep the courses of the newly made astrological entities.
Nevertheless, in all cases the adversary (if there was one) was already neutralized, even
killed, at the time the securing hardware was used. Its function was to enduringly fix
some facet of the newly placed cosmological arrangement. In all of the references, their
inclusion offers assurance of the constancy and surety of Marduk’s ordering of the
cosmos out of a previously pathless and place-less cast of characters. Because gates and
bars serve this broader function in the text, and not always in reference to a persisting
adversarial relationship, no more should be claimed about them than that they reassure
the reader that there is a strong, steady boundary for that which exists and would be
aimless otherwise.
In Job, the birth imagery bears closer resemblance to Marduk’s ordering of his
newly made stars. In other words, the birthed seas are neither a prisoner of war nor the
dismembered corpse of his vanquished foe. In Job, a baby lacking viscosity receives the
132
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type of creative care Marduk’s stars receive: the gift of a steady place that is for the good
of all.
A second issue related to interpretive perspective is that Levenson’s use of Enuma
elish is nearly to the exclusion of considering other possible ANE interlocutors. In the
twenty years since Levenson published his book, comparisons between Genesis 1 and
Enuma elish have been undermined even further than they had been previously.134 Also,
by ignoring the way the primal waters are treated in Egyptian or Sumerian cosmology,
for example, Levenson does not consider as a source for Genesis 1:2 the moral neutrality
of the waters, their generative power, or the non-combative relationship the gods have
with them in much of the ANE literature. Instead he chooses to view the waters within
the notion of chaos that he constructed in comparison to a specific interpretation of one
ANE text.
William Brown has studied the role of waters in Greek, Egyptian, Ugaritic,
Sumerian, and Akkadian cosmologies and found in the MT’s precursors that the closest
parallels to the way waters function in Genesis 1—with a generative function for land,
fish and birds—are found in certain cosmogonic traditions in Egyptian, Sumerian, and
Akkadian. In Sumerian mythology, the originations of birds and fish are conjoined.135
The Sumerian god Enki, the god of the watery abyss, represents the power of fertility. As
that tradition was brought into Akkadian, Enki was cast “as the water god who provides,
in addition to fish, birds from the waters above.”136
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In Egyptian literature, Nun was the primeval ocean deity. “Nun was often
pictured as a stagnant primeval ocean that the air churned in order to bring about the
appearance of the ‘hillock.’… Nun functioned only in a generally creative sense in that
the primordial god was considered the ultimate theogonic source.”137 The gods, such as
Ptah, would seize the power of the potential for being within the primal material into
themselves in order to create. “Water, as personified by Nun, exhibited a generally
creative potency in Egyptian mythology… In short, water is often described in Egyptian
cosmogonies as having a creative link not only with aquatic creatures such as fish, but
also with birds.”138 Thus, within Genesis 1, with the way waters come to participate in
God’s creative activity at God’s exhortation—particularly with fish and birds—the more
likely ANE background for the waters are the positive, generative perspectives from
Sumerian, Akkadian, and Egyptian sources.

ii. Looking for the Function of Images in the Context of the Whole Work

Why does Levenson insist that the Flood narrative and the Exodus narrative
manifest “the same pattern of a cosmogonic victory over lethal waters” as a combat
myth?139 Regarding the Flood narrative, it does not personify the waters and only shows
God as the one in control. The only way to read the waters in that narrative as anything
other than a large volume of water used as a tool of judgment and purification by God is
to import those ideas into the text from combat traditions. The problem with that
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importation is that the antagonists in ANE combat myths are nowhere described by the
term “flood.”140
Similarly, Levenson states that the Exodus is a combat at the sea in which the
“enemy is not the sea (which is totally under YHWH’s control), but Pharaoh.”141 If there
is a combat myth underlying Exodus 14—15 that has been fully historicized, and if the
adversary is Pharaoh (as in the case of the Flood narrative it was the wickedness of
humanity), why does Levenson color his descriptions of the waters in these accounts as
though they represent the watery chaos-adversary from another culture’s combat myths?
Why does he import concepts found in myths about a hand-to-hand combat between a
god and waters into biblical texts about a conflict between God and humans in which God
uses waters? Levenson does not clearly or convincingly show the logic of how an
ancient myth about cosmic combat underlies a story with characters of a different nature
(humans instead of a natural element), in an historical setting (instead of a primordial, ahistorical setting), and with waters having a different role (as instrument instead of living
adversary). Most puzzling, if the antagonist becomes humans instead of waters, how is
Levenson’s vilification of the waters justified, as well as the continuation of the “chaos”
motif in regard to these waters?
In looking at the importance of context, it is questionable whether the author of
Exodus meant for the events at the sea to be read as combat, although this interpretation
has certainly been in vogue.142 Another way to read the entire narrative of Exodus 1—
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14, which results in Israel’s celebration in chapter 15, is that God orchestrates a series of
events whereby Israel and Egypt come to know that he is YHWH.143
The author writes the narrative in such a way that readers, unlike the characters in
the narrative, get to see what God is up to. The reader is let in on the irony that it is God
who must harden Pharaoh’s heart during the onslaught of the plagues. Pharaoh is not
nearly as strong or god-like as those in the story presume him to be. God holds Pharaoh
up so that, at Pharaoh’s letting go of the Israelites, it appears God has achieved a hard
won victory over a strong foe. This played on people’s beliefs concerning the might of
Pharaoh and Egypt in order for them to have some comprehension by analogy of the
greatness of God’s power.
After God, by means of a crushed Pharaoh, lets the people go, God positions
Israel in a precise place by the sea from where they cannot flee (14:2). God then sends
poor Pharaoh after them by once again hardening his heart, and the hearts of any of his
advisors who may have wisely at that point counseled otherwise. The Israelites, who still
at this point fear the Egyptians and not YHWH,144 think they would have been better off
staying in Egypt under the superpower that God is manipulating to come after them. God
saves Israel from his puppet-Egypt by letting them cross the sea, and then God drowns
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the Egyptians in the waters. Egypt comes to know that YHWH is God. Israel also comes
to know that YHWH is God and they fear him more than the world-superpower they
watched YHWH crush. This transfer of fear is a prerequisite for Israel following God
(Ex 13:21-22; 1:17) and not the Egyptians (Ex 14:10-12).
Levenson calls this a “combat” at the sea. However, the term “combat” is only
justifiable from the perspective of the human characters in the narrative. The author lets
the reader see that the “combat” is a sham. Pharaoh is not a god who can combat with
YHWH; so Pharaoh must be propped up (hardened) so that the “combat” looks
convincing to both sides. But never does Exodus’ author let the reader think Pharaoh or
Egypt can engage YHWH in true two-sided combat as the old combat myths reported
among divine/primordial beings. If the author of Exodus imports imagery from old
combat myths and every presupposition in the ANE about the divinity of Pharaoh, it is
only to make a mockery of them and expose their hollowness before almighty YHWH.
In the worldview within which the Exodus narrative is told, God alone is in the category
of cosmic forces.
Thus, it is not enough to be able to say that vestiges of an old combat myth are
present in a biblical text and then interpret terms and images in the biblical text as though
they still function the way they did in the other ANE texts. The meaning and significance
of terms and images must be determined by their use and function in their context, i.e., in
the immediate sentence, passage, work, other works of that genre or theological tradition,
and the extant texts of that people group. Only then should comparisons and contrasts be
made among the ways those images function in other cultures. Neither the Flood nor Sea
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Crossing narratives stand as examples in the Pentateuch giving warrant for linking the
waters of Genesis 1 with chaos.145

e. Reading Chaos into the Priestly Cosmography: Genesis 1:1—2:3

Genesis 1:2 is not overly generous with its descriptions. It introduces a tohu
wabohu earth, darkness, the waters, and the presence of the Spirit of God. The verse does
not say how to view these things. It does not say that some represent chaos, evil, or
anything other than matter. Context helps determine what to do.
Levenson observes that there is no combat, no struggle, or resistance in the text.
In Genesis 1:1—2:3, the primal stuff is inert. God orders it. Even so, Levenson
presumes that the text is in line with Enuma elish so that the stuff of v. 2 is a symbol for
chaos—that it is evil.146 The Priestly account represents for Levenson a new step in the
demythologization of the primordial stuff away from the myth of combat/mastery. This
explains the inertness of the chaos and the absence of resistance to God’s ordering in the
text.
The question is, however, whether reading notions of chaos/evil within the text is
an accurate reading of the Priestly cosmography. William Brown has studied the MT,
LXX,

and the Hebrew Vorlage behind the LXX. He makes a strong case that the tradition

represented by the LXX and the Hebrew VorLXX (itself of Palestinian origin) represents
an older textual tradition that lies closer to the “Priestly” source. In both the LXX and the
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VorLXX the waters play a generative role. They begin as inert, but by vv. 9 and 10 they
are named and are elicited to participate with God in creating.
Analysis of the texts shows that the MT is a redaction of this older textual
tradition. From that older tradition, the Masoretic tradition added many heptatic features.
Also, even though the earth retains its generative role in the MT, certain transition
formulas were moved or removed to downplay the generative role of the waters.147 Thus,
in looking at the text tradition from which the Masoretes drew, one sees there is a
social/collaborative structure throughout in which “God assumes the role as the ‘total’
subject, the earth and the waters are depicted as agents and occasionally subjects in the
process of creation, and the remaining objects of creation are commanded to be agents in
the maintenance of order, all within a rigorously consistent structure.”148 In this social
structure, “God is not set over and against the created order; rather God is portrayed as
acting fundamentally with the created and creating order.”149 The divine “commands”
should be interpreted as jussive commands to “connote a sense of collaboration among
the agents.”150 God’s rule is with creation.
Thus in the conceptual world of P, the picture “is preeminently one of harmonious
collaboration. P is convinced that only such a ‘social’ ordering can result in perfect (tôb)
147
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work and order.”151 According to Brown this is the ideology, or teaching, of P’s
cosmogony. It “offers a cosmic prolegomenon for the realization of a clearly
differentiated community, for the inauguration of a new age in the cultural history of the
exilic/post-exilic community, as well as a utopian ideal by which anything less than
perfect cooperation and order can be critically assessed.”152 Such an ideology is
“characterized by collaboration in which all segments of the cosmic/social order are
incorporated according to their respective abilities.”153

f. Undesirable Theological Implications

In the categories of the classic framework for the doctrine of creation the three
options were creation out of nothing, emanation, or dualism: in other words, creation—
distinct from or out of God—as a total act of God alone or some type of interaction
between God and a preexistent other. Levenson outright rejects a notion of creation out
of nothing within the HB and chooses to read the cosmologies through the framework of
a pre-existing, uncreated chaos. Not only is there this uncreated chaos, it is neither
morally good nor neutral. He classifies it as evil. Thus, God’s most fundamental
relationship to the only thing that is primally other to God is antagonistic. These two
forces, the good-God and evil-stuff, are in open conflict with each other. Levenson does
not give the powers of chaos intellect or give them personhood beyond personifying their
manifestations. Nevertheless, chaos works against God and God’s cosmogonic efforts.
With Levenson’s starting foundation of tension between God and the other, God’s
action toward the other is (dis)colored accordingly. The impetus and end of God’s action
151
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is to gain mastery so that God would reach the fullness of God’s lordship over all others.
This happens in opposition to the other and ultimately at a cost of the complete nihilation of the primal other. God will truly gain alpha position when not only all else is
subjected to his ordering mastery, but also when that fundamental, primal chaos/evil
within all else is conquered and eradicated. When God’s own coming to be is described
relative to sovereignty, lordship, and mastery, it results in an incomplete view of God’s
motive, work, and aim in creating and in relating to creation itself.154 God’s foundational
relationship to the other is not opposition. God’s first act toward the other is not mastery
by way of combat, force, or even command. Rather, God is love; God’s first act is selfgift by the Spirit (Gen 1:2).
Levenson’s starting point of tension has implications for God’s relationship not
only with creation, but also for humans in how Levenson depicts the function of Israel’s
cult and in how their covenant relationship is defined. Within the cult, humanity’s
relationship to creation mirrors God’s. The cult is a matter of holding back and holding
together; it is a tool for engaging the enemy. Only insofar as that is accomplished can
and does the good order that is creation come into being. The cult (and God’s creating) is
154
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not first and primarily about the unfolding of the good and the beautiful. It is not first
about the expression of the good among a people in relation to God. It is not first loving
God and neighbor. It is first a battle. The cult (and creating) is defined first by what it
negates.
In Jacob Milgrom’s years of studying Leviticus, he concluded that in the Priestly
cosmography there was no notion of the demonic.155 The demonic that had to be fended
off and guarded against in neighboring cults was eliminated in Israel’s Priestly cult and
replaced with human sin. Humans were the problem; nothing else.156 Humans did not
start as a universal problem. Rather, insofar as they did not live out the goodness of
God’s calling—i.e., follow after God’s walking before them—they became impure.
Within the cult, there was a solution for the polluting effects of human sin. The solution
was not a warding off or holding back the effects of human sin. The solution was a
positive (creative) life-giving restoration into the goodness of the covenant community.157
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The cultic/religious way of life of the people also needs to be stressed with, if not above,
the reparative practices provided for in the Priestly literature. Living in holiness, in the
sacredness of life, is of key significance in many of the obscure prescriptions for daily
life in the Levitical code.
In regard to the covenant between God and Israel, Levenson wrestles between
humanity’s autonomy and complete heteronomy.158 Humans cannot be completely
mastered and lose their subjectivity. For God to be lord over humans, all hints of
autonomy cannot be erased; that would undermine God being lord over a them. On the
other hand, if humans are utterly autonomous, then God lacks mastery. In Levenson’s
zero sum framework, for God to win, the other must lose some of the freedom it
possesses by nature;159 it must lose some of its personhood.160 Both God and the other
cannot both, at the same time, come to the fullness of personal expression. Covenant and
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God and the world in their existence and operations. Levenson rightly sees that theology of creation and
covenant are linked. Unfortunately, because he works within the traditional polarity of creation theology—
especially by choosing to start with a duality—it shapes and limits how he portrays covenant relationship.
159
See Charles Taylor’s treatment of differing notions of freedom in part II of Philosophy and the Human
Sciences – Philosophical Papers: 2 (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1985). Levenson’s use of the term “freedom” in this portion is a modern use because freedom
belongs to the person instead of being ascribed based on having a certain place in a society (Taylor, 319).
Levenson’s view would also be an example of a negative theory of freedom; freedom is individual
independence from others (Taylor, 213). Levenson says that there is a divine command prior to humans
having freedom. Thus, there is a duty to use freedom according to the command. This is not using a
positive theory of freedom, however, because in the using of freedom, the person has not “effectively
determined oneself and the shape of one’s life” (Taylor, 213). The person is submitting to another’s
designs instead of seeking self-realization. The person freely truncates their freedom, a part of him/herself.
160
Levenson did not invent this dilemma, or zero-sum framework. It is an ongoing issue in the classic
framing of the doctrine of creation. He simply starts on the side of dualism (autonomy) and works toward
divine mastery instead of starting with divine fiat alone (heteronomy) and explain the otherness of creation.
One aim of this project is to move beyond the dilemma of these approaches in the doctrine of creation.
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creation both entail a gain for God and a loss for the other. The other is subjected under
the command of God.
Levenson seeks to find a way through the insufficiency of saying covenant (and
creation) is both autonomy and heteronomy by an appeal to dialectic. Nevertheless, in
the framing of the dialectic, God’s prior commanding and imposition of duties still
remains over-and-against the free ones who must choose the place of servanthood. Thus,
recognizing “God’s inscrutable yet unimpugnable mastery is always painfully difficult—
God has made things that way.”161 The consolation for submitting against one’s grain is
that “it does result in the good life in which God reinstates his justice and renews his
generosity…the good order that is creation comes into being.”162 This willful subjection
is the precondition for the good order to come about. In addition, for creation to be
willfully subjected, then, is also a facet of the good order.163
Levenson hypostatizes chaos/evil and makes it innate within creation. Because
God is against chaos/evil, God is against creation insofar as chaos/evil is innate to it.
God can only be unreservedly for creation at the eschaton when chaos/evil is purged. In
the Christian tradition, evil has been defined commonly as a lack. Even though that lack
is manifest within creation with real, negative consequences, evil is still not hypostasized.
Thus, God does not suppress it; that would be logically absurd. Rather, evil can be
eliminated through God’s abundant gifting. God’s response to evil is not against
creation.164 It is for creation and creation’s fulfillment.
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It is remarkable that Brown, looking at the exact same text, comes to the exact opposite conclusion. It is
cooperation and collaboration—full participation by all according to ability—that is a requirement for and
part of the good order.
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This claim is certainly not a settled matter in biblical theology. Divine justice in the Bible has been
interpreted as punitive for centuries. The challenges raised against this interpretation have been increasing
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5. Levenson’s Laudable Ideas

First, Levenson rejects the presence of a notion within the HB of a creation that
was established in a fixed state at God’s decree. He has observed in the HB the
dynamism of the relationship between God and creation, which includes humans.165 He
also understands that covenant is not fixed by divine decree and irrevocable.166 It too is
relational and dynamic; it is ongoingly honored and chosen. His observations about the
dynamism of the relationship between God and creation/humans in creating and covenant
will be affirmed.
Second, Levenson is right to reject the dichotomy between autonomy and
heteronomy in the divine-human relationship. Nevertheless, in building his creation
theology, he has simply chosen the opposite of creation out of nothing; the tension
between choosing God as sole source or there being an autonomously-existing other
remains. He is to be applauded for wanting to get beyond that tension between the two
polarities. His creation paradigm simply does not enable him to describe his dialectic
outside of the language of “command” and “freedom”, “obedience” and “argument” that
is rooted at the poles in the dichotomy. Even so, his insight and intention to go beyond
the dichotomy will be preserved.
Third, connecting covenant and creation together is a brilliant observation and
Levenson is right in making it. However, the way in which Levenson frames the two

in recent years by those who see God’s justice as restorative; see Sharon Baker’s essay (n. 149). The
notion of evil as a lack is not universally accepted and has not been free of criticisms; see T. F. Torrance,
“Contingence and Disorder,” in Divine and Contingent Order: Nihil constat de contingentia nisi ex
revelatione (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 87-92; also see Robert John Russell,
“Entropy and Evil,” Zygon 19, no. 4 (2006): 449-468.
165
See, e.g., ibid., 12.
166
Ibid., 138.
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components is not the only justifiable viewpoint. He assumes, even in the Genesis 1
account, that the waters, darkness, and tohu-wabohu-earth are symbols of chaos/evil.
Thus, God’s interaction with them is command and mastery. If notions of evil were
eliminated from his interpretation, the relationship of God to the other in creation and
covenant would change drastically. Also, if more attention were paid to the divine
speech of “Let there be…” it could be interpreted as call and response instead of
command and obedience. God’s utterance becomes a positive proposition toward
fullness, goodness, and beauty for the other instead of mastery, limitation, and
subjugation. God’s speech becomes abundant gift for that which is addressed instead of a
curse leading ultimately to God’s own good.167
If anything Levenson does not make the connection between creation and
covenant strong enough. He should have interpreted creation in light of both covenant
and the “spiritual politics” of the biblical narratives. He observes that there is a similar
politic at work in narratives, covenant, and cosmological texts. However, he does not
speak about God’s relationship with matter in cosmogony in the same ways he tries to
nuance his treatment of God’s interactions with Abraham, and later with Israel.
Levenson speaks of creation more in terms of combat and establishing forcefully an order
against the primeval chaos. The goal is heteronomy in regard to the primal chaos/evil.
Levenson does not talk about consent of the chaos/evil—the dynamic at work in the
related narrative and covenant texts. The fact that the waters, darkness, and desert-earth
are called chaos/evil precludes such a notion. Because Israel’s creation texts share the
same dynamic as both narrative and covenant texts and because of the lack of human
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heteronomy before God in those non-creation texts, Levenson should have re-evaluated
how he portrayed God’s relationship with the primal substances in God’s creative
activity.
By identifying the stuff of Genesis 1:2 as symbols of chaos/evil, the way he
described God’s relationship with it was affected. This then pushed his view of the
cosmology of the Pentateuch in a theological direction that the non-creation texts therein
show us not to move. Regardless, Levenson’s observations about the connection between
narrative, covenantal, and cosmological texts in the Pentateuch and their themes are
valuable and will be supported, even if his framing of the texts will not be.
Fourth, the work that Levenson has done linking the temple and cosmos is
significant. The temple is a microcosm of the world—the world as it should be168—and
the world is a macro-temple.169 “Collectively, the function of these correspondences is to
underscore the depiction of the sanctuary as a world, that is, an ordered, supportive, and
obedient environment, and the depiction of the world as a sanctuary, that is, a place in
which the reign of God is visible and unchallenged, and his holiness is palpable,
unthreatened, and pervasive.”170 Even though a different framework for understanding
God’s creative activity and God’s relationship to creation would change Levenson’s
168
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If other ANE gods build a temple after creating, or one is built, and they rest in it (107), what theological
statement does the Priestly writer(s) make about God’s abode/temple by saying that God created the
heavens and earth (2:1) and God rested (2:2)? The absence of a reference to temple seems to be the exact
type of statement Levenson makes that the whole of creation is—or is to become—God’s macro-temple.
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Ibid., 86. In Milgrom’s work on the significance of animal sacrifice being for the cleansing of the
temple and altar from the impurity of inadvertent sin—not the purification of the sinner—he says: “The
inadvertent offender needs forgiveness not because of his act per se—as indicated above, his act is forgiven
because of the offender’s inadvertence and remorse—but because of the consequence of his act. His
inadvertence has contaminated the sanctuary, and it is his responsibility to purge it with a hattā’t”
(Leviticus 1—16, 256). Given Jacob Milgrom’s work on sacrifice, Christ’s spilt blood on the cross would
take on a different, yet significant, cleansing function within the macro-temple, the world. Although, in an
important theological point God’s people (also called God’s temple) are given Christ’s blood to ingest. The
joining of Levenson’s and Milgrom’s scholarship on temple and sacrifice has far reaching implications for
how Christ’s sacrificial death can be understood, as well as for the Eucharist.
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language about temple and world, it is a significant connection, nevertheless, that
Levenson offers.
William Brown has already done some of the work to place Levenson’s
connection between temple and cosmos in a non-mastery framework by focusing not only
on the finished products as Levenson does, but by comparing the processes by which
creation and tabernacle-construction are described.171 Both processes have 1) a social
hierarchy marked by collaboration, 2) respective roles for each group suitable to differing
abilities, and 3) progressions free of resistance or opposition.172 In fact, in Exodus, the
response of the ‘generous of heart’173 is so great in bringing forth raw goods for the
tabernacle that some had to be turned away. Levenson’s work of connecting cosmos and
temple has been invaluable and has led to helpful insights in connecting the processes by
which they were established.
Fifth, Levenson’s claims concerning the type of transformation/new creation that
will take place at the eschaton are good.174 Even so, his framing of history as a
movement between the varying levels of divine mastery over the primordial, innate
chaos/evil in the world, humans, and history is not necessary or desirable. Where chaos
is manifest within creation, it will certainly be eradicated. However, the way “chaos” is
defined makes all the difference in what that means. Levenson’s hopes for the future are
laudable, but they will be given a different meaning as a new framework is proposed and
the terms are redefined.
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C. David T. Tsumura’s Creation and Destruction: A Reappraisal of the Chaoskampf
Theory in the Old Testament

David Tsumura not only takes a different position than Jon Levenson in
interpreting Genesis 1, the character of their writing reflects their methods. Levenson’s
writing is much more colorful and dramatic than Tsumura’s technical, yet still readable,
writing.
In this section Tsumura’s side of the conversation and an analysis of his position
will be offered. The intent in engaging Tsumura’s work is to show that it is not only
possible to give an account of creation in Genesis 1 without reference to chaos, but that it
provides a way to a more plausible and richer reading of the Priestly teachings.

1. The Questions Tsumura Seeks to Answer in Creation and Destruction

There are many assertions about links between the Genesis 1 account and other
ANE traditions. Tsumura in his work seeks to weigh the claims concerning connections
between various ANE traditions within surviving texts based on detailed examination of
the texts in question. Specifically he wants to examine the notions of pre-existing
“chaos” that have been associated with Genesis 1.
Tsumura is greatly concerned with methodology. He, with others before him,
believes “a synchronic and structural study should have priority over a diachronic and
comparative one.”175 Many errors in comparative studies are made because texts and the
images in them are not understood properly. There are also many erroneous links being
175

Tsumura, 4. See K.A. Kitchen, Ancient Orient and Old Testament (Chicago: InterVarsity Press, 1966),
87-88; see also Richard S. Hess’ outlining of the development of methods and his suggestions for
methodology in his essay “One Hundred Fifty Years of Comparative Studies on Genesis 1—11: An
Overview,” n. 92. Similar to Tsumura, in Rebecca Watson’s view it is a problematic methodology to first
go to outside sources to interpret Scripture (3, n. 7).
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perpetuated based upon faulty etymology.176 Thus, in this revision and expansion of his
1989 book177 he investigates not only Genesis 1 and 2, but also “the functions of ‘waters’
and ‘flood’ in biblical poetry” as well as whether “the so-called chaos dragons such as
Leviathan, Rahab, and Yam have anything to do with the creation motif in the biblical
tradition.”178

2. Distinguishing Tsumura’s Methodology from Those Whom He Critiques

a. Tsumura’s Synchronic Approach

In Tsumura’s methodology the first question to ask about a text is its genre and
purpose. Not enough attention has been given to the contrasts between the nature and
function of the literature in the various ANE cultures. For example, “Ugaritic has no
prophetic poetry, no psalmody, no extensive examples of literary narrative prose.”179 It
has very different genres than the Bible. Thus, in making comparisons across cultures,
there has been a tendency to “biblicize” other ANE documents and interpret biblical
documents mythologically.180
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Eisenbrauns, 1981), 107.
180
Ibid. There has also been the tendency to harmonize the differing purposes for the combat motifs in the
Ugaritic and Babylonian traditions even though the nature of the conquest in each is different. On the one
hand, Baal was establishing his kingship among the gods. On the other hand, Marduk was already
enthroned among the gods and was sent to deal with the agitated Tiamat (Tsumura, 151). I have
mentioned, nevertheless, that the superiority of the gods as a whole to the primordial stuff had not been
established in the politics of the narrative at the point that Marduk engages Tiamat. For this reason there is
some parallel between the function of the combat in the two traditions; Tiamat is simply not part of the
pantheon of gods, even though Marduk does need to establish his superiority over her.
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In determining the meaning of terms or images in these various texts, literary
context is of greatest import.181 The structure of the text shows the relationship of the
terms in the text or literary devices at play: i.e., merism, hyponym, antonym, synonym,
simile, metaphor, etc. Seeing the terms’ relationships to others in the text often indicates
the nuances of a term being highlighted. By noting these nuances as well as noting trends
in specific word pairings across texts it enables one to see that certain terms and pairings
are often reserved for specific applications within cultures.182
One brief example of looking at structure is Tsumura’s look at Psalm 46 where
the presence of a fight between God and the sea has been proposed.183 The structure
shows, however, that there is a comparison in the psalm between the destructive
capacities of the sea against the mountains or earth (vv. 2-3) and the destruction God can
bring on the nations or earth in judgment (v. 6). The psalm never places God and the seas
in tension with one another.184
Lastly, Tsumura questions the logic and accuracy of some of the prior
etymological connections made between Israel’s terms and those in the myths of its
neighbors, especially divine names in the myths. The logic had once been that a Hebrew
term such as tehom in Genesis 1:2 was derived from Tiamat;185 therefore, the presence of
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E.g., as will be shown later, certain terms for water are used in reference to certain parts of the world in
both Israel’s writings and those of its neighbors. Also, depending on the context, whether a bipartite
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across cultures.
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Mowinckel, Weiser, Neve, and Day. Their positions can be contrasted with those of Saggs and McCarthy
(Tsumura, 156).
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tehom shows that Enuma elish is a source for Genesis 1 and tehom should be interpreted
mythically as a symbol for the notion of chaos, even if it is much more toned-down than
was once represented by Tiamat. However, more recent etymological analysis shows that
it “is almost impossible to conclude that Akkadian Tiamat was borrowed by Hebrew as
těhôm.”186 Looking at the trend in Mesopotamia and Canaan to take common nouns and
later make them into divine names in limited mythological settings, it is more likely the
seeming similarity between tehom and Tiamat is a shared Semitic root *thm.187 A
simpler, logical explanation for tehom is that Israel never deified its word from the root
*thm as its neighbors did their words in select contexts.

b. Tsumura’s View of Gunkel’s Legacy of Diachronic and Typological
Methods

Given the technical nature of Tsumura’s methodology, he is critical of diachronic
methodologies that draw upon typology and allusions between texts. Much of what he
does is to clear away the conclusions of those types of studies by analyzing the method
by which they were reached, critiquing the logic of the arguments, and dissolving the
evidence through careful study of the texts in question. Tsumura denies that there is any
evidence “that the entire myth of ancient Canaan was transferred to the Bible by means of
so-called historicization. It is virtually only in the poetic texts that the ‘similar’ materials
appear, and they usually constitute just a group of words or phrases, never sentences or
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discourses.”188 His synchronic approach shows that similarity of phrases does not mean
similarity of subject matter across texts with different genres or purposes, and from
different cultural perspectives. Showing the “similarity or the ‘fact’ of sameness in form”
between ANE texts shows only that;189 the hard work of synchronic investigation still
needs to be done before comparing and contrasting terms, images, and ideas between the
texts. Comparing forms has not been distinguished enough from a synchronic
approach.190

c. The Contrasts in Observations of ANE Traditions Based on These
Methodologies

Against the backdrop of the picture that has been typically painted about ANE
mythology and the Bible’s relationship to it, Tsumura offers evidence for a drastically
different account. First, there is more than one combat myth in the ANE. In some—for
example, in the Baal myths—neither the creation nor arranging of the cosmos is ever
associated with the myth, only the cosmos’ maintenance.191 In fact, in the Baal myths the
creator god El is not even involved in the combat.192 Scholarship suggests that if there
was an early combat myth, it started along the Mediterranean or to the North.193 Enuma
elish is a later tradition in which a conflict between a storm-god and the sea is woven into
a story of the creation of the cosmos;194 “a combination of these two themes appears only
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in Enuma elish out of all the ancient Near Eastern literature discovered thus far.”195
Thus, these two mythical themes represent divergent traditions with different purposes in
their cultures.
Second, there are several types of creation accounts in ANE literature. For
example, within Mesopotamia, one tradition, only extant in Enuma elish, links the themes
of combat and creation. A second tradition—for example, seen in Creation of the world
by Marduk, from the Neo-Babylonian period—describes creation without either conflict
or personified waters.196 A third common tradition spoke of creation in terms of a birth
from “Sky” (An) and “Earth” (Ki).197 This is a tradition wherein the process of creation
is clearly not establishing order out of chaos.198 Thus, not all ANE (even Mesopotamian)
creation traditions link combat with creation or speak of creation as the ordering of
primal, chaotic stuff. The broader ANE context is far less homogenous than has been
presented in some comparative studies.

3. Tsumura’s Interpretation of Genesis 1:1—2:3

a. Tohu Wabohu

Even within the early centuries of Christian interpretation, the words tohu and
bohu were understood as “formlessness.”199 This has been continued in many modern
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translations. These translations use, for example, “confusion,” “unreality,” “emptiness,”
or “nothingness.”200 Many modern scholars follow in the line of Albright who suggested
that the phrase tohu wabohu means something like “chaos” and the word tohu itself refers
to “chaos as a watery deep, or tehom, in the Mesopotamian sense.”201 As was seen in
Levenson’s work, in cases where these terms in Genesis 1:2 are thought to symbolize
chaos, chaos means “‘disorder’ or ‘disorganization’ and stands in direct opposition to
‘creation.’”202 In contrast, Tsumura argues that the sense of the words originally was
more concrete.203

i. Tohu

Tohu is found twenty times in the OT—eleven of those instances being in
Isaiah.204 Westermann’s three categories for tohu’s appearances have become a standard
and Tsumura interacts with them. Westermann’s three classifications are: 1) a desert, 2)
a desert-like state, and 3) emptiness. The first category of an actual desert is not
controversial.205 Tsumura agrees with Westermann. In instances such as Deuteronomy
32:10, tohu simply means desert. Ugaritic’s thw, which is probably a cognate of
Hebrew’s tohu, also means “a desert.”206
Tsumura first addresses the abstract third category saying that “a lack” or a
nuanced notion of “emptiness” is closer than notions of “nothingness” for these

Platonic philosophical surroundings than special insight into the Priestly worldview due to closer temporal
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references. It is important to note when trying to find tohu’s meaning in Genesis 1:2 that
instances of tohu fitting in this third category are never in reference to earth or city. If
tohu in Genesis 1:2 is interpreted in terms of Westermann’s “emptiness” or Tsumura’s
“lack” it would be the only place in Scripture where tohu has such a meaning where
‘earth’ is being described.
The second category—a desert-like state—is used to describe the condition of
places like land, earth, or cities.207 Westermann views references in this category as
either a desert-state that is threatened against a people/place or as a reference to “the state
that is opposed to and precedes creation.”208 One text where Westermann believes tohu
is the opposite of creation is Job 26:7. However, Tsumura notes that tohu is in parallel
with “a place where there is nothing” (emphasis added). Thus, a corresponding concrete
translation of “a desert-like place” or “an empty place” better fits the context.209 In Isaiah
45:18 Westermann again takes tohu as “chaos,” the opposite of creation. In the structure
of the verse, however, the first line is contrasted with the second. That would contrast
tohu with “to be inhabited.” Here again it is a desert-like or uninhabited place.210 The
translation is more appropriately: “He created it not to be a desert-like place; he formed it
to be inhabited.”211
Westermann’s second grouping of occurrences is not necessarily wrong. It is
more a matter that his comments and translations of the texts do not adhere strictly
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enough to the more concrete notions implied by the texts themselves and the category
heading given them—“a desert-like place.”

ii. Bohu
This word only appears three times in the Bible and it is always with tohu.212 Its
etymology is not certain, but it “seems to be a Semitic term based on the root *bhw,
possibly a cognate of Arabic bahiya “to be empty.”213 The Arabic term is known to have
a concrete meaning of a tent being empty rather than an abstract meaning like
“nothingness” or “emptiness.”
In bohu’s three uses it is parallel to tohu in Isaiah 34:11 and juxtaposed with tohu
in Genesis 1:2 and Jeremiah 4:23.214 The uses are only “in reference to ‘earth’ (Gen 1:2;
Jer 4:23) or the ‘land’ of Edom (Is 34:11).”215
De Moor, when studying the Ugaritic phrase tu-a-bi-[u(?)], suggested it signifies
“the state of chaos” in light of Akkadian nabalkutu and Hebrew tohu wabohu.216
Tsumura follows the possibility of a link between these words by looking at instances
when Akkadian nabalkutu appears in reference to earth, as tohu wabohu is used in the
Bible. There are only a few such instances in versions of the Atra-Hasis Epic and The
Ritual of Kalû. In all of these instances, which point toward a development of an
idiomatic meaning in Akkadian, they speak of the Earth’s womb or the earth itself being
“out of order,” “not bearing,” or being “unproductive.”217 Just as with a human womb
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that has no children when it is barren or unproductive, the earth (or its womb) is said to
be ‘out of order’ when there is a state of “no vegetables, no cereals.”218 Tsumura
concludes that this use of nabalkutu “has nothing to do with ‘the state of chaos.’”219 If
the Ugaritic phrase and Akkadian idiom are compared, as De Moor proposes they should
be, their uses in reference to earth undermine claims about being references to chaos.
This undermines the claim for reading tohu wabohu as chaos in light of them. Tsumura
also questions the linking of tu-a-bi-[u(?)] with tohu wabohu due to the possibility that
the damaged symbols on the Ugaritic tablet are being misread, and thus the Ugaritic in
that context may not have any correlation to tohu wabohu.220

iii. Tohu Wabohu

The view that Jeremiah 4:23-26 depicts a return to primeval chaos is strongly
influenced by reading tohu wabohu in Genesis 1:2 as chaos; it is “not based on contextual
analysis of Jeremiah 4:23ff. itself.”221 The two texts do at least both describe the “earth”
with the phrase tohu wabohu, although overall the components of the earth are listed in
different orders and different terms/components are listed in the two texts. They also
have different subject matter; “in the Genesis passage it is ‘earth’ // těhôm that is
described; in Jeremiah, ‘earth’ // ‘heavens.’”222 In Jeremiah the two parts, earth and
heavens, represent the whole which is the topic of concern. In Genesis, tehom is part of

218

Ibid., 19.
Ibid., 22.
220
Ibid.
221
Ibid., 28.
222
Ibid., 30.
219

149
“earth” and completely covers the earth/land—much like the flood waters covering the
land in chapters 6—9.223
In Jeremiah 4:23-28, the words “earth” and “heavens” appear in v. 23 and v. 28
forming a frame for the section; the descriptions of the heavens and the earth in the two
verses correspond to each other.224 The passage says in v. 23 “(the earth) tōhû wābōhû”
// “(the heavens) are without light” and in v. 28 “(the earth) will dry up” // “(the heavens)
will be dark.”225 Tohu wabohu corresponds with “will dry up” just as “are without light”
corresponds with “will be dark.” This means tohu wabohu in v. 23 means something like
“aridness or unproductiveness,” a consistent picture with v. 27: “the whole earth will
become a desolation.”226 The threat in Jeremiah 4:23-28 is thus destruction due to a lack
of water.
Isaiah 34:11 places tohu and bohu in parallel. The NASB translates the verse:
And He shall stretch over it the line of desolation
And the plumb line of emptiness.227
In connecting the vocabulary of this verse with Genesis 1:2, some have said the land is
reduced to chaos. However, Tsumura sides with Wildberger when Wildberger claims
this verse simply speaks of the land becoming desolate and a waste so that it cannot
support inhabitants.
Given Tsumura’s examination of tohu appearances and concluding that there are
three types of uses that are similar to Westermann’s analysis—desert, desertlike/desolate/empty place, or emptiness—and given that the uses of tohu with bohu in
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Jeremiah 4:23 and Isaiah 34:11 remain consistent with the second category of tohu, “it
would be very reasonable to understand the phrase tōhû wābōhû in Gen 1:2 as also
describing a state of ‘desolation and emptiness,’ though the context suggests that this was
the initial state of the created earth rather than a state brought about as a result of God’s
judgment on the earth or land (cf. Jer 4:23, Isa 34:11).”228 In other words, “tōhû wābōhû
signifies the earth in a ‘bare’ state, without vegetation and animals as well as without
man…the earth as being ‘not yet’ normal.”229
Tsumura believes his literal translation of these words for the condition of the
“earth” as “desert-like and empty” or “desolate and uninhabited” fits the literary structure
of the entire chapter. A discourse analysis of Genesis 1:1-3 shows that vv. 1-2 are the
setting for the event that begins in v. 3.230 Verse 1 is a summary statement of the
whole—using the merism “heavens and earth”—and v. 2 focuses on the “earth.” The
author uses in v. 2 a grammatically positive statement—tohu wabohu—instead of
negations like in 2:5-6 (“no shrub…no plant…no rain…no man”231).
In looking further at the literary structure, the climax days, days three and six on
which vegetation, animals, and humans are created, are fitting for a tohu wabohu “earth.”
In Tsumura’s words, “the ‘not-yet-productive’ earth becomes productive when God
says,…‘let the land produce vegetation’ (v. 11) on the third day and…‘let the land
produce living creatures’ (v. 24) on the sixth day. Then, the ‘not-yet-inhabited’ earth
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becomes inhabited when God says,…‘let us make man as our image, in our likeness’ (v.
26).”232 Tsumura calls these three creative events “God’s fiats.”233
Regarding the issue of whether v. 2 tells us about the pre-existence of the stuff
mentioned in it, Tsumura gives a short treatment. He says the narrator’s concern was not
one of ontology. The text does not say that the earth and water had pre-existed, that there
existed an earth in this state, or that there was nothing there. “Rather, he simply provides
the audience with the preparatory information that the ‘earth’ was not yet normal—that
is, ‘not yet’ the earth as it was known to them.”234 In other words, Tsumura stops at
saying it is a scene of ‘not yet’ instead of saying it is either a scene of ‘not yet there’ or a
scene of always there. It is a scene of “universal readiness,” with “God’s spirit hovering
in anticipation.”235

b. Tehom and Other Terms for Waters

Since Gunkel suggested that tehom derived directly from Tiamat, many scholars
have assumed some type of direct or indirect connection.236 Etymological studies since
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then have shown that it “is almost impossible to conclude that Akkadian Tiamat was
borrowed by Hebrew as těhôm.”237 This has not deterred some scholars from still
claiming that there is at least a “mythological” connection between the terms.238 A
distinction between two words having a common Semitic root (*thm) and one word
coming from the other has not been kept. Akkadian’s common noun ti’āmtum > tâmtum
(“sea,” “ocean”) from which the divine name Tiamat was formed, also came from this
shared Semitic root. Hebrew’s tehom should not be assumed to be a depersonification of
an Akkadian divine name since there is a shared Semitic root that lies behind both
languages.239 Furthermore, even the common nouns in Ugaritic, Akkadian, and Eblaite
appear in some mythological texts without personification, with the ordinary meaning of
“sea” or “ocean.” These cultures had the grammatical means to distinguish between the
ordinary, non-personified thing and the deity.240 The missing definite article with tehom
in Genesis 1:2 is only one instance among several in the chapter where the definite article
is missing with a common noun.241 Given the abundance of counter evidence, its absence
“has nothing to do with personification or depersonalization of the original term.”242

account of Enuma elish, a connection not made in any other extant work. In fact, it was probably a
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Tehom is a Hebrew common noun from the Semitic root *thm and is not a de-personified
or de-mythologized loan word.
Common nouns based on the root *thm appear in West Semitic languages, but it
is the term ym or yam that typically is used to denote the sea in these languages. Even so,
it often depends on what type of cosmography that is being used for which term will be
employed. In Hebrew, if a three-part universe is being discussed—heaven/earth/sea—
tehom is never used; it is yam that is the third part, the sea.243 Hebrew yam, then, was
used in circumstances that correspond to the Akkadian apsu and tiamtum, tamtum, even
though the correspondence is not exact between the Hebrew heaven/earth/yam tripartite
division and the Babylonian heaven/earth/Apsu division.244 “On the other hand, in the
relationship with the term ’eres ‘earth,’ Hebrew těhôm(ôt) is hyponymous (Ps 71:20,
148:7; Prov 3:19-20; Gen 1:2) and, hence, what těhôm(ôt) refers to is included in what
’eres refers to—that is, the těhôm-water is part of the earth.”245 If a three-part earth is
described—or as the Babylonians had the three earths: the abode of humans, Apsu, and
the underworld—tehom(ot) is the term used for the subterranean waters that corresponds
to the Babylonian Apsu.246 In Ugaritic, their terms thm(t) and ym function very similarly
to their Hebrew cognates.247 In sum, “tehom” in its uses in the various Hebrew
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cosmographies never parallels the place of “Tiamat” and its cognates in Akkadian
cosmographies.
If there is a bipartite division of the cosmos—heaven(s) and earth— eres “earth”
is everything under heaven, including the sea.248 Thus, if a bipartite division is being
used in a Hebrew text, tehom(ot) is a part of the eres, the everything under heaven. Since
Genesis 1 opens with a bipartite division of the cosmos, since elsewhere tehom(ot) is
hyponymous with eres in bipartite cosmographies, and since tehom(ot) is never used
elsewhere in tripartite descriptions of the cosmos, tehom is best understood in Genesis 1:2
as being part of the “earth.”249 The earth and its tehom are described as tohu wabohu and
hosek: “not yet productive and inhabitable and without light.”250
In this picture within v. 2, “the water (hammāyim) of těhôm seemingly covered all
the ‘earth’ like the Deluge, as vv. 6ff. suggest.”251 Since, “earth” in this verse is
everything under the heavens, “land” is not being placed “in opposition to the seas
(yammîm; see v. 10).”252 Rather, the situation is viewed from above, similar to Psalm
104:6—“You covered it with the deep as with a garment; the waters stood above the
mountains.”253 The topmost/visible part of the earth of Genesis 1:2 is the covering of
tehom-waters, darkness, and the Spirit.
[The] dry land was ‘not yet’ formed (or seen) until v. 9, where God said:
“Let the waters from under the heaven be gathered to one place and let the
dry land appear.” Unlike the cosmology in Enuma elish and other ancient
myths, the land in Gen 1:9-10 was not a product of the primeval water,
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hence a part of the water; it was a product of divine fiat by which God
gathered the waters from under the heaven “to one place,” that is, as
“seas,” which are a part of the earth.254
It is relatively common for the conditions brought about by the Flood to be
compared with Genesis 1:2. Claims have been made about the flood waters being linked
with chaos or chaotic forces. The Hebrew term mabbul (flood) appears thirteen times in
Scripture: twelve in Genesis 6—11 and once in Psalm 29:10 where God sits enthroned
over the flood.255 Tsumura refers to P.C. Craigie’s belief that the Psalm reference
symbolized God’s subjugation of chaotic forces, just as Baal was enthroned over the
conquered flood.256 However, the Ugaritic term mdb “flood” is never used to describe
Baal’s enemy, Yam/Nahar. The term mdb does not refer to a conquered foe in any extant
Ugaritic mythology.257 Also, Baal never sat enthroned over his conquered enemy, the
sea-dragon Yam.258 Likewise in Hebrew mabbul does not refer to a conquered foe. It
“always refers to the ‘Deluge.’”259 The Deluge was the mighty power used by YHWH to
totally destroy the world.
In the Mesopotamian traditions, Marduk never sits enthroned over Tiamat.260
However, Marduk does use abūbu “the Deluge” as a weapon when attacking Tiamat.261
Thus, the Deluge in Hebrew and Akkadian is not a “chaos”-enemy. It is a divine
instrument. Several ANE gods such as Adad, Nergal, Asshur, and Marduk are said to be
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the “holder of the lightning, lord of the Deluge.”262 In Psalm 29 God’s voice is compared
with lightning seven times in vv. 3-9. In v. 10 God is enthroned from “before the
Deluge,” eternally.263 If there is a connection in thought and/or imagery between Genesis
1:2 and the Flood narrative, the scriptural and possible ANE background behind the use
of mabbul undermines thinking of the covering waters as a symbol of chaos, or God’s
once-upon-a-time adversary. The Flood waters are a divine instrument in chapters 6—9
as they were in other ANE cultures.

c. Ruach Elohim

Tsumura does not treat the ruach elohim in great detail. Earlier it was mentioned
that Tsumura treats Genesis 1:2 as a scene of “universal” readiness, with “God’s spirit
hovering in anticipation.”264 He sights William Brown’s analysis of the debate on
whether to translate ruach elohim as “the wind of God” or “the spirit of God.”265 Those
who choose the first option often do so because they view ruach as the final description
of chaos in v. 2. Those favoring “spirit” see 1:2c as a reference to “divine creative
potency.”266 Tsumura, with Brown, favors the evidence for “spirit.” “Contextually,
’elōhîm of rûah ’elōhîm (2c) refers to ‘God,’ who created the universe (‘the heaven and
the earth’ as merismus) in v. 1. In v. 2c he is about to get involved positively in the
universe as rûah.”267
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God’s creative action was accomplished by his speech in v. 3, according to
Tsumura. Verse 2c “seems to describe a situation in which God’s words were not yet
uttered; in other words, God’s breath was not articulated as a voice to pronounce his
creative word but was ready to get involved in such creative actions.”268
This “breath of God” is not without a creative function. In other biblical texts,
there is a close relationship between God’s breath and God’s creative action: Ezekiel
37:1-14; Psalms 104:30; 33:6; Genesis 2:7. 269 God’s breath is said to either create (Pss
33:6; 104:30) or animate (Ezek 37:14; Gen 2:7). In Genesis 1:2 God’s breath is “ready to
become engaged in his creative action.”270 It happened in v. 3 when God uttered his
word.

4. Critique

The most significant critique of Tsumura concerning his interpretation of the text
is his insistence on creation being by divine fiat within the Priestly creation account.271
His claim is that God alone acts; there is no other actively involved. The creation itself is
passive. He cites the work of William Brown concerning ruach elohim but does not
interact with Brown’s study of the MT, LXX, and VorLXX. Even if Tsumura uses only the
MT

and not the earlier available texts, he still cannot avoid dealing with God’s speeches

being addressed to water and earth. In v. 11 God says, “Let the earth cause wild
vegetation to sprout…”272 The report in v. 12 states, “the earth brought forth wild
vegetation.” Even though the MT minimizes the waters’ creative role, it still contains
268
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remnants of the older tradition. In v. 20 God says, “Let the waters produce…”273 Verse
21 reports: “So God created the great sea monsters and every living creature that moves,
of which the waters produced swarms, according to their kinds…”274 The LXX and the
VorLXX are even more explicit in making these claims about the activity of the earth and
waters.
Tsumura shows that in v. 2 the “earth,” everything under heaven, is
nonproductive and empty. However, the text moves beyond this initial not-yet-familiar,
“passive” stage; it lasts only until v. 9.275 “In short, both ‘land’ and ‘water’ are
transformed from passive to active participants in the creative process when they are
conferred their respective names in v 10.”276 Earth and its waters are brought beyond that
initial infancy to be active participants according to what suits them in the cosmic
community. Through the process of God’s early ministrations, the lack in v. 2 was
reconciled; they are brought into producing, filled entities.
Related to this critique is the way Tsumura finished his analysis of De Moor’s
connecting of the Ugaritic phrase tu-a-bi-[u(?)], Akkadian nabalkutu, and Hebrew tohu
wabohu. Tsumura finds that nabalkutu and tu-a-bi-[u(?)] are used similarly when used in
reference to “earth.” In the oldest Akkadian text there was a reference to the “earth’s
womb” being “unproductive/not bearing/out of order.” Later in Akkadian, when “womb”
was no longer included, it meant an “out of order” earth that had no plants or cereals.
Even though Tsumura believes, based on the other occurrences of tohu and bohu in
273
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Scripture, that they mean something like arid/unproductive and empty/uninhabited, he
tries to distance the Hebrew phrase from any connection to the Ugaritic tu-a-bi-[u(?)] by
citing Lambert and Huehnergard on whether tu-a-pí-[ku(?)] and not tu-a-bi-[u(?)] is the
word to be read in the damaged Ugaritic. Given, however, the generative roles of the
waters and earth later in the Priestly account, the possible notion of the earth “not
bearing” or being “barren” makes a great deal of sense. Even if a morphological
connection is uncertain or questionable, there seems to be resonance between the ways
these phrases functioned respectively in these cultures.
Tsumura works to sever any ANE connections whereby biblical creation can be
interpreted in such a way that it is not completely by God’s operation/fiat.277 He wants
tohu and bohu to be adjectives about ongoingly inanimate matter. He does not want to
consider the possibility that in ANE worldviews, including that of Israel, they
encountered their world as an other, not inert stuff.278 Tsumura chooses not to speak of
God’s creative activity through/by the Spirit and Word being the possibility for an
abundantly productive earth/creation. The theological framework that will be developed
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in chapter 5 will try to move beyond the zero-sum spectrum between divine fiat alone and
the conflict of dualism in which theology of creation for so long has been placed, and in
which Tsumura operates.

5. Tsumura’s Laudable Ideas

Given the precision with which Tsumura investigates texts, his work as a whole is
of great value. He does not assume as fact many of the claims made by those employing
diachronic and typological methods, but rather weighs them against the available data. In
so doing, he clears the way for a new picture of ANE cosmologies.
The connection between violence and creation is far less widespread than had
once been thought; in the extant texts it is limited to Enuma elish alone. Cosmologies in
which the primal waters are not personified are common. Also, cosmologies in which the
primal waters are generative or creation takes place by way of procreation between two
entities are more commonplace. There were many different cosmologies within the
ANE. As the work of H. and H. A. Frankfort shows, some cultures simultaneously held
contradictory accounts because each account was for a different purpose; they were
specialized to answer different questions.279
Tsumura shows that the connection between Israel’s cosmologies, especially
Genesis 1, and Enuma elish, or Ugaritic combat myths (that are not about creation),
should not be made.280 Eliminating the prior presupposition of a combat influence and
reading the biblical texts synchronically undermines previously held notions of combat
279
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within them. The voices of the biblical texts themselves undermine frameworks such as
Levenson’s built on the idea of combat and mastery. God is shown not to be
fundamentally at odds with creation or any part(s) therein.281
Tsumura shows that interpreting tohu and bohu in Genesis 1:2 in a manner
consistent with their other occurrences in the Bible is itself consistent with the direction
the rest of Genesis 1 takes.282 The climactic days are fitting for a world unproductive and
uninhabited.
If Genesis 1:2 is a “chaos” that must be ordered and mastered, as Levenson
suggests, that ordering of “chaos” only stands as a backdrop or condition for the
vegetation, animals, and humans of days three and six. Levenson’s account lends itself to
viewing the history of creation being about the pinnacle creation—humans—and their
drama that unfolds on the earth. Such an interpretive view of the natural world is not out
of line with the development of anthropocentric thinking in the West during the past
millennium.
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If, on the other hand, Genesis 1:2 is about everything under heaven being
unproductive and uninhabited, then God’s creative activity is about and for the whole of
creation. There is a singularity to the text’s theme and a unity of destiny shared by all.
The text is about the “earth” no longer being a barren waste and empty. The “earth” is
coming to maturity; humans enter as part of the growing complexity of related/relating
participants. Humans are one character, undoubtedly an important one, in the grand
narrative of everything under heaven with a divine calling in relation to God and the rest
of the “earth.” All are developed into and participate in a single community.

D. Moving Forward: Interpreting Genesis 1

1. Looking at the Broader Literary Unit: Genesis 1—11

Claus Westermann has an intriguing perspective on the many points of resonance
between Genesis 1—11 and other ANE texts. He takes a step back from trying to link
specific biblical texts with a specific ANE precursor. Throughout his commentary on
these chapters, he accepts that there are many points of comparison between Genesis 1—
11 and the texts of all of Israel’s neighbors. Westermann is just as quick, nevertheless, to
point out how the biblical texts are different in the details. The texts’ authors were able
to integrate many points of contact with Israel’s neighbors while still speaking in the
unique theological voice of the Priestly tradition. These contrasts with other ANE texts
actually help to bring into focus the points being made in the biblical texts.283
In Westermann’s view the theological point of these chapters is to point in two
different directions. First, in looking back, these texts share in the circle of human
283

This notion of bringing Israel’s thought into focus through comparative studies is similar to Clifford’s
position already cited.
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tradition.284 There is a moment that Israel shares with its neighbors; the authors “wanted
their audience to hear something that belonged to the prehistory of Israel.”285 After all,
the very content of the chapters is the story of all creation and humanity. Westermann
does not say this, but the artistic genius of these chapters is that as they speak about
everyone’s story through the theological lenses of Israel, they do so in the vernacular of
everyone’s stories. Second, the stories “look forward to the history of Israel and of the
people of God.”286 Unique to Israel’s primeval story is that it is linked to history. As the
shared stories come into greater focus, with ever increasing detail, God calls to Abram to
leave his home and become one through whom all families will be blessed (Gen 12:13).287 Again, in the artistry of Genesis, Abram is called out from among the people in
whose vernacular the story thus far had been told.
Thus, any allusions to other ANE traditions that may be present in Genesis 1 will
not be examined as though they fit in a progression of religious belief. Rather, it will be
assumed that the myriad of images are part of the genius of the artistry of Genesis
employed for theological purposes. The very medium through which the story is told
serves to underline the theological points being made. There are not remnants of a
tradition (or traditions) that could not fully be suppressed in Israel, but rather, there were
images that were consciously and deliberately employed for the author’s own purposes.
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Westermann, Genesis 1—11, 65.
Ibid.
286
Ibid.
287
Westermann’s interpretation of this point runs against the cultic claims of Levenson. Westermann
states: “When the primeval story is seen as a prologue to the history of God acting with Israel, then each
narrative and each genealogy is affected, and each individual text takes a new direction. The texts no longer
speak to Israel in the context of the action of the primeval period on the present—there is no cultic
actualization—but through the medium of history. The created cosmos is not created and ordered anew in
Israel with the recitation of the creation story; rather, God’s action, which Israel has experienced in its
history, is extended to the whole of history and to the whole world” (65). Westermann later says quite
clearly, “When the creation narrative [generically understood] lost its setting in life, it also lost its original
function which served to maintain and secure the present state of the world and of life” (92).
285
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2. Interpreting Genesis 1

William Brown’s strong arguments about the MT being a later development of the
textual tradition contained in the VorLXX indicate that the VorLXX would then lie at least
one redaction closer to the original Priestly tradition than the MT.288 The theology of that
VorLXX is distinct from both Levenson’s and Tsumura’s positions.289 That Priestly
worldview resonates quite strongly in the current theological milieu. Its significance will
be seen in the theological framework being constructed in this project.290 For now, what
that Priestly perspective will be presumed to entail will be summarized briefly.
A few points about the biblical text will be noted in moving forward from the
positions of Levenson and Tsumura. First, the “double creation” in the LXX has been an
attractive option within the tradition for interpreting Genesis 1.291 The LXX clearly makes
v. 1 a creation statement; God made everything. Verse 2 is then a description of what
was first made and then v. 3 begins the formal process of creation. The LXX is one
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It is interesting, given the likelihood of the MT being a redaction of the earlier theology represented in
the VorLXX, that the LXX is often dismissed by scholars or treated as dangerous. For example, Westermann
notes when commenting on Genesis 1:20 that “The Gk, like other versions, understands the first sentence
of v. 20 as a command directed to the waters to spawn fish…, by analogy with v.11” (136). Since the
version in the LXX tends to systemize these links between days, Westermann warns that “We must be on
our guard against this and note that P was careful to preserve the unique character of each work of creation
knowing full well that they were once independent” (137). However, Brown has shown that this common
dismissal of the LXX is unmerited given that this same “systemization” appears in the Qumran texts
(Structure, Role, and Ideology, 129). For those working subsequent to Brown’s work, just the opposite
concern should be operative. It is the MT that moves to separate the days once structurally paired.
289
Arguably the theology of the MT is different from their positions as well.
290
See Chapter 5.
291
Brown uses the phrase “double creation” to mean: “Heaven and earth are the created ‘aformal’
substances from which the entities named ‘heaven’ and ‘earth’ are fashioned in vv 6-8 and 9-10,
respectively, within the formal creation account of six days” (Structure, Role, and Ideology, 35).
Theophilus of Antioch had a similar type of idea about creation; God created a formless material
substratum ex nihilo and then formed it (Gerhard May, 161). William of Conches also had such an idea of
double creation (Christopher Kaiser, 57; Willemien Otten, “Reading Creation,” 240). In Genesis, verse 1 is
silent about the “what” from which God created everything. In the Christian tradition, Tertullian argued
based on that silence for creatio ex nihilo. From Ambrose to the Middle Ages, that verse was thought to be
sufficient by itself to refute Platonic notions of the eternality of matter (Brown, 35). Cf. Westermann, 95,
for a critique of more contemporary appearances of a double creation position.
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example of an early step in unequivocally precluding the eternality of the stuff in v. 2.
Even so, the VorLXX and MT do not try to give a clear answer to the question of genesis.
Tsumura and Levenson are correct that there is no definitive way to answer from
the grammar of the text whether the earth, waters, and darkness are created or
uncreated.292 Even so, there are other factors that can be considered in deciding the
relationship of the first three verses to one another, and thus, how to interpret the
statements of v. 2.
One consideration for deciding how to arrange vv. 1-3 is the stylistic tendency of
P to employ staccato, punchy sentences.293 It would be quite out of character within P to
have a long, complex sentence that includes all of vv. 1-3.294 If v. 1 functions
independently as a short heading or description for all that is to follow—the creation of
the heavens and the earth (i.e., everything)—it does not create a problem in the
relationship between v. 1 and v. 2. Verse 1 is simply a summary statement and v. 2 is the
start of the narrative.295
Claiming that v. 2 is the start of the creation narrative is a reading consistent with
the content of the verse and its similarity to other ANE stories of creation. When
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Cf. Hahn, 35ff. for a discussion on the various grammatical options concerning the relationship between
vv. 1, 2, and 3; he also mentions the theological motivations why the various choices are often emphasized.
Hahn himself opts for translating v. 1 as a summary or title statement, v. 2 as a “once upon a time” or
“when-there-was-not-yet” clause (a statement of “before”), and v. 3 as the beginning of the action proper
(44).
293
This has been noted as far back as Wellhausen (Westermann, 97).
294
Westermann, 97.
295
Westermann cites H. Strack, H. Gunkel, O. Procksch, W. Zimmerli, G. von Rad, W. Eichrodt, W.H.
Schmidt, H.A. Brongers, U. Cassuto as fellow supporters of this position (95). Hahn also concurs with this
position in his dissertation (44). Claiming that v. 1 is a summary is different than claiming doublecreation—that v. 1 is a statement that God created a hodge-podge that he then fixes in the rest of the
chapter. Rather, it leaves any possible pre-v. 2 events unspecified as the VorLXX and MT do. Also, by
resisting the temptation to make v. 1 a report about God’s first creative act, it respects the progression of
the narrative. The narrative opens with a tohu wabohu earth. It is not until God creates a dome in the
waters that separated some below and above it, that there is a sky/heaven(s) (v. 9); see both the Greek and
the Hebrew. Since the creation of the heavens does not come until v. 9 in the narrative, this undermines
claims that v. 1 narrates the first creative act.
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narrating creation it was common to look at the present and narrate its opposite. “This
state and all that is taken for granted with it is, as it were, abolished for a moment; the
present and apparently permanent state of the world is taken back to a moment when an
event is taking place in which the present state is in a process of becoming; the event
starts from a ‘not yet,’ from a state of nothingness of chaos.”296 This is the way creation
is narrated, instead of being stated propositionally: e.g., creatio ex nihilo.297 It sets up
the “flash point” in a sequence by which to narrate creative activity.298 The intent of such
statements in cosmologies “is not to describe a state that preceded creation, but to mark
off God’s act of creation from a ‘before’ which is beyond words and can only be
described in negative terms”;299 its primary purpose “is to delimit and not to describe,
even where a positive expression such as ‘darkness and night’ or…[tohu wabohu] has
replaced the negative sentence.”300
Verse 2 is a statement of “not-yet”—a not yet that is yet full of anticipation.
Little more should be read into v. 2 about if or how the stuff narrated therein got there.
Also, the language of “matter” and “formless matter” had not yet passed from Greek
philosophy into Hebrew thought at the time of P’s composition.301 “Both formulations,
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Ibid., 43. As careful as Westermann is with deconstructing many facets of Gunkel’s tradition, he still
uses “chaos” and some accompanying notions unapologetically.
297
Ibid., 46.
298
Ibid., 44.
299
Ibid., 46.
300
Ibid. Westermann states later: “It is much easier to exegete the verses when we can presume that the
intention of the writer is not really to give a picture of the situation that preceded creation, but to present the
act of creation as an event, corresponding to the “When not yet” of the older narratives (similar
explanations are given by G. von Rad and K. Galling)” (102). It is worth noting that it is from Egyptian
texts that Westermann finds a parallel to the “not yet” being stated in the positive and not the negative, as is
most common in ANE cosmologies (46).
301
Ibid., 109f. There are some scholars like Kitchen and Milgrom who believe the Priestly materials were
composed much earlier than the exilic, post exilic time period. Milgrom’s strongest argument about the
antiquity of P is that whole sections of D reflect the language of P, but D is never used within P (Leviticus
1—16, 10, 12f.). He believes P was redacted in the time of the first Temple, prior to exile. Kitchen points
out that the features of Genesis 1 are consistent with other second millennium ANE cosmologies. Thus, if
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that God created the world out of nothing and that there was a formless matter before
creation, first occur where Judaism has come under the influence of Greek thought.”302
Thus, the questions of pre-existent matter and ex nihilo are later questions that v. 2 does
not address. It cannot be said that one or the other is intended in the text.303 In
Westermann’s (and Tsumura’s) view, Genesis simply says “God created the heavens and
the earth.”304
Even if it is allowed that v. 2 was not written to answer the later question
concerning creation happening either ex nihilo or from uncreated pre-existent matter, and
if its primary purpose was to provide an entry point into which God’s creative activity
could be narrated, how the Priestly author(s) chose to begin the narrative and what to call
it is still significant. The ‘not-yet’ description of v. 2 is informative concerning the
nature of God’s creative activity that is narrated, even if the question concerning the
origin of the ‘not-yet-as-we-know-it’ stuff of v. 2 is not answered.305 It says what was
imagined within the Priestly tradition to be the opposite to the results of God’s creative
activity. Because it has implications for what God’s creative activities entail, the
interpretation of the not-yet is important.

it were to be dated according to ANE studies and not by the documentary hypothesis, it would be dated
much earlier than the second half of the first millennium. This makes a roughly nine-hundred year
spectrum in suggested dating among scholars for the composition of the Priestly cosmology—from the
fourth to thirteenth centuries BCE.
302
Ibid., 110.
303
Ibid. In Westermann’s words: “It is meaningless then to ask whether P thought if there was or was not
matter before creation” (109).
304
Ibid. For the sake of doing theology in today’s context, however, more must be said than that there is an
apparent absence of the question of genesis, and thus the absence of an answer, in the text. Saying that
“God created” begs the question of what is meant by “created.” In giving an account of God’s creative
activity in this dissertation, the Hebrew text will have to be allowed to reverberate beyond its own bounds.
305
It is common to view the “Let there be…” statement of v. 3 as the initial instance of creation. I would
suggest that the movement of the Spirit at the end of v. 2 should not be overlooked as being a necessary
component to God’s creative activity. Both Spirit hovering and speech are narrated as activities of God in
the Priestly cosmology. Claims concerning creation by Word alone are an insufficient commentary on the
text.

168
The Priestly cosmology opens with positive statements instead of statements of
negation. From the point where the Priestly cosmology begins its narrative there is no
place where the two most basic components of the earth—the tehom waters and the land
(as well as the darkness)—are said to come in to existence. The darkness is present in the
report of vv. 4-5;306 the prior presence of the waters is implied in the wording of the
command of v. 6;307 and the “appearance” of land at the gathering of the waters in v. 7
suggests it had simply been covered to that point.308 But the language of what to call the
introductory, ‘not-yet’ condition of v. 2 still needs to be determined.
Many have imported the Greek term “chaos” to either describe the condition of
the first components or that the stuff itself is chaos.309 Both uses of the term presume that
what is described—created or not—is present and is not just an elaborate way of saying
nihil. In the Christian tradition there have been thinkers who have followed Greek ideas
that v. 2 is a description of raw matter lacking everything but material causation, a
situation akin to the khora in Plato’s Timaeus.310
As the narrative unfolds, however, it shows that there is not a complete confusion
or mixture of materials. Rather, as Tsumura suggests, there is a layering of the earth’s
components (land, tehom, and darkness) that is assessed as tohu wabohu—unproductive
and empty. The not-yet circumstances of v. 2 could just as easily be called “infancy” or
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“And God saw that the light was good; and God separated the light from the darkness. God called the
light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, the first day.”
307
“And God said, ‘Let there be a dome in the midst of the waters, and let it separate the waters from the
waters.’”
308
“And God said, ‘Let the waters under the sky be gathered together into one place, and let the dry land
appear.’ And it was so.”
309
Westermann uses this language too, going back and forth between “chaos” and “nothingness.” Or, he
will use the phrase “the nothingness of chaos” (43).
310
Watson provides a helpful list of references in the writings of early thinkers who either supported or
criticized such a position (13). Critics included Hippolytus, Methodius, and Clement of Alexandria.
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“immaturity”—a trope used elsewhere in Scripture (e.g., Job 38:8-11) and within the
Christian tradition (e.g., Irenaeus).
The option selected has many implications for how to understand in the text
God’s initial relationship to creation and the nature of God’s creative activity, as well as
what kind of world is coming into existence: a passive or obstinate stuff receiving forms
or a subject being nurtured into maturity. Claims concerning the nature of the stuff are
just as important as claims concerning its condition. Concerning the former: the narrative
of Genesis 1 points toward the subjectivity of the land and waters.311 They are guided
and/or enlisted as much as they are formed and/or coerced. They are neither utterly inert
nor recalcitrant.312 Thus, the subjectivity of the v. 2 components will be affirmed.313
Concerning the condition of this subject: the narrative of Genesis 1 opens with
basic infantile stuff, which God addresses. It is not “chaos”, obstinate, or in a chaotic
condition. It is tohu wabohu: “barren/desolate” and “empty.” God’s dedication to the
young creation leads to the forming-as-we-know-it of heaven and earth on days 2 and 3
respectively. This can be interpreted as formation for the sake of ordering (to be a stage
for history) or the nurturing of that infant into life in the community. The earth, waters,
and other parts of creation mature in their active participation under God’s guidance in
cosmogony; they progress from moving about at God’s request to the production and
support of other parts of creation.
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Brown suggests this in “Divine Act and Persuasion,” in History and Interpretation: Essays in Honour of
John H. Hayes, edited by M. Patrick Graham, William P. Brown, and Jeffrey K. Kaun (Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic Press, 1993), when he says that “what is described in Gen. 1.2 is not malevolent, autonomous
chaos, but the earth and the waters as living ‘elements’ that are enlisted by divine command to participate
positively in the creative process” (32).
312
It should be recalled that people in the ANE did not perceive natural things as lifeless matter. Later
Greek or scientific views should not be put on the text.
313
This is consistent with the observations of Christopher Kaiser in Chapter 2 who noted that the biblical
view of God is as a king who legislates for his subjects, including the earth.
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Holistically viewed God’s creative activity is more community development than
the formation or establishment of particular objects or a cosmos. Each part is related to
others and has responsibilities relative to others, or, in turn, has responsibilities that
contribute to the fulfillment of the whole. More than establishing a fixed structure out of
inanimate matter, God develops a community.
This trajectory is foreshadowed in the statements made in v. 2 at the opening of
the narrative. Tsumura’s arguments about tohu, bohu, and tehom are compelling, yet
moving forward from his findings has not gained traction. Brown thinks Tsumura was
too concrete in arriving at his interpretations. However, as noted above, if the terms are
taken as “arid/unproductive” and “empty/uninhabited,” this functions very well in the
direction the entire passage moves. Brown characterizes this direction as “a movement
from constituent bases (light, water, and green earth) to the particular ‘social’ forms they
help produce and sustain.”314 He does not see the story of those particular “constituent
bases” beginning in v. 2, but only, rather, as they are called to and named in vv. 3, 9-10.
Those verses are a significant dividing line for him in the text.315 But prior to Brown’s
reading of the parts, however, the text introduces itself as a story about the whole (v. 1)
and begins its telling with the not-yet description of the whole ‘earth’—that which would
become an organic community.316 When the first narrated divine act has come to pass
through the operations of God’s ruach and speech in vv. 2c-3, there is no reason based on
314

Brown, Structure, Role, and Ideology, 217.
Perhaps his interest in the parts/individuals in the text over the whole is a reflection of our times more
than the interest of the text. Clifford points out that “Perhaps the single most important feature of ancient
Near Eastern cosmogonies is that they generally issued in a peopled universe, a world, a system. Even
when focusing on a single item…they put that item in the context of the whole…Any dichotomous
distinction between creation of the whole and creation of the individual is not warranted for the ancient
Near East” (199).
316
Interestingly, in v. 2 God is included, by the Spirit, as a participating agent in this growing-up
community—not that God needs maturing, but that the community with which he is joining himself needs
to grow into his goodness.
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the text to exclude from the whole the presence of any of the parts in which Brown
initially takes interest: light, waters, and land.317 The infant whole of which they are part,
nevertheless, even this side of that creative act, is not yet beyond the tohu wabohu
description of the not-yet earth in v. 2. The descriptions of v. 2 are fitting descriptions
about the community (or lack thereof) into which the parts would come to participate.
Before (or in the absence of) God’s community-nurturing creative activity, there is only a
dead emptiness.318 Even after the Priestly cosmology begins to narrate God’s creative
ministrations the earth does not immediately cease being barren (literally), empty,
undifferentiated, and dark; but even there (or precisely there), the Spirit of God was
present.319
God’s “ordering” of creation in Genesis 1—or establishing “constituent bases”—
is not a highly debated notion; the narrative moves from the general to the particular. In
that movement, it also moves progressively to greater multiplicity and complexity in the
317

Just as the narrative of all creation’s story in Genesis 1—11 is Israel’s story, because they are within it
but not yet called to the specific place and purpose for which God chooses them, so too the story in Genesis
1 is from vv. 2-3 the story of the whole, inclusive of the light, waters, and land, which have not yet been
called to specific places and purposes—i.e., to mature in expressing goodness according to what is suitable
to them.
318
In the Priestly cosmology there is the same dynamic that Jacob Milgrom has found in Leviticus. God’s
creative activity is life for the community just as the cult affirms, protects, and nurtures life and holiness.
In the cult, death is the opposite experience for the community just as in Genesis 1:2 the opposite
circumstance from the realization of God’s creative activity is a dead waste. In the cult, apart from walking
in God’s ways, the people of God would experience a deadly destruction upon God’s departure from the
Temple (Milgrom, Leviticus 1—16, 50); Tsumura finds that tohu and bohu together are used to describe
such a destruction; “it would be very reasonable to understand the phrase tōhû wābōhû in Gen 1:2 as also
describing a state of ‘desolation and emptiness,’ though the context suggests that this was the initial state of
the created earth rather than a state brought about as a result of God’s judgment on the earth or land (cf. Jer
4:23, Isa 34:11)” (33). The point of creation is not a movement from disorder/chaos to order. The whole
point of the Priestly thinking about creation and the cult is the development of a vibrant community that
affirms, protects, and nurtures life/holiness!
319
As will be suggested in Chapter 5, it is precisely there that the Spirit is present because the Spirit of God
is the Possibility of God for the o/Other. It is this Spirit that operates inseparably with God’s Word to make
possible the coming to be of creation. On another topic, noting this movement in the text from emptiness
and unproductiveness marks a significant departure from Levenson’s framework in which he interprets
patterns in Genesis 1 such as the light being created on the first day and the sun not being made until the
fourth day as an instance of demythologization of the sun: in other words, his view that Genesis 1 is one
step further away from the combat myth and cosmography of Enuma elish (Levenson, 65). Rather, there is
continued growth and development unto being a productive, full community narrated in the text.
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social forms established among the parts.320 As has been mentioned, after the parts are
named—e.g., the “land” is named “earth” and the “waters” are named “seas” in v.
10321—the various parts are each invited to participate in the unfolding community; all
parts are called upon to contribute in the community according to what is suitable to
them.322 The land/earth and waters/seas become “collaborative agents” in creating under
God, the Creator and “Commander.”323
One of the progressions in these callings is significant. In calling the land and
waters “to the particular ‘social’ forms they help produce and sustain”324 God was
essentially addressing environments in which the produced things were to thrive. God
first addresses the land, telling it to “grass grass” (v. 11). This is only one of two places
in the whole Bible where the verb “to grass” is used.325 God’s intention is that the thing
which is produced is to be dependant upon and united with the continued activity of the
actor. It is like the action of singing a song, where the song ceases when the singing
ceases. This is different from an action where the thing produced is distinct from the
thing producing it or the very action of producing it (e.g., a chair being built by a
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Brown, Structure, Role, and Ideology, 217.
Ibid., 37.
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In Brown’s words: “the etymological eloquence characteristic of the divine commands addressed to the
waters and the earth have the effect of underscoring their respective abilities in the formation of products
suitable for the divine creative scheme” (Structure, Role, and Ideology, 214). All of this is part of the
“social dimension of the priestly cosmogony” as seen in both Genesis 1 and the building of the Tabernacle;
it “is most evident in the respective roles of the earth and the waters in relation to God. The earth and the
waters are treated as active creators in Genesis 1 and work in collaboration with God. Hence, each bears a
social function in relation to [’elohim]” (213). Importantly, the respective contributions of the earth and
waters “in the process are made in the context of service” (213f).
323
Ibid., 212.
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Ibid., 217.
325
Robert D. Sacks, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1990), 7. Cf. Joel
2:22 where it is used within a description of a harmonious (eschatological) time. Westermann translates
Genesis 1:11, 12 as follows: “v. 11: ‘Let the earth green forth fresh green’; v. 12: ‘And the earth greened
forth’” (142).
321
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carpenter).326 Following this first divine address for land to grass grass, God addresses
the waters telling them to “flying flyers” and to “swimming swimmers” (v. 20).327
The pattern is very clear and very important. Before each thing comes into
existence, the environment is addressed to which the thing produced is related. The
environment itself is supposed to play a part, to be in sustaining, nurturing relationship
with that which lives in it;328 the nature/character of its existence is dependent upon and
united to the continued activity of the environment. Those within the cosmic community
shape both one another and the resulting dynamics of the community by their nurturing
activity.
After addressing both the land and seas, God then addresses God’s self and says
“let us create man in our image, male and female” (v. 26). God is the final ‘environment’
introduced in the narrative. The “let us” is not as much a theological assertion in the
narrative, as it is often treated, as it is an anthropological assertion.329 The writer
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It is certainly odd that God would address the waters in regard to birds. However, Brown has searched
other ancient writings and found that Israel is not alone in linking the creation of birds with water. This
link can be seen in the ANE as far back as Egyptian and Sumerian sources (Structure, Role, and Ideology,
184). “Such a tradition casts a generally positive light upon the role of water in creation, in contrast to
other traditions that highlight the negative, resistant role water often assumes in mythological texts (E.g.,
Tiamat in Enuma Elish, Yam in Ugaritic literature)” (Brown, 184).
328
Without having to accept that these environments are addressed as characters and that they have any
participation in bringing about their inhabitants, it can at least be conceded that the environments are
named. Although the work being conducted in contemporary science is discovering the “self-organization”
of systems (or “active” matter) and the effects of one system on neighboring systems (cf. Prigogine and
Stengers, 8-13). Joseph A. Bracken has also done a great deal of theological reflection on systems,
including the effects sub systems have on larger systems of which they are part; see Society and Spirit: A
Trinitarian Cosmology (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1991). The movements in Genesis 1
toward complexity, multiplicity, and interrelationships have a great deal of resonance with work being done
in science.
329
Others have made related statements. E.g., Phyllis A. Bird has noted that “The verb ‘āśâ [‘do, make’],
which has heretofore been used only in the execution reports, to emphasize the divine activity, is now taken
up into the announcement itself. The becoming of adam is inconceivable apart from God’s own direct
action and involvement; the willing of this creature requires divine commitment” (“‘Male and Female He
Created Them’: Genesis 1:27b in the Context of the Priestly Account of Creation,” in "I Studied
Inscriptions before the Flood" [Winona Lake, IN; Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications; Eisenbrauns,
1994], 346). Not only does Bird note the nature of God’s statement, she notices its relation to the prior
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distinctly separates humans from other animals—from all other created things—by the
unique environment in which humans exist. To be human is to exist in God. God is
addressed as humanity’s environment. By God’s breathing, they live. “In him we live
and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28). Brown notes the structure in the LXX also
helps give both light and humans a special, more unmediated, relationship to God.330
There are three groupings in the LXX structure: 1) Heaven, firmament, luminaries; 2)
Water, seas and land, marine and winged creatures; and 3) Earth, plants, land animals.331
Structurally light and humans are associated with heaven and earth; however, they are
unique in their creation. God is the one called to relate to this creature who is dependent
upon his continued breathing into them, as that which lives within and out of the very life
of the Triune God. Humans are to be the song God sings, imaging their creator.332
The details of the biblical narrative continue to illustrate that relationship. For
example, God breathed neshama (breath) into the nostrils of adam (2:7). Only God and
humans have neshama in the Old Testament.333 Human beings, as ones who share breath

commands: “each order is referred to an already existing element of earth (land and water) and its locus and
proximate source. In contrast, adam is assigned a function or task by the very word of announcement, a
task defined in relation to the other creatures and to the earth, which is its habitat but not its source.
Humanity is also distinguished from other orders of life by its direct and unmediated dependence upon
God. For adam, habitat is neither source of life nor source of identity” (346). See n. 329 concerning
Brown’s position.
330
Brown, Structure, Role, and Ideology, 40. “As noted above, only in the sections dealing with the
creation of light and human beings does one find the transition marker (kai egeneto houtōs) enigmatically
missing from its typical location. Thus a tighter connection is forged between command and fulfillment
without the formal intermediate step” (Brown, 40). With humans, first, the command is directed at God.
Second, humans are not distinguished by species/kinds (their likenesses to one another), but in their being
created in the image and likeness of God. And third, humans are to rule over specific things within the three
domains of the community: “‘over the fish of the sea and the winged creatures of heaven and the herds and
all the wild animals of the earth and all the reptiles that crawl upon the earth’ (vv 26, 28)” (41).
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Ibid., 41.
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In the very way humans were made to exist relative to God, God was creating a creature that he could
become. ‘Human’ is not something that is outside of or disconnected from God, and in that way not
foreign to God.
333
Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17 in The New International Commentary on the
Old Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990), 158ff. Isaiah 42:5 and Job
27:3 show that this word is closely related to rûah (158).
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with God, live in a dynamic, dependent relationship with God; “when you take away their
breath, they die and return to their dust. When you send forth your spirit, they are
created” (Ps 104:29-30).334 Human life is God’s song. Furthermore, humans’ desires for
the good and their kingly-status do not proceed from themselves but from this intimate
relationship;335 these come from God. It was necessary for Adam to go regularly to the
center of the garden for sustenance and guidance from God, from the tree of life.336

E. Summary

There have been proposals since very early in the tradition of equating Genesis
1:2 with “chaos.” Whereas these comparisons were originally a conscious effort to
harmonize Christianity and Greek philosophy, the comparisons in the past century have
been driven primarily by ANE comparative studies. While, as Watson points out, this
choice of terminology was immediately challenged in the nineteenth-century as being
inappropriate for Genesis 1, it has become widely used. It is still being challenged by
those employing synchronic methods to the biblical text. Yet the term with its
accompanying notions is still being applied to the text.
Links between ANE texts have been asserted often on the basis of shared notions
of chaos. These typological connections are often repeated from one scholar to the next
as fact even though dependence is not demonstrated between the texts and detailed
334

It is verses such as this one that makes the statement about God’s Spirit being present with the tohu
wabohu earth in Genesis 1:2 so interesting; the Spirit is for all creation what humans experience in a special
way.
335
Hans Walter Wolff makes these assertions particularly in relation to a study of ruach; Anthropology of
the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), 39. Hamilton has argued that these two words have
a very close function in the OT.
336
It will be developed in Chapter 5 that the Spirit breathed into adam is the same Spirit that is the
Possibility for all creation. God gifts himself within the cosmic community as the good into which it is
called to mature. That good is God’s own self-emptying love at work for others, for their growth and
flourishing.
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synchronic methods have not been applied to verify kindred thinking.337 Recent studies
have raised flags about many of the cross cultural links that have long been asserted.
Some of the assertions are about links between terms, images, or myths across cultures,
as well as about the conflation of divergent mythological themes. For example, creation
has often been asserted as having a connection to chaos in the ANE. However, chaostalk in reference to creation has been more challenged than affirming the use of chaos
imagery within other mythical or historical contexts, for other theological/rhetorical
purposes.338 Brown’s examination of many of the ANE creation myths shows how
diverse their accounts of the beginning are. There is little ground in ANE literature for
connecting Chaoskampf and creation.
By clearing away many of these long perpetuated assertions through the work of
scholars such as Tsumura, Watson, and Brown, it opens up a view of Genesis 1 (as well
as other cosmological texts) that is quite powerful and much more in line with the tone of
the rest of Scripture. The Priestly creation account as a whole moves from a not-yetproductive, dark, and uninhabited infancy, into a nurtured and nurturing social network in
which all are called according to what is suitable to them into the service of the o/Other.
The Priestly account is a teaching concerning God’s creative call against which the
responsiveness of the whole community is measured throughout history. It is a picture of
the beginning, the end, and God’s calling at every moment between—as the narrative
about the Tabernacle’s construction showed. This will be developed in Chapter 5.
In the next chapter, an example will be investigated of the way “chaos” language
has been used by a systematic theologian. Catherine Keller adopts the terminology from
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Watson, 24.
Ibid., 19.
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biblical studies—as well as science and philosophy—while at the same time, taking it in
a different direction in her reading of Genesis 1 than suggested by Levenson or his
opponents.
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IV. CATHERINE KELLER’S TEHOMIC THEOLOGY: A
THEOLOGY OF BECOMING
A. Introduction

In the previous chapters the manner in which “chaos” has been used in science
and in biblical studies has been critiqued. It was noted in the introductory chapter that
the uses of “chaos” in these fields have been taken up into theological reflections. The
aim of this chapter is to show an example of how “chaos” language has been borrowed
out of science and biblical studies into systematic theology. Any number of examples
could have been chosen.1 Along with the sophistication of Keller’s thoughts on chaos,
her work was chosen due to the number of useful cautions and suggestions she has for
doing theology in this historical context. Also, Catherine Keller’s tehomic theology, as
she lays it out in Face of the Deep: a Theology of Becoming,2 has been selected because
her position varies from those already seen in the previous chapters. Although influenced
by exposure to science and ANE comparative studies, she takes the opposite approach of
Levenson and does not demonize the stuff of Genesis 1:2.
Keller has both a different perspective and a different approach than Levenson. In
her approach to interpreting scriptural images, she does not select an ANE lens as
Levenson does, and interpret Scripture through that matrix. On the other hand, she does
not represent the side of Tsumura or Brown who either denounce “chaos” language
1

E.g., Morris Inch, Chaos Paradigm: A Theological Exploration (Lanham, Md.: University Press of
America, 1998); Enda McDonough, Between Chaos and New Creation: Doing Theology at the Fringe
(Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1986); James Hutchinson, Pandemonium Tremendum: Chaos and Mystery in
the Life of God (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2001); Beatrice Bruteau, God’s Ecstasy: The Creation of a SelfCreating World (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997); Don Cupitt, Creation Out of
Nothing (London; Philadelphia: SCM Press; Trinity Press International, 1990); Ruth Page, God and the
Web of Creation (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1996); Phyllis Neiman, “The Myth of Chaos: Implications for
Jewish Religion,” D.H.L., Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2002.
2
London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
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and/or propose other sources from the ANE with which to compare the images of the
Bible. She does not try to make any direct claim for an interpretation of the text based on
what she believes is the most appropriate reconstructed ANE perspective. Rather,
Keller’s approach is to deconstruct what she sees as the Babylonian and biblical
tendencies toward masculine domination of the tehomic feminine. She shows briefly
how this is a recurring theme throughout history that rises out of tehomophobia. By
deconstructing instances of domination and by folding in layers of voices from less
dominant traditions throughout the centuries, she both opens up the possibility of a new
reading and legitimizes it with a myriad of past witnesses. These marginalized voices
become permissive and instructive in reading creation in Genesis 1 in non-ex nihilo ways,
wherein tehom plays a significant, positive roll. In short, they help Keller weave a
tehomophilic tapestry.
In this chapter, first Keller’s tehomic theology will be outlined. Second, there
will be an assessment of which aspects of her theology are useful and which aspects are
not useful (or would benefit from revision according to the alternative approach being
developed). In general, the dynamic aspects of creation’s relationship with God within
her theology are applauded. On the other hand, the lack of a more conventional
trinitarian paradigm in her theology will be questioned; it need not have been excluded.
Further, in her theology concerning the relationship of God to creation, Keller moves too
far in her grammar of inwardness, thus, in the end, blurring together God’s and the
world’s becoming.
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B. Catherine Keller’s Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming

1. Keller’s Tehomic Hermeneutic

Genesis 1:1—2:3, especially 1:1-3, is the biblical text of primary focus in Face of
the Deep. Throughout her work, Keller focuses on specific terms in these first verses
through her tehomic hermeneutic3 in which understanding is not about knowing the
object from a fixed perspective.4 Rather, there is a dynamic relationship between the text
and the interpreter. Understanding is “a relational, therefore relativizing, effect of
interpretation.”5 The task of understanding is never complete; the subject, the text, is
never mastered. The interpretive relation is forever ongoing, with “infinite perspectives
of knowledge.”6
The complexity of hermeneutics is not multiplied only by the factor of the
multiple contexts and theological perspectives of the interpreters but also by the factor of
interdimensional folds7 and gaps8 within the text, in the layers of positive and negative
relations of biblical texts with one another and with other ANE texts.9 Thus, texts have
3

See Face of the Deep, 103ff.
Ibid., 104. Keller shows a familiarity with several post-foundationalist thinkers in her work and follows
in that vein. It is interesting to see the resonance between this hermeneutic philosophy and new views of
the universe since Einstein; there is no absolute space within which things are plotted, but things are
understood relative to one another. Notions of relativity and intertextuality function similarly in their
respective fields of the sciences and the arts.
5
Ibid., 105.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., 109.
8
Ibid., 118. Gaps make room for dialogical relationship with the text. Gaps “invite the filling of them by
citing other passages in the canon” (118).
9
Ibid., 108f. See Keller, 5 on Keller’s goal of soliciting a “chaotic multiplicity of biblical writings, genres,
voices and potentials” in order to achieve an “algorithmic expansion of a hyper-familiar old text.” She does
not explicitly confess here, but she also uses extra-biblical texts and images to expand familiar biblical
texts. In outlining her hermeneutic with its fields of effects, Keller does not address if it is possible that
some affects go too far afield from the text.
Texts can certainly have many effects; but not all of them are righteous (doing justice to the text).
Effects can be as disordered as the people (and their contexts) doing the reading; thus some effects stand in
need of recapitulation. In her post-foundationalism, she does not talk about what to do with disordered or
4
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fields of effects.10 In this relativizing relation with a text, interpreters creatively negotiate
with the history of a text’s effects.11 “Thus the text cannot mirror an original,
transparent—and apparently nonexistent—meaning. It will make meaning through a
cooperative interaction in history—meaning not from nothing but from everything
preceding. That meaning lives only in the relationships constituting the present signifying
process.”12

2. Tehom: The Site of Becoming

Within her work “tehom” (the deep) itself—from Genesis 1:2—folds and unfolds
in its meaning(s). Most basically it is the site of becoming.13 She uses many synonyms
for tehom: matrix of possibilities, chaoid, milieu, etc.; most commonly, however, she
uses chaos and deep. Tehom is not the creator or a creature (i.e., not created).14 This
milieu, this “unformed future,”15 is “neither being nor nonbeing.”16 It is tempting to
reduce tehom to a signifier for an idea, but Keller rejects making this site of becoming a
nothing; she will not let it go away.

ill effects—effects that are not rightly related to the text. Keller dismisses any moderating point of view
and thus leaves her audience no ground for assessing whether the effects she describes from the biblical
text in her work are rightly related to the text. In the context of the tapestry she weaves, any claims against
her perspective would be considered dominating and repressive. Perhaps the only option is to weave a
different tapestry and let the readers of this present work choose which work in the gallery to take home
with them.
10
Ibid., 109.
11
Ibid., 106, 109.
12
Ibid., 119. Much like in process thought where all that becomes does so out of the milieu that precedes
(plus options offered by new aims/lures), Keller’s ongoing hermeneutic is in conversation/relation with
what has preceded.
13
Ibid., 12.
14
Ibid., 10, 28, 181.
15
Ibid., 29.
16
Ibid., 12.
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Tehom is “always already there,” and thus, both creator and creature always
already have a prior relation to it.17 However, instead of considering it as a place before
beginning, it is better understood as of beginning.18 It is a “between-space” in the
“feedback loop of the new and the given”19 fraught with potentiality/possibility. With
Deleuze, Keller affirms that this “depth is not ‘a dimension’ but the dimensionality out of
which the spatiotemporal dimensions unfold.”20
It is not until the fourth and final part of her work that Keller brings “creativity,” a
well known process-thought term, to the foreground of her treatment of tehom. “The
creativity is not a cause, not even the First Cause, but rather the condition that conditions
all causal processes. The creativity itself does not become; it makes becoming possible.
We imagine it therefore as the matrix of possibilities.”21 Since, for Keller, all is in God,
tehom becomes the depth of God (and of world)22 that gives birth to God;23 it is “Ocean
of divinity, womb and place-holder of beginnings, it is not Elohim but the first place or
capacity of genesis.”24 Both God and world “arise as effects of the primal creativity.”25
God (Elohim) as effect is the one through whom all causes arise.
Keller is careful to clarify that tehom/creativity is not nothing; it is not a
vacuum.26 She rejects any creatio ex nihilo reading of the Bible. The Bible “knows only
of the divine formation of the world out of a chaotic something: not creatio ex nihilo, but
ex nihilo nihil fit (‘from nothing comes nothing’), the common sense of the ancient
17

Ibid., 163.
Ibid., 161.
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Ibid.
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Ibid., 168; cf. 35
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Ibid., 181.
22
Ibid., 231.
23
Ibid., 180.
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Ibid., 231.
25
Ibid., 181.
26
Cf., e.g., Ibid., 115.
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world.”27 From an ex nihilo position, if a primordial chaos is considered, the autonomy
of this chaotic something is often assumed.28 However, this presupposes the logical
opposite of creatio ex nihilo as the only option. It presupposes a “dualism of
Creator/creature or Creator/chaos.”29 Keller chooses a third option of dialogical
cooperation, which precedes that Creator/creature dualism—a creatio cooperationis:
“non-linear interactions between Elohim and Tehom.”30

3. Becoming

Throughout the entire work, Keller critiques the theological tradition of creatio ex
nihilo. One of her first critiques is the lack of biblical warrant for creatio ex nihilo.31 In
the history of Christian and Jewish thought, through the second century C.E., “creation”
referred to the formation of the world from unformed stuff.32 This idea did not disappear
immediately. The biblical and philosophical notions of primordial stuff were still at issue
when Augustine was writing the last three books of his Confessions at the end of the
fourth century.33 Even though the creatio ex nihilo position rose quickly in dominance,
Genesis 1:2 remained problematic for its proponents—everything that comes between “in
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Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 116. Augustine called this chaotic something a nothingsomething (nihil aliquid); cf. Keller, 75 and
Confessions, XII.6.
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Ibid., 117.
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Ibid. Cf. 98, 116ff. This dialogical cooperation will be explained further when her panentheism is
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Ibid., 6.
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Ibid., 15. Keller relies heavily on Gerhard May’s Creatio ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of “Creation out of
Nothing” in Early Christian Thought, trans. by A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke, 1994) for her
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the beginning” and “God said.” For example, Athanasius skips over the verse altogether
in his polemic support of creatio ex nihilo.34
It was widely known in the fourth century that Genesis 1:2 was compatible with
“pagan mythologies and the platonic khora.”35 Keller exploits this quandary for the
creatio ex nihilo proponents. In Genesis 1:2 and within the imagery of the OT, “This
interstitial darkness refuses to disappear. It refuses to appear as nothing, as vacuum, as
mere absence highlighting the Presence of the Creator, as nonentity limning all the
created entities…this void evinces fullness, its waters, viscosity.”36 In the previous
section it has already been laid out what Keller does with the tehom, how she treats it
positively in contrast to the tehomophobic tendencies of the West.37 She uses v. 2 in her
theology instead of skipping over it or doing hermeneutical acrobatics to make its
contents into nihil.
In taking v. 2 seriously Keller rejects any idea of creation as a unilateral act,
whether it is understood as an act of domination, repression, or even making—if
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Ibid., 57.
Ibid., 58.
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Ibid., 9.
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Keller not only critiques the phobia of chaos in the theological tradition (especially Barth; 84ff.), but she
even deconstructs it in Scripture and other ANE traditions (26ff). She blames this tehomophobia on a
culture of (male) dominance and its exultation of “order,” Chaoskampf, mastery, etc (cf., e.g., 31ff.,
95ff.)—i.e., creation as order (20). Chaos in literature, art, and culture is often feminine—e.g., Tiamat in
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ordered, related, directed to man… In other words in the subordination of woman to man lies the social
template of chaos-control: the very bottom line of the Creator’s dominance and defeat of tehom.” (95; cf.
Julie Galambush, “Ādām from Ādāmâ, ’Iššâ from ’Îš: Derivation and Subordination in Genesis 2.4b—
3.24,” in History and Interpretation: Essays in Honour of John H. Hayes, edited by M. Patrick Graham,
William P. Brown, and Jeffrey K. Kaun [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press], 33, n. 2 and 3 for a
bibliography of differing positions on order among God, Adam, Eve, and animal in the Garden). In this
matrix of power and dominance, creation takes place by battle, not by procreation/birth (18ff, 28, 60ff, 82,
130); the waters are sterilized. The problem is that in this matrix of dominance (whether in the divine
realm or the human) “it must produce the monsters that at once justify its control and mock its mastery”
(97; cf. Timothy K. Beal, Religion and Its Monsters [New York and London: Routlege, 2002], 4-10). The
“monsters” (e.g., Tiamat) may never have been monsters to begin with. They only were reacting to threats
and/or attack. Keller uses the demonizing by the Nazis of the Jews as a human example.
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“making” is meant as either “forming” or “creation from nothing.”38 She dislikes notions
of origin because of their characteristic of being absolute.39 She also wants to avoid
totalizing origins because they are prey to accusations of ontotheology.40 The idea of
divine origin has been privileged in most traditions in their myths.41 The notion of origin
“classically subordinates and ontologically precedes ‘beginning.’”42 On the other hand,
however, the notion of beginning is a relative, historical notion. It developed as a secular
counterpoint to the notion of origin.43 Just as Keller rejects the polarity of ex nihilo
versus autonomous co-eternal stuff that is conquered and/or formed, she rejects the
polarity of origin versus beginning. Both ideas of beginning and origin, in the end, come
from or function as a myth of origin.44 In contrast, in the matrix of tehom there are no
totalizing origins. There is beginning and beginning again, which “are historical-secular
and therefore also mythical/theological.”45 The topos of the deep is “a place not before
but of beginning.”46 There are the possibilities of the deep and all that has pre-existed
with which all that is becoming already is related. Even God, through whom all causes
arise, is first an effect. In the process of becoming there is no absolute origin.
Early in Face of the Deep Keller’s focus is on the issue of creation’s becoming.
She juxtaposes her position against the familiar creatio ex nihilo. The doctrine of creatio
ex nihilo entails in it a metanarrative that is a single line from beginning to end,47 origin
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to goal.48 God’s ultimate dominion is unquestionable in that metanarrative in that he
established it ex nihilo. Further, time and space serve only as the arena of salvation—
salvation history.49 Nature is a matter of fact—a given that is of little consequence—
wherein the drama unfolds. It is not an actor in the drama or a key recipient of God’s
creative-salvific ends. Keller addresses this in her reading of Genesis 1. One way is
through the unpacking of v. 2 and treating all its terms, including the waters, respectfully,
not making them nothing or making them evil.50 Another is in taking seriously the
repeated phrase: “let there be…”51 In answer to any interlocutors who might point
toward “making” or “creating” in Genesis 1:1—2:3, Keller asserts: “For a theology of
becoming, it is precisely the dichotomy of ‘making’ and ‘letting be’ that Genesis
precludes. How else does Elohim make—but by letting be: ‘And God said: let there
be…’?”52 In her view of there being dialogical cooperation—creatio cooperationis—
between Elohim and Tehom (and between God and creation) she reads the “let there be”
less “in the monotone of command than in the whisper of desire.”53 In the divine address
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Genesis 1 in Structure, Role, and Ideology in the Hebrew and Greek Texts of Genesis 1:1—2:3 (SBLDS,
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of Tehom, “create is not to master the formless but to solicit its virtual forms.”54 It is at
God’s invitation in v. 11 that the earth produces vegetation and in v. 20 that the seas
creatively produce sea creatures.55 Keller welcomes, in direct opposition to Barth, the
idea of the maternity of the spirit or its waters that makes room for “more evolutionary
theories of emergence, theories that might now emphasize the self-organizing complexity
of creation.”56 In Keller’s view it was many of the church fathers who “nihilified the
(m)others of the narrative.”57 And many recent theologians simply follow in this
tradition.
Keller’s theology of becoming turns away from a logocentric doctrine of creation.
Instead of eliminating tehom and inserting the divine Logos into nothing, she sees the
incarnation of the Logos derived within “the chaosmic width of the creation.”58 In the
feedback loop of beginning and beginning-again, of new and old, a “chaosmic Christ
would represent the flow of a word that was always already materialized, more and less
and endlessly, a flow that unblocks the hope of an incarnation, in which all flesh takes
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Ibid., 19.
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part.”59 Thus instead of ex nihilo’s linear history, Keller opts for an Irenaean “helical,
recapitulatory sense of history.”60 In the recapitulatory loops, the new creation of all
things is forever hoped for and possible. This is a material eschatology wherein
incarnation, creation/new creation, is always going on in “redemptive recapitulations.”61
In the last chapters of Face of the Deep where Keller goes more fully into God’s
becoming, she addresses the notion of panentheism, of which she is a proponent.62 This
is where her idea of creation and new-creation as incarnation becomes not only a matter
of the world being capax dei but God being capax mundi.63 For Keller creation is
incarnation64 to the point that “the incarnation is coextensive with the body of the
creation.”65 In her words, the “en,” “in,” of panentheism
does not as one might think designate some clearly lineated space of
intersecting substances, let alone of mutual containment—as though the
mutual immanence of divinity and world resembles Chinese boxes or
intersecting circles. The “en” designates an active indeterminacy, a
commingling of unpredictable, and yet recapitulatory, self-organizing
relations. The “en” asserts the difference of divine and cosmic, but at the
same time makes it impossible to draw the line.66
There is flux, or overlap, “of divinity with world, of world with divinity.”67 The relations
are recapitulatory for God as they are for the world. The relationship of grace is no

59

Ibid.
Ibid., 56.
61
Ibid., 56, 220. It should not be assumed however, that Keller means by the ongoing incarnation that God
“consummates his loving control” by it or achieves complete lordship, understood as the subjection of his
subjects (90). She rejects this Barthian “intimacy of domination” wherein there is “intimacy without
reciprocity” (90; emphasis original). She rejects Barth’s “He-God” who “penetrates but is not penetrated”
(90). Thus, for Keller, in the incarnation that is creation, God is taking form/body and is being affected.
62
Cf. 218ff.
63
Ibid., 219.
64
Ibid., 219, 226.
65
Ibid., 221.
66
Ibid., 219.
67
Ibid.
60

189
longer one of unilateral dependency of creation upon its Creator.68 Rather, the becoming
of creation constitutes God’s embodiment/incarnation.
In the interplay of Tehom and Elohim, there is the capacitation of creation’s
becoming; it is in this capacitated relationship of creature with creator that the world is
capax dei and God is capax mundi. Thus, “Any event, every spacetime of the capacious
process of creation, might become readable as a unique, holy and temporary embodiment
of the infinite.”69 In this ongoing process of creation “there takes place always, in endless
quantities and qualities of difference, deformation and transformation, the incarnation.”70
This incarnation results in carnage. Only some of what is possible is materialized,
actualized in the decision of becoming.71 With the deformations and transformations in
the incarnation there is always the hope of redemption, that the scars of
creation/incarnation “may fade into gentler wrinkles.”72
This highlights the reality that becoming does not always go according to divine
aims. In her move away from creation out of nothing to creation (becoming) out of chaos
Keller works to replace the idea of sin that has been passed down from Augustine. In
Augustine sin is “understood as the internal resistance to the ordained order,” which
“requires external dominance”73 as a corrective, containing corollary. Augustine’s
definition, Keller claims, represented a shift from “socially framed guilt”74 to personal
shame about the darkness of each human’s disordered nature.75 For example, sin for the
psalmist “meant a deforming injustice for which members of a community stand
68

Ibid., 89.
Ibid., 219ff.
70
Ibid., 220.
71
Ibid., 220, 221.
72
Ibid., 221.
73
Ibid., 70.
74
Ibid., 71.
75
Ibid., 70.
69

190
responsible before each other and therefore God.”76 They are guilty for their unjust
relations.
Keller revives a communal, relational way of looking at sin in her theology of
becoming. Tehom—which is neither good nor evil, but the potential for good or evil77—
is the medium of human sin. Within it / out of it is the freedom to actualize good or
evil.78 Since we are not created from nothing but from preconditions, that which
precedes us constitutes us; for good or ill, preconditions infect us; they “have shaped,
privileged and deformed” us. 79 This originating sin (not a one-time original sin) is part
of the mix (the good and the bad) that co-originates us.
If one earthling falls into alienation, into greed, into domination—that sin
will infect its relations and thus in part constitute all who follow…I stand
not guilty for the patterned chaos of relations performing me—but
responsible. I become guilty if I do not take responsibility for the effects
of past relations upon me now, as I affect the future.80
In this way, Keller calls sin, as Augustine did, a “force of habit;”81 “We go along, we do
not resist, we seek to secure our existence. The repetitions become habitual, often
compulsive, carried along by global patterns of assumption—economic, sexual, racial,
religious. Amidst these structures, our agency may be unconscious. But it is never
simply absent—we slip ‘by our will.’”82
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This force of habit is “the habit of discreation.”83 Instances where this discreative
habit is blocked are conduits for chaos, the potential for good or ill. In that place a
decision for a new good or a new ill is made.84 “The habit of discreation is healed,
inasmuch as it can be healed, not by a one-time, unmoved incarnational solid, but by the
capacitating flux of what for us mammals is an ever carnal grace. Which we may
address. As you.”85 It is in these recapitulatory loops that new creation happens from
what is available, not ex nihilo. 86 New creation is the aim, the lure, of the word87
perpetually incarnating itself, perpetually becoming.88 Salvation is this new creation.89

4. The Divine

a. “Elohim” and “God”

“Elohim” and “God” are two common terms that are broadly opened up within
the final part of Keller’s Face of the Deep. By deconstructing them within Genesis 1—or
opening up their field of meaning—she makes room for tehom and her theology of

overwhelming scourge passes through it will not come to us; for we have made lies our refuge, and in
falsehood we have taken shelter.’” God’s response to this behavior is as follows: “therefore thus says the
Lord God, See, I am laying in Zion a foundation stone, a tested stone, a precious cornerstone, a sure
foundation: ‘One who trusts will not panic.’ And I will make justice the line, and righteousness the
plummet; hail will sweep away the refuge of lies, and waters will overwhelm the shelter. Then your
covenant with death will be annulled, and your agreement with Sheol will not stand; when the
overwhelming scourge passes through you will be beaten down by it” (vv. 16-18).
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becoming. It helps her avoid any hint of ontotheology by placing the divine within the
origin-less process of becoming. “Clearly a tehomic theology does not use ‘God’ as the
founding word, ‘God creates’ as its original act and fact.”90 In questioning ‘God’ as a
something or “some One,” her tehomic theology relocates the “identifiable subject of
theology.”91
“Elohim” itself is a plural word, which Keller takes to have theological
significance.92 It is not a personal name and can be used of any deity. Keller asks what
to do with the word’s impersonal plurality given that “Elohim” is “a common name for
the object of the Bible’s monotheism.”93 She answers through her panentheistic
framework. Normally “Elohim” takes a singular verb, but in bara’s second use in the
Bible, in v. 20 at the creation of humans, it is in the plural.94 She takes this plural “let us
create” as the democratic voice within the heavenly court of the “angelic multiplicity of
God him / her / it / themself.”95
In her unfolding of angelology it enables Keller to affirm: “‘Even “in the
beginning” there is God and not-God, thus enabling God, as concept, to be.’ The notGod within God reinscribes at the same time the many within the one.”96 Thus, the
complexity of “Elohim” in Genesis 1 is read as a “plurisingularity;”97 as in the whirlwind
of Job—which Keller reads as a midrash on the Genesis creation—“with its chaotic
swarms of star, angel and beast,” there is a hint of multiplicity of the divine in the
90
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Genesis creation.98 Or, with Norbert Samuelson, Keller reads “the Elohimic multiple: as
angels and as energies.”99 Angels embody, not just bring, messages as the multiple.100
Angels both hide and reveal God.101 In short, “angels” becomes a way for Keller to talk
about God’s embodiment in the world while keeping some notion of distinction between
God and world.
There is no way to grasp this plurisingularity; when “our thought habits press
toward unity and division, the multiple is reduced to an aggregate of ones, contained
within, adding up or reducing down to a single One…but these sub- and super-unities
keep dissolving as we approach them.”102 Elohim/God is “not just anyone. And not just
the One. We hear the Manyone…the turbulent swarm of godhood has always
transgressed any possible boundaries between the One Original Creator and the many
derivative creatures.”103
‘Elohim’ is a created space. There is no way to name the subject of the verb
“created.” ‘Elohim’ too is an object—effect—of “created.”104 The “creation has no
substantial subject.”105 Creator and creation are both effects of primal creativity—
tehom/depth/chaos—even though creativity does not cause anything.106 Tehom/creativity
is the depth of God that gives birth to God.107 Creativity is only “the condition that
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conditions all causal processes.”108 It is Elohim that/who is “the effect through whom all
causes arise.”109 “All that becomes is in God, but not as apples are in a basket; perhaps
more as they grow in a tree. Because all that becomes, becomes within God—as part of
God—God is also becoming. So a primal Other not separate from but within
God…produces the elohimic effect within language.”110 In the “chaosmic committee
work” it is up to creation/the creature to respond with sensitivity to “the cosmic desire”—
the lure or initial aim of elohim—and not block its own becoming.111

b. Ruach and the Tehomic Trinity

There is pneumatic space in between the divine and the world, between the spirit
(divine) and the waters (deep). It is in this space that “the intimacy of the infinite begins
to open,” always looking/moving to the future.112 This space is an erotic field, a rhythmic
drumbeat pulsing all forward. The ruach deposits “the wad of writing in the next abyss.”
The “writing” is the opening of the deep and the unfolding of the divine manyone;113 it is
their intimacy that opens. It is the deep and manyone together that is capacitating of
creation.
The Spirit/Ruach is the third in Keller’s tehomic trinity: Tehom, Elohim,
Ruach.114 Tehom/Chaos, the topos of Deep, if “it were a person or a god it could signify
the trinitarian ‘first person.’”115 It is not God but the depth of God; “Ocean of divinity,
womb and place-holder of beginnings, it is not Elohim but the first place or capacity of
108
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genesis.”116 Because all is in God, Chaos is “the heterogeneous depth of divinity and of
world,” the complicatio.117 It “anonymously gives birth to another, ‘not separate but
different,’”118 the explicatio. This explicatio which is not separate but different from
Tehom is what is realized, which means at once to be divinized and to be actualized.119
In short, God-world is/are birthed on the face of this depth. The explicatio “enters
language as Word, Wisdom, Torah.”120
The oscillation between “tehom and elohim,” the first two “persons,” creates.121
“Creation begins—continually—in this relation, this incipient incarnation, at the edge of
the waters.”122 The relation between tehom and elohim, “the ‘relation of relations,’ may
be called by implication the spirit of God.”123 This pulsing force, this relation, opens a
“third space,” an implicatio, “where Tehom could flow into language and Elohim.”124 As
the pneumatic space between God and either world125 or tehom, the Spirit is “the
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differentiator which relates them one to another.”126 Thus the Spirit is differentiator and
connector; “this spirit will not transcend or obliterate differences; rather differences are
intensified precisely by being brought into relation.”127 “Spirit” signifies the relationality
itself. Keller relates her treatment of Spirit to Augustine’s in which the Spirit is the Love
shared between the Father and Son; it binds them together “as lover and beloved.”128
God the Spirit would then signify not only the “immanent” trinitarian
relations, but also an “economic” interdependence of creator and creation,
and as such the interrelation of all creatures…The “differentiator” can be
said to connect divergent forces to their shared potentiality—i.e. the
possibilities that can be realized only in relation: the “I” who cannot
become apart from “you.”129
Chaos and God must be held in relation to one another.
Apart from the spirit ‘brooding o’er the chaos,’ Tehom remains a sterile
possibility and ‘God’ remains mere Word, fleshless abstraction and power
code. Only through pneumatology does theology have a prayer. For if the
life and breath of divinity is the life and breath of the universe, then only
in the “Spirit of Life” can our God-words address the mystery. Without
this Spirit all our words circulate in a disembodied vacuum. For only in
Spirit does Logos have body: that of creation. The universe becomes
Sacred Body there where genesis takes place. No wonder the
Spirit…vibrates at the edge of chaos.130
The Spirit also “connects our depths to our differences. It is of course our spirit—not as
a possession or a self-possession but as the rhythmic life of all creatures, and only as such
the spiritus creator.”131 The erotic field, the rhythmic beat of the Spirit ensures that there
is creation, that incarnation takes place on the face of the Deep.132
In her theology of becoming, then, the “persons” of Keller’s tehomic trinity go by
many names. The first “person” may be called Tehom, Deep, Womb, Tiamat, depth of
126
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God. The second may be called Manyone, Difference, Elohim, Word, Wisdom, Torah.
The last, the relation between the first two, is the Spirit, wind, Shekhinah, or Ruach.133
Thus, in her triune formulation she concludes that “In beginning: a plurisingularity of
universe, earth echoing chaos, dark deep vibrating with spirit, creates.”134

C. Analysis

1. Keller’s Laudable Ideas

There are many of Keller’s ideas that are noteworthy and will serve as helpful
building blocks when they are placed in an alternative framework in the next chapter.
Many of them will work with little change. However, within a non-panentheistic
theology, certain parts will need to be adjusted or left out.
First, in contrast to Levenson’s perspective, her tehomic theology demonstrates
what a theology employing chaos would look like that views the watery deep in a
positive light. She tries to make tehom neutral. Tehom is not good or evil; it is the
possibility for either. In her reading of Psalm 104:24-26, she says that the sea monster
can be affirmed as good, just as such monsters were in Genesis 1:21. Nevertheless,
affirming the goodness (or moral neutrality) or playfulness of the chaos monster does not
mean it is “safe” or “cute.”135 Her treatments of the book of Job and Herman Melville’s
Moby Dick caution against such assumptions. In other words, as was claimed in the
previous chapter, the Priestly cosmology does not demonize any part of creation and
Keller is right in rejecting tehomophobic positions.
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Second, Keller’s tehomic theology presses on many of the weaknesses of
traditional formulations of creatio ex nihilo, with accompanying notions of an absolute
origin and end. Her treatment exposes the fact that salvation history and any other linear
metanarrative about history is a constructed idea; it is not a given. In this linear
construction, ideas about original sin or a fall have been articulated; she joins the chorus
of thinkers in the past few centuries who find this doctrine of a one-time change in the
past to be troublesome.136 Also, linear notions of history easily serve as a breeding
ground for visions of endless growth, development, and advancement of human beings in
not only their social arrangements, human capacities, and collective knowledge, but also
in their conquest, utilization, and consumption of creation.137 There is no end to human
hunger and hope for more ad infinitum.
Keller’s work exposes a related problem concerning the traits of dominance and
power that are asserted about God in traditional ex nihilo formulations. Any such claims
about God have drastic effects (or are the effect) on how people will seek to live in the
image of that God. The subjecting of the (m)other is just one outcome of the
unquestionable might of the God who creates order from nothing at his very
command/word, or even the God who crushes instantiations of chaos by his mighty arm.
Keller prefers the ethical implications of a non-absolutizing, origin-less becoming.
While Keller’s jettisoning of the creatio ex nihilo doctrine will not be followed in
this dissertation, her attention to dangerous issues surrounding the doctrine makes her
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work laudable and worth listening to. There is a need to re-articulate this significant
doctrine in a manner that integrates well with context-appropriate articulations of
Original Sin. There also needs to be attention given to her concerns about linear growth
and a God who interacts with creation one-sidedly.
Third, Keller’s tehomic theology helps to resolve those same accompanying
problems of traditional formulations of creatio ex nihilo that her theology presses against.
In bringing many past voices into her tapestry, Keller sides with a non-chronological
treatment of Genesis 1:1—2:3. She, like Levenson, cites the interpretations of an
eleventh-century Jewish commentator, Rashi, which have been gaining popularity in
recent years. Keller draws on E. A. Speiser’s revival of Rashi’s views.138 Key among
them is the breaking down of the presupposition that Genesis 1 intends to communicate a
precise chronology of events. This paradigm shift away from the subject being about a
serial listing of acts begins in the first verses where Rashi shows that the first sentence,
which begins with “When Elohim began to create heaven and earth,” is more the subject
matter of the first chapter; it is about the whole together, and not chronology or steps.139
Chronology contradicts the first sentence;140 through the lens of vv.1-3, the chapter serves
more as a panoramic view than a turning of the pages of a cosmic scrap book. An
implication in this change is that creation is not a one-time, back then act. The “When
Elohim began to create…” becomes the clue not only for reading Genesis 1, but it then
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prefaces the reading of all of Scripture: the unfolding of God’s creative activity that will
come to fullness in a/the Sabbath rest.141
By Keller changing the “when” of creation to always (instead of then) she also
changes the character of creation. She lets the “let there be…” of Genesis 1 hang in the
chaos. She rejects God being completely separable from creation and, with it, God’s
utter dominance, or any reading of Genesis 1 that includes notions of mastery. God
solicits creation’s forms.142 The earth and the waters are invited “into the grand creative
sweep of God’s designs.”143 Just as important to the notion of divine invitation is the
accompanying notion of creation’s response, the response-ability of creation.144 In the
next chapter a non-panentheistic framework will be outlined in which this address and
response could take place. In so doing, the distinctions made will preclude some of
Keller’s statements about the self-organizing complexities within creation or spontaneous
natality. She does not endorse the autonomy of the cosmos, but, nevertheless, by enmeshing creation and divinity, creation is often attributed with divine capacities. Even
so, her ideas about the ongoing nature of God’s creative activity, God’s soliciting
invitation to creation, and the responsibility of creation are all positive.
With Keller’s deconstruction of creation from nothing and its accompanying
linear metanarrative, comes her suggestion of a helical view of history. There is
beginning and beginning-again. Each entails a decision from among possibilities, from
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preconditions.145 These loops of decision from preconditions not only hold promise for
an account of God’s ongoing work of new creation, but they also are equally promising in
giving an account of sin. These two sides of Keller’s treatment on becoming were
already outlined in detail in this chapter so that will not be repeated. However, there are
some benefits to this type of paradigm that should be pointed out, some of which Keller
herself neither makes explicit nor draws upon in Face of the Deep.
The following benefits are related to Keller’s description of disordered becoming.
Before listing the benefits, however, it should be noted that Keller limits her discussion of
discreative habits to humans. Her theology of becoming encompasses all creation, yet
she does not expand sin—discreative habits that hinder or destroy the fullness of
becoming—to all creation.146 This is a loss within her account. The idea of “chaos”
being developed in this project will treat all discreative “sins” uniformly, whether they
are “committed” within matter itself or by thinking beings.147 Thus, the benefits of taking

145

Keller pays attention to developments in science. Her elimination of a linear metanarrative and
downplaying the Beginning (as though history deterministically unfolds out of it) in favor of beginnings
can, in part, be attributed to voices beyond religious studies.
146
One possible reason is her desire to celebrate the abundance of life within creation. She does not want
to demonize circumstances where humans are harmed by nature. I imagine her response to such harm is
‘who are we to blame nature and its explosive, frolicking life when we are in its world.’ This guess is
based on chapters 7 and 8 in which she treats respectively the Book of Job and Melville’s Moby Dick. In
her treatment of Job, Keller believes the point of God’s final response is to tell Job to look at the
magnificence of the wild things—their frolic and animal energy; we wander in their midst at our own peril.
By interpreting Moby Dick as a midrash on Job, she sees Moby Dick—the leviathan—as a character
content to swim along in its domain, but also as an unbreakable rock against which all who battle it will be
dashed. Thus, Keller protects creation from her discussion of becoming-gone-wrong. She wants to
embrace the explosive force of creation’s becoming and deconstruct any prior labels of its evils.
147
The expectations of human beings for themselves and for the rest of creation have gone through cycles
since the Enlightenment. Various thinkers have had perspectives ranging from positive expectations for
humanity and creation, to positive expectations for humanity and negative ones for creation, to negative
expectations for both (see Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought). William Brown suggests that the
central lesson of Job is that only when Job was stripped of his constructed societal notions of what is
right—by watching the grace of God at work among the wild animals—could he begin to find a proper
perspective of right relation as a human to God and creation. If Neiman’s (and to a degree Brown’s)
research teaches anything, it is in showing the complicated history of humanity understanding and finding
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her thoughts on “sin” and applying them universally within all creation will be the
following. First, that which God is saving creation from can be defined uniformly for
material creation and for living beings. It is no longer multiple problems of creation’s
fallenness and humanity’s fallenness and sin. Second, within Keller’s paradigm, it is the
existence of specific disordered decisions of becoming and their consequent disordering
effects that is of greatest concern. The decision is certainly willed; becoming cannot be
otherwise. However, her theology does not lose itself in discussions of intent. Within
most western judicial thought there is a necessity of mal-intent for there to be a crime, or
sin.148 All creation and creatures are responsible for (guilty of) their discreative
decisions; the consequences stand in need of recapitulation regardless of what was
intended when making those decisions. Keller’s framework cuts through to this most
basic problem. Third, Keller revives a communal (relational) paradigm for understanding
sin in juxtaposition to most post-Augustinian formulations. The relational definition of
sin—or the more comprehensive idea of “chaos” that is being developed—works for both
individuals and communities. It is individuals in relation making decisions of becoming
that effect the subsequent relations within the whole. Both individuals and communities
need healing. Fourth, Keller defines the problem of sin in a dynamic and historic way.
Each event happens in relation to that which preceded it. She does not depend upon a
one time, once upon a time, mythical account of a fall, which has for centuries now been
a liability when presenting Christianity to an audience who thinks in post-Enlightenment
ways.149 Lastly, Keller’s description of sin—within her framework of becoming—takes
embodiment seriously; she says it cleverly: matter matters. Sin arises in the process of
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embodiment/becoming. It will be fixed in the process of embodiment/becoming, as new
creation takes place within the recapitulatory loops. This is our salvation.
The last benefit of Keller’s description of sin naturally leads into discussing the
benefits of her position on salvific recapitulations. The benefit of taking our embodiment
seriously has already been mentioned. If Keller were to keep together creation and
creatures more closely in defining sin—or as is being developed, the idea of “chaos”—
other benefits are, first, that recapitulation addresses uniformly the process by which
discreative occurrences within material creation and living beings are rectified.
Secondly, the process of new creation is not only the same for all creation, but it is
equally for all creation. God’s creative and redemptive activity involves the material
world as much as it involves all living beings. The world becomes a significant character
in the drama instead of the background. Lastly, salvific recapitulation is just as dynamic
and relational as Keller’s treatment of sin. It requires unending, ongoing cooperation—
response—from creation.

2. Critique

There are two major critiques of Keller’s tehomic theology that will be given
here. Each one is related to significant facets of the theological position being developed
in this project. The first critique relates to the relation of God within creation. The
second critique relates specifically to the use of “chaos” in Keller’s work.
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First, on the ontological spectrum between pantheism and divine transcendence—
such that everything is in a reality distinct from God’s own150—Keller proposes her
panentheism as a third, middle option. Her position does not hold God as ultimately
being the only subject, with the world being reducible to God and God’s activity
(pantheism): nor does it hold a stark distinction between God and a world-bereft-of-God.
She affirms that God is “Thou” to the world as theism desires. However, at the same
time, the “en” in panentheism “makes it impossible to draw the line” between God and
world.151 Keller’s full position will not be repeated here. In it, however, the boundary
between God and world is so blurred, it is in such flux, that God and world are
inextricably caught up with one another. The “en” affirms this relation. The manyone
cannot be defined apart from the inclusion within its array of a concretizing angelic
host—embodying messages; nor can creation be defined apart from the inclusion of
divine embodiment. Within Tehom, the creator and creature “create, effect, each
other.”152
She further strengthens the indistinguishable in-ness of God and world in her use
of incarnation. Creation is the incarnation of the manyone on the face of the Deep (which
should not be separated from the becoming of the manyone itself/themselves). Creation
is where God is embodied. Incarnation becomes coextensive with all realization: both
divinization and actualization.153
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Even Keller’s thoughts on Spirit end up confusing divine Spirit with
human/cosmic spirit.154 She is right to recognize the need for both differentiation and
relation between God and the other, whether that other is creation or Tehom. However,
“spirit” becomes little more than a term that describes that space of separation and
relation. Keller does no better in her pneumatology than the Western tradition—which in
line with Augustine defines the Spirit in terms of the relation between the Father and Son,
the love shared between them—in objectifying (and thus minimalizing) the Spirit. As
will be shown in the next chapter, the pneumatology of Lyle Dabney affirms distinction
and relation between God and creation, but “Spirit” is abundantly more than a name for
that space of distinction-relation. Keller’s pneumatology has hints of connection with
Dabney’s in that she sees the pulsing, erotic field of the Ruach as the rhythm of life that
moves all creating forward by keeping all in her tehomic trinity in relation. Nevertheless,
Dabney keeps the Spirit as Divine Spirit, the third person of the Trinity, who is the
Possibility of God for the other and who operates transjectively through creation, opening
it up to the possibility for the o/Other. This means the Divine Spirit is less likely to be
reduced to or confused as being the human spirit (as Keller can be interpreted to do in her
framework of “in”), nor does the Spirit make objects out of human subjects (as Keller
reacts against in the creatio ex nihilo paradigm, especially as it is in Barth).
Folding God into the process of becoming in ways that gives God little
differentiation from the world and its becoming is not the only option between pantheism
and a world devoid of God, or a world made by God. She claims to be teasing out
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It was mentioned earlier that the Spirit signifies the interrelation of Keller’s trinity and all creatures with
others. Thus, the Spirit “connects our depths to our differences. It is of course our spirit—not as a
possession or a self-possession but as the rhythmic life of all creatures, and only as such the spiritus
creator” (238).
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suppressed minority positions within the tradition. Even so, it is questionable whether
any of her predecessors would recognize their sentiments in her theology. For example,
even those who did not renounce the eternality of matter affirmed a start to God’s
formative/creative activity. There are other ways of speaking about the relation between
God and the world that affirm dynamic relationality between them, and yet still are
located within more prevalent currents of the Christian tradition. Due to their familiar
landmarks, these options can more broadly resonate within the Church as it wrestles with
understanding the mystery of its faith in certain of the Church’s current contexts. It can
also serve Christians in those contexts as a vehicle for articulating the Gospel in a way
that may be comprehensible to their unbelieving neighbors.
As has already been noted, many of the ideas in Keller’s theology of becoming
are useful as they relate to creation. However, on the other hand, where God is
concerned, there is no sufficient reason that a more recognizably Christian view of the
Triune God must be abandoned. In the next chapter it will be demonstrated that it is
possible to give an account for the becoming of the world in response to the call of the
Triune God: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The contrasting difference between this
account and Keller’s will be the contrast between the use of “trans” versus “in.” The
operation of the Spirit in creation will be spoken of as transjective. And the operation of
the Word in creation will be spoken of as transcarnate. By setting up this relational
dynamic, it will open a very specific place in which “chaos” can be used theologically.
This use of “chaos” will have many benefits within the realm of theology, some of which
have already been mentioned.
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Second, Keller uses the term “chaos” most often as a synonym for tehom and
deep. She uses many other terms as synonyms to these three words; however, chaos,
tehom, and deep are her three most commonly used terms. Her use of “chaos” in that
manner should be avoided. The term “chaos” has a long history within biblical studies.
All of them are tehomophobic uses, which is exactly what Keller works to deconstruct.
Keller certainly does not want tehom to be mistaken as a cute or safe space; perhaps this
is why she might want to draw on the connotations of “chaos.” Nevertheless, she does
not want to present a position wherein ordering and forming are the default assumptions
about what is needed within the primordial stuff, the milieu of milieus.155 Tehom and
deep work well as terms that evoke a boundless well of unrealized futures. Even though
Keller wants to weave in some angst about the wiliness of becoming on the face, chaos is
not the best term to use for that purpose—given its history and connotations. Keller
herself outlines the deep rooted tradition in western culture to try to fix or solve instances
of “chaos.” At worst, it needs to be conquered and mastered. Keller could have
developed a term such as profundus to bring in that sense of angst, instead of working
upstream against the history of “chaos” in the realms of biblical and ANE studies, as well
as its cultural history.
The connotations of chaos work against her development of a tehomophilic
framework. If “chaos” popularly evokes something in need of solution, why not reserve
it theologically for that type of function? Within this project, that is precisely what is
being suggested; “chaos” should be used as the overarching category for instances where
discreative decisions take place within all creation. Keller’s discussions of human sin
155

Keller does not speak of a primordial stuff/situation because in her framework there is no time prior to
the process of becoming. If there were, there would be an absolute origin. Thus, in her theology, there is
the site of becoming, the realm of possibilities, but it is not before becoming; it is of becoming.
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would be a subset within this broader category.156 Developing this account of chaos
within a more recognizably trinitarian paradigm is the direction we now turn.
Lastly, concerning “chaos,” as was shown in the previous chapter, recent biblical
scholarship questions the validity of applying it to Genesis 1:2. Without critiquing
Keller’s use of “chaos” within her post-foundationalist hermeneutic based on an
historical-critical approach, it can at least be pointed out that she adopts the use of
“chaos” in reference to Tiamat and Genesis 1:2 based on scholarship such as
Levenson’s—even if she critiques what he and the masculine tradition(s) do with the
(feminine) chaos.157 Arguably, she should not have adopted their use of “chaos” given its
questionability.

D. Summary

Keller’s work has as many folds as the deep of which she writes. The complexity
of the process thought in which she positions herself aids in the mystery. Nevertheless,
there are gems in her work that do resonate not only with the Priestly perspective outlined
in Chapter 3, but also with contemporary audiences.
By looking at the history of the doctrine of creation, entering the biblical studies
debates, and by showing how a contemporary theologian uses “chaos” language,
hopefully it has been shown that this terminology has been used in a myriad of different
ways, few if any of them in desirable ways. Even if Levenson and Keller are to be
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One danger with this use is precisely what Keller is working against. She is concerned about any
instances when one group makes monsters out of another in order to justify their mastery. The definition of
chaos being developed does not go without the problem of who gets to name what is chaos. Keller has a
post-foundationalist framework in which making any one position absolute is avoided. Without going that
route, this problem will need to be addressed in the following chapter.
157
Keller, 26.

209
applauded for the underlying impulses that pushed their thinking in the directions they
did, there is another way forward in our context that seeks to listen both to the voice of
Scripture and the intentions of the tradition. It is now time to turn to the work of laying
out that alternate framework in which “chaos” language can serve an appropriate and
useful purpose.
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V. DEFINING CHAOS IN A DIFFERENT FRAMEWORK
A. Introduction:

In preparation for moving forward it will be helpful to provide a brief summary of
what has preceded. Up to this point, there have been several issues noted concerning
“chaos.” First, in the introductory chapter, it was noted that the term “chaos” lacks a
precise definition according to which it is consistently used in theological studies. In
general it is used to designate various notions of pre-creation conditions and problems
arising subsequent to creation; some authors link the two uses in an attempt to account
for evil based on the endurance of (or recurrence of) pre-creation chaos. Clarity and
consistency in using the term is needed. Second, using the term “chaos” for differing
notions of pre-creation conditions has a long, contentious history within Christianity.
Through that history, given the differences in thought worlds between eras, the notions to
which the term has been applied have changed. Even with their uniqueness, some of the
notions in various eras show similarities. Regardless of any novelties, they wisely have
been challenged.
The term “chaos” itself is not the problem, only the notions within the various
frameworks to which it has been applied. “Chaos” has strong connotations and certainly
a more suitable application for it can be found in which its strength can be put to use.
Concerning the issue of creation, the following has been noted. First, although
the intent of those wrestling to articulate the faith in ever changing thought-worlds has
been honorable, it was noted in Chapter 2 that there were at times undesirable and
unintentional consequences to the paths chosen. Among those highlighted, the physio-
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spatial divide (for lack of a better term) between God and the world, such that the activity
of one was seen to be mutually exclusive of the other, has been quite problematic. This
tension will be eased in the framework being proposed by expanding key ideas from Lyle
Dabney’s pneumatology. Second, there has been much debate in biblical studies
concerning what the Priestly creation account says theologically. While being faithful to
the movement of the text, the text will be allowed to reverberate in answer to questions
that postdate its composition for the sake of informing theology in the present. While
what follows is not biblical theology—in that it does not attempt to summarize the
theology of a biblical text, book, or author—it does seek to be informed by Scripture and
in return serve as a framework for the present through which to read and engage
Scripture.1

B. The Uses of “Chaos” Being Avoided

The many types of “chaos” uses in theological studies were outlined in the
introductory chapter. Most all of those uses are being avoided for various reasons.2 The
following is a listing of notions that are being excluded in the present formulation of
chaos.
First, any notion of there being anything that pre-exists God’s creative activity is
being rejected; such a dualism creates more problems than it answers. There is no pre1

This circularity between theological affirmations, rules of faith, and the biblical text has been part of the
church’s practices since the early centuries; cf., e.g., David S. Yeago’s essay, “The New Testament and the
Nicene Dogma: A Contribution to the Recovery of Theological Exegesis,” in The Theological
Interpretation of Scripture: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Stephen E. Fowl (Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell, 1997).
2
One of the ways Enda McDonagh uses the term is the closest any current uses come to the way it will be
defined in this project. Even though he uses “chaos” in many ways being rejected, in one place he says:
“Consideration of Jewish-Christian reconciliation should reveal the depths of the chaos, psychological,
social and theological, in which we find ourselves and indicate the radical character of the new creation
required of humanity and offered by God” (McDonagh, 51).
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existent matter in any form (or lack-of-form). There is no pre-existent force, power, or
entity that is other to God or even part of God that should be called “chaos.” The wisdom
of the Christian tradition in affirming creatio ex nihilo is being embraced.3 Second, along
with notions of pre-existence, Catherine Keller’s notion of tehom/creativity is also being
excluded. Even though chaos for her is neither before nor after creation, neither existent
nor non-existent, but rather of-creation, her framework and the hermeneutic she employs
pushes into categories less prevalent within the major currents of the tradition. The
issues she wants to address can be met within frameworks bearing stronger resemblances
to more familiar voices in the Christian tradition.4
The third type of notion being avoided is linking “chaos” with “disorder,” either
pre- or post-creation. Authors who use the term in this way often, in turn, link God’s
creative activity with ordering; the work of creating is primarily about achieving and
sustaining a comprehensible structural arrangement. This suggests that order/structure is
the telos of God’s creative activity. Or it suggests that the aim, nature, and character of

3

It has already been noted that the move to creatio ex nihilo did not come without accompanying
difficulties through the centuries. In some regards, it too introduced a new kind of dualism between God
and creation subsequent to the affirmation of creatio ex nihilo; “For in that idea, God, as the external, selfsufficient and eternal Artificer, is separated by an impassable gulf from the temporal, finite world He
creates” (Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth: The Christian Doctrine of Creation in the Light of
Modern Knowledge [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985, 1959], 10). As José Morales states:
“Christian theology has always had great methodological difficulty in finding the right place for the world
alongside a God who stands in no need of that world” (Creation Theology [Dublin, Ireland; Portland, OR:
Four Courts Press, 2001], 71). The affirmation of the tradition that there is nothing that pre-exists God’s
initiating creative act will be preserved while at the same time a grammar that finds a closer relationship
between God and the world without melding God with the world will be sought.
4
Process thought, within which Keller works, is often criticized for its dualism of two divine-like
components: God and creativity. Langdon Gilkey believes process thought is in line with the Timaeus and
Gnostic thought as historical examples of dualism (Maker of Heaven and Earth: The Christian Doctrine of
Creation in the Light of Modern Knowledge [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985, 1959], 45).
He defines dualism as any view in which there are, on the one hand, principles of organization that provide
form or structure (e.g., God) and, on the other hand, something that is structured (e.g., khora; or for Keller,
tehom; Gilkey, 46). Christians who try to articulate the faith in a process framework do many things to
smooth over the dualism of God and creativity. Some equate the Spirit with creativity. Keller makes a
similar move by also bringing creativity within the divine. However, her “trinity,” then, does not have the
traditional three persons. Her trinity is Elohim, Creativity, and Spirit.
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God’s creative activity are distinct from and/or secondary to God’s greater aims relative
to creation through history. The undesirable implications of these options can be
illustrated by using Irenaeus’ suggestion that the destiny of creation is the Glory of God.
On the one hand, if creating is about developing an order and if creation’s destiny is also
said to be the Glory of God, then somehow order becomes definitive of the Glory of God.
On the other hand, if ordering is not definitive of God’s Glory, to which creation is
destined, then God’s creative (ordering) activity simply becomes background or
secondary to a divine activity far more definitive of God and creation’s relationship to
God. In other words, if creating equals ordering, the creation of the world becomes
disconnected from its history and telos.
Keeping “chaos” distinct from “disorder,” especially if disorder is believed to be
the opposite of creation, will be helpful in the framework that is being proposed. Thus, in
a similar vein, “chaos” should not be used to describe systems with a high degree of
entropy. The Second Law of Thermodynamics does not govern the movement between
“chaos” and “order”—between non- or pre-creation and creation—in the universe. That
language colors conceptions of the nature of the world in which we live and does not
appear to be most fitting for what is revealed in Scripture concerning our world and
God’s work therein. It assumes that the universe is made to be a cosmos/structure, a
lifeless arrangement of cogs, instead of being an organism/community of interrelating
participants and systems. It also contradicts the reality that life/living requires the release
of energy that accompanies the shift to a higher level of entropy. Similarly scientists and
theologians interfacing science have used “chaos” as a descriptor for systems or
phenomena that appear, based on their current epistemic abilities, “unpredictable” or
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“random.” Again, the witness of Scripture does not concur with such conclusions that the
universe is “chaotic.”
Fourth, “chaos” should not be used concerning that within creation that has notyet reached fullness. Infancy or immaturity should not be demonized or called “chaos.”
It certainly does not exhibit fully all that we hope for it in the future. However, its
potential to be nurtured into further growth and learning is not properly called “chaos.”
For someone or something to operate in an “age-appropriate” manner in itself is not
“chaos.” Even with a need to mature, God’s creations are called to participate in
goodness within the community according to their ability.5 Such a contribution can help
mature creation so that in the next response, a new expression of goodness would be
appropriate.6
Lastly, as with rejecting the use of “chaos” as a synonym of “disorder,” as the
opposite of “order,” the notion of chaos being developed in this project avoids using
“chaos” in reference to things or person’s being anti-order. Such uses assume that the
measure of creation and the completion of God’s efforts is order. Notions of a particular,
fixed societal and natural order are being excluded as the goal of creation in favor of
relational notions—relationships of love. Chaos will be defined relative to goodness,
truth, and beauty being expressed within relationships rather than the presence of order.
Not just any arrangement will suffice. Order, structures, can be beautiful, but order itself
is neither the impetus nor end of creation. This better reflects theological assertions that
the One who is Creator is love. God is not defined as order. Thus, chaos is not anti-

5

Recall from Chapter 3 William Brown’s examination of P’s account of the manner in which creation and
the construction of the tabernacle took place. The calls given were for all to respond according to what is
suitable to their gifts and abilities.
6
More will be said about this later.
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order, but juxtaposed with love of God and neighbor. Relating in love defines the
divinely-gifted hum of the cosmic community.

C. Proposed Framework in which to Define “Chaos”

1. Adapting the Pneumatology of Lyle Dabney

a. Some Key Features of Lyle Dabney’s Pneumatology

Lyle Dabney seeks to complete in his pneumatology the theological turn begun in
Luther.7 Whereas there had been, in Luther’s eyes, a theology of glory—a theology of
human ascent (graced nature)—Luther proposed a theology of God’s descent,
understanding God in relation to the incarnation and the cross. Within this Lutheran
tradition, the Father and Son had been defined in relation to the cross. However, the
Spirit was defined in terms of bringing humans to what had been accomplished in the
cross. Dabney seeks to finish Luther’s turn by defining the Trinity, including the Spirit,
in terms of the cross.8 To that end, in an examination of Mark’s narrative, he concludes
that the Spirit is
the possibility of God even in the midst of every impossibility that God
could be present and active, the divine possibility that the living God
might be found even in the midst of chaos and death, indeed, precisely in
the midst of chaos and death, the possibility that God might yet be for us
and we might yet be for God, and thus the possibility that even those who
suffer that deadly estrangement might beyond death be raised to new life,

7

Dabney’s pneumatology is laid out in an accessible manner in a series of lectures published together in
Starting with the Spirit, edited by Gordon Preece and Stephen Pickard Hindmarsh (Sydney, Australia:
Australian Theological Forum, 2001); several of them were later published in other forms after their
original appearance (see Bibliography).
8
See his “Pneumatologia Crucis: Reclaiming Theologia Crucis for a Theology of the Spirit Today,”
Scottish Journal of Theology 53, no. 4 (2000): 511-524, esp. 513-515.
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transformed life, a life in which the crushed and broken and incoherent
bits and pieces of a life are taken up anew and made whole.9
Because the Spirit is the one who is the possibility of God in every impossibility, the
Spirit is integrally part of the life, death, and resurrection of the Son—not just the
subsequent application of that which was accomplished by the Father and Son on the
cross and mediated by the Son.10 The Spirit is the presence and possibility of God in
Christ’s Passion—the possibility that creation might still be for God and the possibility of
God to be for/in impossibility. “Indeed, it is precisely the kenotic work of the Spirit of
life to plunge himself into death, hell and the grave, to ‘empty himself’ into the abyss of
death and raise the one who, by virtue of that self-same Spirit, gave himself to death on
the cross to gain new life for all creation.”11 Simply, in the cross, which is centrally
definitive of God, the Spirit is seen to be the possibility of God and “is not to be identified
simply as ‘power’ or as ‘life’ or as a ‘relationship’ or as ‘gendered’, male or female—as
is so often the case.”12 If the Spirit is to be named, the primary name should be
Possibility of God.

9

“Naming the Spirit: Towards a Pneumatology of the Cross,” in Starting with the Spirit, ed. by Stephen
Pickard and Gordon Preece (Hindmarsh, Australia: Australian Theological Forum Inc., 2001), 58—italics
original; cf. “Pneumatologia Crusis,” 524.
10
Cf., e.g., Wolfhart Pannenberg’s pneumatology. His typical formula is to talk of an activity of the Father
by the Son and the Spirit. He clarifies the “by” as the obedience of the Son to the Father and the
glorification of the Father and Son through the consummation of their work by the Spirit (Systematic
Theology, vol. 3, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1998], 1, 134-136). This is true in the case of creation and redemption. In redemption the Spirit
reveals and teaches about what the Father and Son accomplished and moves us to faith, hope, and love (5);
the “basic saving works of the Spirit” are summed up in the gifts of faith, hope, love, and adoption (cf. 136236). Thus, “the work of the Spirit is simply to glorify the Son by teaching us to know the Father in the
Son through whom we have access to him… Because the Spirit, as Creator of a new life with no death, is
himself an eschatological reality, he can also make manifest the eschatological significance of the coming
and history of Jesus” (16, 17). The Son gifts the Spirit to us as an anticipation or pledge of the future (7,
11). Until then, the Spirit ecstatically raptures believers into union with Christ (16, cf. 134).
11
Dabney, “Pneumatologia Crucis: Reclaiming Theologia Crucis for a Theology of the Spirit Today,” 524.
12
Dabney, “Naming the Spirit: Towards a Pneumatology of the Cross,” 58.
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The use of the word “possibility” can be misleading for those who are accustomed
to its philosophical use, in the distinction between possible and actual. The term is not
being used in this technical sense. That would make the Spirit something not-yet-realized
in God (a potential) that could not, then, have agency or be in a give and take loving
relationship.13 That would also make the Spirit very similar to the Tehom in Keller’s
trinity.
Nevertheless, there are certainly philosophical issues in the background of
Dabney’s pneumatology. His pneumatology
develops its understanding of creation in terms of the priority of
possibility, not in terms of the priority of being or the real…As Eberhard
Jüngel has pointed out, it was an act whose consequences for the history of
the western intellectual tradition are almost impossible to overestimate,
when Aristotle declared in his Metaphysics that the real was necessarily
prior to the possible (Met Q, 1049 b 5; cp L, 1072 a 9), which had as its
logical correlate that the real defines the parameters of the possible in
thought and deed.14
“Possibility” is being used in the sense of the Spirit, as an agent, a person of the Trinity,
“making possible.” This framework “does not begin with a metaphysical claim for the
ontologically real, it starts rather with the Spirit of God who in the death and resurrection
of Jesus Christ is identified as the possibility of God that brings the real into emergent
being.”15 The Spirit being the Possibility of God should not be understood that the Spirit
is “making possible” God. Instead, it is that which is other to God for whom the Spirit is

13

I thank Thomas Oord for reminding me that this term has other technical uses that may create
misunderstandings of the pneumatology being advocated.
14
Dabney, “The Nature of the Spirit: Creation as a Premonition of God,” in Starting with the Spirit, ed. by
Stephen Pickard and Gordon Preece (Hindmarsh, Australia: Australian Theological Forum Inc., 2001),
101f—italics original. The implications of the priority of the Real and some of the ways this has shifted in
Western thinking has been outlined in helpful ways in Remi Brague’s The Wisdom of the World: The
Human Experience of the Universe in Western Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
15
Ibid., 102.
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the Possibility of God. As Dabney’s work shows, this operation of the Spirit,
demonstrated powerfully in Christ, is a work of God for us.
This turning around of the deeply engrained order of possible and real merits brief
illustration beyond what Dabney offers in his lectures. Since the Spirit is the first
creative move of God as possibility for the other, the Spirit is not making or giving
“possibilities” or a “set of possibilities.” Such a use would be more in keeping with
Aristotle’s legacy. Also, such a use is common in those who speak about creation
organizing, or being organized, from randomness and disorder, from a realm of
possibilities. However, the word is not used in the plural. Such notions are being
excluded. Instead, the Spirit is the possibility for the other. There is the openness of
God-making-possible the other, the other’s expression. By such open-endedness to the
making-possible activity, it provides space (possibility) for the agency and ingenuity of
God’s other to be operative with God in creatively moving forward.16 By the Spirit, God
makes possible the stepping forward into what is not, rather than the making actual one of
the not-yets (possibilities).17 There is no capacity that nature or creation possesses to
16

See, ibid., 104. In looking at the focus of creation theology through the eras of the church, there has been
a progression in the focus on the Father (the first article) to the Son/Word (the second article). This has had
its effects. “As we saw above, a theology of the first article thinks of the act of creation as that state of
emanation of necessary being down the ladder of contingent being from divine to angelic to human to
animate to inanimate. The theology of the second article, on the other hand, emphasizes the personal and
purposeful nature of the act of creation and likens it to the speaking of the Word of Law and Gospel—so
Luther—or to the carrying out of a providential plan—as in Calvin. But perhaps a theology of the third
article should conceive of creation in a different way entirely: as an act of discovery” (104).
17
There is one possible objection that needs to be addressed. The finitude of creation is still being
affirmed. In the Spirit being the Possibility of God, a human cannot decide in the next moment to be a bird.
However, instead of seeing our finitude as there being a limited set of possibilities given to us by God (the
Real), another option is being proposed. God has not had calculated from the beginning all possible
outcomes based on every possible combination of choices made among the provided possibilities. God is
not waiting to see which option among all possible outcomes becomes reality. The question for God is far
more interesting than which horse entered in the race will get around the oval first. God certainly is more
knowledgeable than creation about the precise ripples that each action has on the relational dynamics
within the cosmic community. However, the beauty of God joining with the cosmic community, of making
possible that which is other, that which truly has agency, is being surprised by the activity, the word, of an
other. The great mystery in God’s relationship with creation is where these agents who God makes
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move forward, but the life-giving breath of God blowing through makes possible the
‘new’ or the ‘further.’18
Moving forward: in the relationship between God and creation, the Spirit, as an
operating agent, is the possibility that there can be an other for God, one that is both
related and distinct.19 It is this “relationship in the Spirit as the breath of God that gives
breath to all creation, which is the possibility of God for the world and the possibility of
the world for God, a relationship that even permits the speaking of a/the w/Word to an
o/Other and the hearing of the w/Word of the o/Other.”20 The Spirit is not the
relationship between God and the other—neither a space giving distinction between God
and creation nor a glue that keeps them related, or interacting in proximity. Another way
of stating this: the Spirit is other from creation, but being other implies relatedness.21 We
are not identical with the Spirit, the Giver of Life, who is the very Breath of God breathed
through us; but being other means that we can be, indeed are, defined relative to the
Spirit. It is in the Spirit “that we are established and maintained in relationship with the
One who is truly Other, the Wholly Other, with whom we are not identical and yet with

possible will take this thing. How often must God reflect, “That certainly is not how I would have thought
to do that, but that works,” in response to the positive inventive responses of creation? God makes possible
that creation can participate in creating the non-existent future, rather than picking and choosing among
not-yet futures that God provides.
18
Dabney, “The Nature of the Spirit: Creation as a Premonition of God,” 103f.
19
Recall the tension within the tradition between affirming a distinction between God and creation while
still articulating a relation (or need) of God to creation. Catherine Keller’s pneumatology defined the Spirit
as the space that gives separation/distinction and relation to God and creativity/tehom. Her approach
reflects the trend in Western pneumatology to define the Spirit in terms of the relation between the Father
and Son, the love shared between them. Dabney cuts through identifying the Spirit as the relation in favor
of identifying the Spirit as the relating one. The Spirit is the third person of the Trinity who is not merely
passive, but acts, with the Father and Son, relative to creation.
20
Dabney, “The Nature of the Spirit: Creation as a Premonition of God,” 100.
21
In Dabney’s words: “Only that which is both different and related is ‘other’. That with which we are
identical is not ‘other’, it is simply a repetition of ourselves. That to which we have no relation, on the
other hand, is likewise no ‘other’, it is as far as we are concerned, simply ‘not’” (“The Nature of the Spirit:
Creation as a Premonition of God,” 97).
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whom we are always related. And in that difference in relationship we are at one and the
same time related to one another and to the entirety of God’s creation.”22
From the first page of the Bible there is no part of creation devoid of the Spirit’s
presence. God is other than creation, but creation is not “autonomous from its Creator.”23
In the Spirit, God is with and for creation, even where it seems most unlikely or
impossible. Even in the imagery of Genesis 1:2, what elsewhere may be a catastrophic
destruction for God’s people and the land is, because of the Spirit’s presence, a picture of
“the possibility and promise of creation.”24 In all that takes place in the narrative, “there
is woven the presupposition of the presence of the Spirit.”25
By the Spirit’s presence in human beings, they can be and were created to be for
the o/Other: God and the-rest-of-God’s-creation (i.e., neighbor). “By virtue of the Spirit
as the ubiquitous and life-giving presence of God in the world, we might say then that,
from the very first, we—indeed all creation—are ‘otherwise engaged in the Spirit’ and
are thus ever and again encompassed in events of emergent commonality…For the Spirit
of God,” writes Dabney, “is that which relates us to God and to one another ever and
again at each moment of our existence.”26
This o/Other orienting Spirit, as Dabney points out, is not the same as human
subjectivity, the human spirit seeking out God, nor is the Spirit God’s subjectivity
meeting us face-to-face or making objects out of humans to control them. The Spirit does
not operate in the categories of subject or object within God’s creation, but rather
transject. This means that “from the very inception of our lives we live ‘out of’ the
22
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presence of God’s spiritual breath, borne away from ourselves on the winds of the Spirit
to the ‘other’ of our neighbor and to the ‘Wholly Other’ of our Creator.”27
This grammar of “trans” is helpful in shaping the imagination concerning God’s
relationship to and operation relative to creation. “Trans” dances between seeing the
Spirit either as an outside causative force intruding on creation or being conflated as part
of creation. In blowing through/across creation, the Spirit orients those whom the Spirit
inhabits outward toward others. That which is the Possibility of God for us is not generic
in its operation; the Spirit is o/Other pointed. In the Spirit we live “eccentric” lives that
have their center in an o/Other.28 The Spirit is the possibility of God for the other and the
possibility that the other might be and live for the o/Other. All created things, especially
humans, “are, from the first, social in nature.”29 They are to live eccentric lives by the
very possibility of God by which they were created to do so. The Spirit operates “trans”creation to that end. Love of God and neighbor is the orientation according to which
creation exists by the Spirit. The Spirit is not present to creation that the Spirit might be
ours, but it blows where it will that we too might be for others.30
Thus, just as the ‘east wind’ drives the various waters westwards or bend
the many different plants of the field in a common direction, thereby
effecting in the many a common result without in any way reducing their
individual differences, so in like manner the divine wind of God’s Spirit
can move upon the waters of chaos at the first or among a people at a
certain time and place and bend their lives to a common purpose and a
distinctive social existence.31
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It is in this way that the Spirit is the possibility that there can be an other for God
that is both related and distinct. The new category of God relating to creation by the
Spirit transjectively affirms simultaneously distinction and relation; it does not try to
balance between the two separately-stated antinomies of transcendence and immanence,
but rather offers a grammar that moves beyond the prior tension.
In terms of God’s creative (and redemptive) mission, the Spirit is the possibility
of God for all creation, for that which is not yet “son/daughter” to the Father. For
example, upon Jesus’ anointing with the Spirit at his baptism he is cast by the Spirit into
the desert and eventually to the cross. It is precisely in the impossibility of these places
that the Spirit is the possibility or presence of God in the not-yet of the Father. This
mission is manifest in God’s others by the Spirit. The outwardly-oriented/orienting Spirit
takes God’s children into all that is not yet child of the Father so that new, transformed
life might be found there. More than gracing nature unto salvation or making a favorable
judgment concerning a dead, rejected nature, salvation is a transformation of that nature
by the possibility of the divine Spirit.

b. An Adaptation to Dabney’s Proposal: Looking Again at the Second Person

By the fourth-century, a method typically employed against those who claimed
either that the Son and/or Spirit were creatures or that three Gods were being taught
within Christianity was to demonstrate the inseparable operations of the Trinity.32 With
this method Christians sought to establish not only the divinity of the three persons, but
also the unity of the distinct persons in being, power, presence, and activity. Even though
orthodoxy on these trinitarian issues has been worked out in that early context and
32
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inseparable operations is not needed for the purpose of establishing right doctrine, it is
still a helpful theological affirmation both supported by Scripture and through which to
read Scripture.
Dabney originally sought to finish the turn begun in Luther by defining the third
person of the Trinity, with the Father and Son, relative to God’s work in Christ and the
cross. This aim can be seen as a move toward inseparable operations in a context where
it had been insufficiently affirmed. This facet of his work on pneumatology is especially
laudable. Nevertheless, in seeking to define the Spirit based on the activity of the Spirit
relative to Christ, the West’s traditionally-passive Spirit was depicted as active almost to
the detriment of the second person. The second person, especially in Christ, became the
one whose activity was a matter of consent to the Spirit.33 The traditionally active and
passive qualities assigned in the West to the Son and Spirit respectively were nearly
reversed. In moving forward, a more robust manner of speaking about the inseparable
operations of all the persons, including the Word will be suggested.
As with the tensions noted in Dabney’s work concerning traditional positions
about the Spirit’s relation to creation, finding a way to talk about the Word relative to
creation has been equally difficult. The options have tended to vary between either the
Word being a distinct, external command given to or acting upon creation, or the Word
being imbedded to some degree within creation. Keller’s theology is an example of the
latter in which creation is coextensive with the incarnation of the divine word. There is
indistinctiveness in subjectivity of who is expressing whom. In Chapter 2 it was noted
that problems arose later in the tradition when God either was conceived as existing and
acting as an external force to creation or was confused with creation in pantheistic or
33
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panentheistic paradigms. With the growth of scientific inquiry, in the first option God
became unnecessary and in the second the spiritual became subject to natural observation
and eventually superfluous as well.34
Those are not the only options. Just as the Spirit operates transjectively to
creation, the Word operates in a transcarnate manner—through, across. God is certainly
distinct in this framework, but not solely exterior to creation or spatially separated from
creation. God is not conflated with creation or embodied therein, save in the incarnation
of the second person in Jesus. Incarnation is the self-revelation, self-expression of God
living enfleshed. On the other hand, in the coming to be of creation, made possible by
the inseparable operations of the Triune God, it is not God’s self-revelation, selfexpression (i.e., incarnation). It is our self-expression of God’s self-gifted goodness
trans-creation. We are imaging divinity, but God is not self-expressing God in us.
Preserving respectively the subjectivity of creation and God at work is key in affirming
the Word operating relative to creation transcarnately versus incarnately.
The coming to be creation is also not plucking out from the intersecting Word
what to embody of the Word. Just as the Spirit does not become our possession, creation
does not capture snapshots of the Word as the form it takes on. There is a movement and
orientation of the Word; it is a song of love to/for the other. Initially it is in the
Possibility of the Spirit that the operation of the Word makes possible a word to be
spoken by an other in relation to the Godhead.35 In God’s subsequent creative activity, it
is the rub of the Word/Call of God trans-creation—with the always present Possibility of
the Spirit—in relationship to which creation can respond with a word. Creation does not
34
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speak the Word, but its own—its own word sparked and made possible by the God who
speaks first. The friction of the expressed love of God—the Word transcarnate—in
creating is the possibility of creation having a voice, and a vocalization relative to which
creation makes its tones. Creation can come to self-express, in orchestral array, the
divine love/goodness God self-gifts trans-creation. The Word is the possibility for that
expression, any expression, in creation’s becoming.
Thus, the invisible God is not seen in creation. Creation is not God’s body such
that disharmonious response implies a disfigurement of God in God’s embodiment or in
what other’s describe as God’s becoming. At the same time, creation was not created to
subsist distinct from God in such a way that God’s activity or presence is an addition to it
or a disruption of it (e.g., with potentia absoluta). Creation lives, moves, and has its
being by the moment by moment transcarnate, transjective operations of the Word and
Spirit respectively from the Father, whose creative work by the Spirit and Son is the
possibility that creation might be embraced as an other by the Father and self-express that
he is Father; it is his child. He searches creation, knowing it and delighting in it. The
language of a self-operating, self-existing nature that receives grace as a possession does
not make sense in the framework of God’s existence and operation relative to creation by
the Spirit and Word. Neither does language that enmeshes God with creation through an
emphasis on incarnation have a place. All concerning creation takes place/is possible by
the inseparable operations of God trans-creation.36
36
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In developing the grammar of this new framework it certainly would be helpful to
have a new preposition: for example, “throughin.” “Through” by itself can carry too
much the notion of a passing intersection with little or no interaction, unless it is taken in
the sense of “by means of.” “Throughout” can carry too much the notion of extension
versus dynamic relation. Using “in” can be confusing in that either creation would be a
container for God or there could be misunderstanding that the Word incarnates as the
substance and/or form of creation or the Spirit is creation’s subjectivity and/or expressed
by creation. With the word “throughin” there would be both the movement of
intersection between God and creation—thus avoiding pantheism or panentheism—as
well as the friction of inwardness that circumvents a clean duality in terms of creation’s
utter separation from God. There is no creation apart from the acting presence of God
throughin it.

2. Clarifying the Relationship of This Position with Panentheism

Within this project, the “in” of panentheism has been criticized, especially the
way it can be interpreted to function in Catherine Keller’s work in her language of
incarnation and divine embodiment. There are, nevertheless, many forms of
panentheism. In some ways, positions that lie on the spectrum “between an acosmic
theism, which separates God and world (G / W), and a pantheism which identifies God
with the universe as a whole (G = W),”37 can all be labeled as panentheistic positions—
very loosely defined with the formula G > W. These moderating positions want to
embrace both the self-identity of God and God’s intimacy with creation, the two poles of
37
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the spectrum.38 To the extent that the position outlined herein has been forged out of
those same sympathies, it could be labeled as panentheistic. However, differences in
understanding the “in” of panentheism typically become the splintering issue among
panentheisms. Such is the reason the position of this project bears little affinity with the
traditional markers of panentheistic positions39 or with one of the positions in a typology
of major Western panentheistic positions.40
The framework developed herein moves against the manner in which many—if
not all—of the eight common themes in panentheistic positions, as outlined by Michael
Brierley, are articulated. Those themes include the cosmos as God’s body, the language
of “in and through,” the cosmos as sacrament, language of inextricable intertwining,
God’s dependence on the cosmos, the intrinsic, positive value of the cosmos, divine
passibility, and degree Christology.41
The grammar of “trans” has been adopted and developed specifically to preclude
many of these panentheistic markers. The cosmos is not God’s body, divine incarnation.
Also, the cosmos does not become sacrament “under, in, through which God comes;”42
there is not a general sacramental principle being affirmed, which claims “that any and
every thing has the potential to become a full vehicle of the divine.”43 God is fully
present throughin creation at all times; but God is not “graspable within finitude” or “to
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be discovered in the miniatures of life.”44 The move away from “in” to “trans” means
that God is not present “in” creation by degrees, only to be fully realized in Christ or at
the eschaton.45 God is always fully present and operative trans-creation; but God is
present so that creation itself can express its own word in relation to God’s manner of
relating to others, not a portion of God’s Word or a lesser-quality version thereof. Our
word is expressed relative to the plumb-line of God’s relating to others in love, goodness,
truth, beauty, etc. Our word is expressed relative to the very Possibility of God that it can
be expressed at all.
The claim that God suffers in and with creation where and when creation suffers,
because of being embodied therein, does not translate in the grammar of a “trans”
relationship. The reality that God can suffer emotional wounds as a lover, suffer the
blasphemy and quenching of his operations, or suffer in the Son’s incarnation is not being
rejected. However, God is not suffering by being embodied throughout the cosmos.46
Also, God is not “inextricably intertwined with creation” or “dependent on the cosmos”
by some necessity of divine nature or even by choice in the ways panentheists tend to
talk.47 God has chosen to join with and gift himself throughin the cosmic community, for
which God is its possibility, according to his covenants with the community. It is true
that the community cannot be defined apart from an inclusion of the present activity of
God throughin, meaning that “nature – God = o.”48 However, this relationship of God to
creation is not eternally or necessarily part of God.
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Even though avowed panentheists both identify with and deny certain themes
common among panentheist positions, the language of “trans” places the position of this
project at odds with nearly every one of them, at least the manner in which “in” colors
them. It also places the present position at odds with Gregersen’s taxonomy of positions.
The language of “possibility” and “trans” means that God can be, indeed is present,
everywhere. The Spirit is possibility in every circumstance, including impossibility.
Thus, the proposed framework is not a soteriological panentheism in which creation is
not-yet “in God,” but awaits such a conversion/movement.49 This position also does not
fit either the cycle of “alienation of finitude” from God and return to God within German
Idealism or the God-World relationship in dipolar (Whiteheadian) panentheism.50 The
world is neither a self-expression of God or a journey of self-experience by God nor do
our “misdeeds” become the “misfortunes”51 of the God who is at the same time both “the
universal cause and the all-inclusive reality.”52
Thus, even though the position offered in this project shares the aims of
panentheist positions to affirm together the self-identity of God and God’s intimacy with
the world, there are few ways in which the grammar of “possibility” and “trans” place
this project in agreement with the predominant types of panentheism or common markers
of panentheistic frameworks. The “in” of panentheism far too much governs the
articulations of various issues for the label of panentheism to be embraced as suitable for
this framework. At the most this framework sympathizes with the common themes and
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intentions of panentheism in general while proposing a significant revision of much of
the grammar, including the label itself.

3. Describing God’s Creative Activity in Conversation with Genesis 1

By applying the proposed framework to the reading of Genesis 1, it gives the text
a fresh flavor. The presence of the Spirit in v. 2 is precisely in character. It is the
eccentric character of the Spirit to be always present no matter the scene. The Spirit is
the Possibility of God in every circumstance. The Spirit is also the Possibility of God
that there be an other, one characterized both by distinction to God while at the same time
itself being eccentrically oriented to the o/Other. God’s other is a response-able other.53
The Spirit’s eccentricity is also kenotically driven into every impossibility for God.54
Just as the Spirit drove Christ into the wilderness and even to the grave in Mark’s Gospel
that the Kingdom might come even there, the Spirit in Genesis 1 was actively nurturing
the infant creation that was yet desolate and empty; it was not-yet unfolded into a fully
expressive agent of God’s goodness (loving care for the o/Other) in God’s developing
cosmic community. Its responses had not yet matured into productive/reproductive
fertility, the abundance of life.
In responding both relative to and by the transcarnate Word according to the
eccentrically orienting Spirit, creation was growing not only into the goodness and beauty
of its relationship with God, it was in turn maturing into ever more numerous creation(s)
spawning and nurturing others. All the characters in the cosmic community develop in
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Genesis 1 into ones operating in service to the growth/good of others.55 The result is that
we are not just related to God and others by the Spirit, but, by the cooperative response
of others to God’s call in our coming to be, we are dependent on the activities of both
God and others in our becoming. In Genesis 1, God elicits that which exists to support
the coming to be of others.
In the Godhead, so moved according to the manner seen in the operations of the
Spirit, it comes as no surprise that the Word’s involvement in creation would be oriented
in a like fashion.56 The Word too is spoken as both the possibility for expression by the
other and as care for the unfolding of the other.
The divine speech of Genesis 1 has often been labeled as “command.”
Technically the grammatical force of the verbs makes the statements commands, even if
that is nuanced by saying they are jussive.57 However, if the Word operates
transcarnately in creation, the commands must be considered differently than they have
been. They cannot be an object/force acting upon God’s creation—moving it about as a
55
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pawn. They cannot take shape as creation, becoming incarnate. Nor can they be thought
to establish/create ex nihilo by divine fiat, monergistically.58 Rather, as the Spirit and
Word operate inseparably, there is the possibility for an other enabled to
become/respond in concert with the goodness of God’s self-gifting for it in the Spirit and
Word. The divine speech would be more appropriately labeled as “call.” As God’s Word
operates transcarnately with the transjective Spirit, it is both message for and possibility
by which the other responds. It is both the call for self-expression and the possibility for
it. The call is being issued such that creation can speak out in its own voice ongoingly,
moment by moment. For creation movement/becoming is always taking place.59

4. A Creatio Ex Nihilo through the Possibility of Creation’s Self-Expression
rather than Divine Fiat

Genesis 1 does not answer the question whether God created out of nothing or
began with a pre-existent stuff. The narrative opens with a non-productive, empty
earth—a not-yet-as-we-know-it earth, over which the Spirit hovers. It narrates the earth
as opposite of what the Priestly theology believed creation to be about (except, even then,
58

This statement does not deny ex nihilo. It only denies a certain notion of creatio ex nihilo.
This framework draws on Irenaeus’ general affirmation that “God is Creator, and he creates as the trinity
of Father with Son and Spirit” (M. C. Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of
Redemption, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, vol. 91 [Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008], 67. Two outcomes
of this are that creation is a “communal act of Father, Son and Spirit, working in harmony and with singular
purpose” (64) and that everything God creates is in communion with the triune God (67). Even with these
trinitarian claims, Irenaeus does not always carry them out well. For example, with humans it is the Trinity
in whom they are brought to life and are to be perfected. However, Irenaeus repeatedly states that it is the
physical form of the Son’s future incarnation after which humans are made (Steenberg, 137). This helps to
give much of Irenaeus’ claims a more Christological than trinitarian focus. The roles of the three persons
that are emphasized also keep the focus on the Father and Son; the Spirit, except in reference to being an
ongoing vivifying principle through the human soul, is not as essential to the creative process: “the Father
is creator, the Word the means by which the Father creates, and the Spirit is the adorner of that creation
wrought by the Father through the Word” (64f). In one location Irenaeus explicitly calls the Spirit
“creator,” a term usually reserved for the Father and Son (AH 4.31.2; Steenberg, 70). To Irenaeus’ credit, it
was rarely claimed that the Spirit was “creator” for over two centuries after Irenaeus. Even Augustine did
not press that claim until some of his latest writings (cf., e.g., his Contra Maximus from 426 in which he
utilizes Ps 33:6). It is Irenaeus’ general affirmation of trinitarian participation that resonates with the
current framework.
59

233
the absence of God’s presence in the Spirit could not be affirmed). In spite of the ancient
method employed to narrate creation in Genesis 1, the grammar of creation being
developed here affirms with the tradition the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.
In the present framework, the nature of God and God’s creative activity makes
possible the inclusion of a word from the other in the creative event, an other who does
not pre-exist the very creative activity of God itself. It is the grammar of divine
possibility that makes room for saying simultaneously both that prior to creation there is
nothing—non-preexistence of any other—and that the event of creation itself entails a
synergism between the activity of God and an expression from an other made possible by
God. The active ingredients in the very first coming to be of creation included, to the
Father’s delight, the Possibility of God, the Word of God, and the non-preexistent word
whose expression was/is creation’s coming to be. While this makes a positive statement,
it is still a humble one; there is a great deal that remains unasserted about the mystery of
creation in the grammar.
By speaking about the Spirit’s relation to creation as transject and the Word’s
relationship to creation as being transcarnate, it enables different language about coming
to be. This language honors creatio ex nihilo and intends to communicate its spirit while
employing a different grammar. With the very Call of God for the other is the present
Possibility of God; it is their activity together which is the possibility that the response of
a non-preexistent other be included in the dynamic of the creative event. Joining the
Spirit, who is everywhere always present as possibility in impossibility, the reverberation
of the transcarnate Word gifts the possibility of our coming to be, that we speak as other.
There is no sequence to the call and the expressed word of becoming a related creation
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that the call makes possible; it is with/upon the call that creation’s self-expression is
possible. There is no capacity of either life or expression possessed by creation; there is
no autonomously existing creation, but only a creation whose coming to be is possible by
the Spirit and Word presently operating throughin. There is simultaneity in the other
being related to God the Father (established by the inseparable operation of the Spirit and
Word) with the very establishment that there is the other by the synergism of Spirit, Call,
and self-expression/word. By the Spirit and Word the Father calls “let there be” and by
the same Spirit and Word there is with/upon the call the self-declaration of an other,
“here I am.”
There is no entity that is made that is subsequently addressed and/or empowered
for response; there is not a thing created that is turned on or enlivened. There is not a
second act of God by which the created other is then addressed or by which it can
respond. God does not act on creation or as creation, but trans-creation. There is only
the creative act of God by the eccentric Spirit and Word. In the very act of making
possible an other, creation expresses itself as a responsible other.60 It does not pre-exist
the initiation of God’s creative operation while at the same time participates with God in
the creative event due to the nature of God and God’s creative activity making such
synergism possible.
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Because of the nature of the inseparable operations—the character of which are
fitting of the God who is love—creation does not take place by divine fiat. God’s
creative activity is the very possibility that there is a word from another to that activity.
God’s operations trans that coming-to-be creation ensure that it is not God establishing a
creation with possibilities, but being the possibility for the self-expression of an other
relative to God. In the creative event there is that which is truly other whom God loves.
In creating, God’s operations in respect to that other demonstrate the nature of divine
love. It self-gifts for the good of the other while exposing itself to the unknown of
whether the free-other will openly, outwardly self-express itself in kind.
The coming to be of creation is no longer a matter of zero-sum accounting. God’s
creative activity is synergistic with the very other who is being created. Without being
pre-existent to the call, the being-created-one speaks with/upon it. The coming-to-be
creation comes to be in relation to the Triune God. The Call, with the Spirit, is the
possibility for the expression, the becoming, of the other. That which is creation is the
response(s) to—word’s expressed relative to—God’s call(s). Creation’s coming-to-be is
not necessarily saying the same thing as the call; it does not incarnate the Call. Creation
cannot express via its subjectivity divine subjectivity and God does not express God’s
subjectivity in the other. Rather, God’s call(s) make possible the self-expression of the
other; it allows for ingenuity in response.61 Thus, God’s creative activity is in itself a
kenotic act. It is a joining of and a joining with the cosmic community being created; it is
in total respect and care for the others therein.62 In making possible the other, God self-
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More will be said about this later.
In the words of Michael Lodahl: “The very fact that Christ, the Word become flesh, was nailed to a cross
by other men reveals a vulnerability on God’s part, a willingness to suffer our abuses of freedom. God the
omnipotent One does not hoard power but shares power. In the very act of creation, the God who is self-
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gifts himself as the possibility for the other. Nevertheless, the shape creation comes to be
is the word it speaks.
In the earliest image of creation in Scripture God is present with it. The
introduction of the theme that God is creating the whole (v. 1) is met subsequently with
an affirmation of God’s abiding presence throughin. The Priestly tradition cannot narrate
for its pupils a world devoid of God, to which God or God’s activity is foreign or an
“external” addition. The first definition (by way of an image) of God as Creator is God
with creation. The earliest notion of creation—in all its dimensionality and historicity—
includes within creation/world a statement of God being with it.
God is not just with creation, a participating member of the newly begun and
emerging community, God is for creation. With the newly becoming creation in Genesis
1:2 God is seen as relating positively with it in offering himself in gift. Self-gifting is
precisely the first movement of God’s creation of the heavens and the earth; God, by the
Spirit, gifts himself as the possibility for the other (Gen 1:2). The Spirit broods over the
waters.
In Chapter 3 the structural analysis of Genesis 1 in the work of William Brown
was used to highlight the way God calls to various parts of creation to participate with
God in the increasing unfolding of the community. Looking at the text through the
proposed framework, their participation is by the transjective Spirit and transcarnate
Word. In asking the land “to grass grass” (v. 11) and the waters “to swimming

giving Love has shared with the creature the power to be. Anglican theologian John Macquarrie has
written, ‘His creation was also a self-emptying…His love and generosity led him to share existence with
his creatures. [This is not simply] a limitation of power but also God’s making himself vulnerable, for
there cannot be this love and sharing and conferring of freedom without the possibility of suffering on the
part of him who loves and shares and confers.’ The God we call omnipotent does not exercise all power, if
indeed power has been shared with us” (The Story of God, 62; cf. 63).
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swimmers” (v. 20) God’s intention is that the thing which is produced is to be dependant
upon and united with the continued activity of the actor. It is not as though God creates
alone or that there is such a thing as an independently-existing creation that can create
alone. Creating is cooperative and the result is collaborative, not only between God and
the part of creation beckoned to act—beckoned to nurture the new other—but also with
that which comes to be. Ever since the first creative gesture there have been three parties
in each creative event: God, existing creation responding to the call to nurture another,
and the new responding other.
In Chapter 2 Irenaeus was criticized for making a clean distinction between God
and creation in being, power, and operation.63 He made creation a zero-sum enterprise
with God having the entire operation. Even so, the intention was laudable. Irenaeus
wanted to stress the immediacy of God to every part of creation through the respective
operations of the persons; there is no mediation.64 Since each thing has a creation ex
nihilo by none other than God alone, everything in the cosmos has a direct connection to
the incarnate Christ (rather than to a generic material substrate). Creating is a ‘hands-on’
affair for God that true-to-character went to the extreme intimacy of the Incarnation and
the Pentecostal indwelling.65 “With creation itself as the act by which the economy is
initiated, God’s immediacy to and direct contact with the creation—established by this
63

This does need to be tempered by the fact that spatially and temporally, for Irenaeus, there was no place
beyond or outside of the infinite God. Nothing falls before or outside of God’s creative activity. Also,
when the Father creates with Son and Spirit they are not extended outside of or beyond the Father; cf.
Steenberg, 114. (Irenaeus has the seeds of all that would eventually fall under the inseparability of the
Godhead.) More than spatial separation, it is the clear distinction in being of creation from God that
becomes conceptually problematic (see n. 3). In the proposed framework, it is not possible to talk of a
creation at all apart from the transjective and transcarnate operations of the Spirit and Word therein.
Irenaeus was able to speak of material bodies that endure after God’s formative activity—bodies upon
which God could act and breathe life; cf. Steenberg, 132-134. In contrast, God does not act upon a distinct,
enduring creation; God enduringly acts throughin, being the very possibility that there is a responding
other.
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Ibid., 78f.
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Ibid., 81.
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image of the Father with his two hands—becomes the basis by which it can be declared a
reality established in and moving towards his goodness in his work of redemption.”66
Even though the immediacy of God to creation, for the purpose of creation’s
perfection in God, is laudable, by eliminating God’s creative work within creation such
that creation is also called to become by and for the other as it is called to become by and
for the Other, Irenaeus thereby defines creation’s, especially humanity’s, perfection
relative to God alone and not relative to God and neighbor.67 By including in our coming
to be the participation of God and others, our telos is defined by the perfection of those
constituting relationships—the love of God and neighbor.
What is being affirmed in the present framework is that God’s goodness is
directly present throughin an o/Other oriented community. It is the goodness of God in
which and toward which creation moves, to the delight and Glory of God; God makes
possible for creation to self-express the divine manner of relating to others. Nevertheless,
the complex expressiveness of the community in relation to the newly becoming
creature—which is intrinsic to the synergism of the creative event—is also significant,
and not just God’s creative activity with isolated individuals. In such a communal
synergism, God’s goodness can still directly be the “substance” of all created reality—
understood in terms of it being the provided possibility and the end of God’s call.68
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Ibid.
This can be seen, for instance, in Steenberg’s statement: “This is of the utmost importance when Irenaeus
comes to consider the perfection of this human creation, which is ultimately the perfected communion of
the human being created by the triune God, with the life and glory of the Father, Son and Spirit” (107; cf.
108).
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This use of “substance” plays on its use in the work of Irenaeus. He states that God’s will and power are
the substance of all created reality (Steenberg, 45, 49). It is crucial to attend to the point in Irenaeus
making such statements. He is not talking about ‘how’ at this point. “In stating that ‘God’s will is the
substance of all things’, he speaks not of a definition of ontological essence, but of formative generation by
the one thus capable of redemption” (45). It is more helpful to view “the character of that will as the
substance of the fashioned handiwork” (104; italics added). This is easily translatable into the framework
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This sharing with creation (operating and dwelling throughin it) defines God as
Creator and Lord. In creation, God is certainly Lord among the many; but that lordship is
defined by way of being the possibility for good (self) expression by others and nurturing
them into the fullness of good (self) expression. Even as the Lord and Creator, God
interacts with the world and his creatures in a way that suggests partnership, not an overagainst relationship. God’s lordship is not the subjugation of the other. There is no
cosmic struggle to subdue the infant creation. God reaches out with the possibility of
establishing a relationship with an other by the Spirit. The Spirit and Word make
possible a responding, relating other, whose very response, with God’s creative
operation, is the creative event.69
In terms of further growth and development, God acts and the situation once
marked by indeterminacy, non-productiveness, and emptiness is enlivened. It expresses
itself for the community, the o/Other. Creation does not move to fulfillment
immediately, all at once. God nurtures this one into maturity and participation in the
discovery and expression of good, loving interrelations in the community—the
community in which God has chosen to participate integrally and ultimately
unite/incarnate himself. This type of kenotic creative-activity that nurtures the other

being developed in which the self-gift of God for the other as possibility is not only according to the
character of God’s goodness, but it is a self-gifting of the possibility of the other to express divinegoodness in relation to the o/Other. Irenaeus’ work can be interpreted that the character of God is the form
for creation. In the present framework, it is a matter of creation, with ingenuity, expressing itself in
harmony with the pitch of God’s creative activity trans-creation.
69
Biblical notions of righteousness and justice typically follow in these lines of care for other; cf. Sharon
Baker, “The Repetition of Reconciliation: Satisfying Justice, Mercy, and Forgiveness,” in Stricken by
God?: Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ, edited by Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007). Care for the least-of-these was a
key measure of justice. The rule of Israel’s kings was often measured by the treatment of the widows,
orphans, and poor—not just that they might not suffer, but might have fullness of life. In the life of the
community, God in his activity of creation and dominion was to be imaged.
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defines the character of God. The activity is according to the nature of the loving God
and the manner of the inseparable operations of the Godhead.
Certainly God exercises authority over his creation. He is the Master Craftsman
who initiates, enables, and leads the formation of a good world. He, as the loving, good
God, gifts himself to that end. He is simultaneously impetus, possibility, and plumb-line.
He alone is worthy of our worship. Nevertheless, God’s lordship is not an end in itself
but a means of loving relationship for all within creation. It cultivates and governs
community to and into the Glory of God the Father.70

5. Birth and Maturation

Using the tropes of birth, infancy, and maturation in regard to creation is not
foreign to Scripture or the Christian tradition. For example, important to Irenaeus’
theology is his idea of maturation and growth. Creation, for him, was called forth to
move toward a telos and not to stay forever as it was in the beginning. “Creation is not
stagnant, but ever maturing and advancing towards that telos which since the genesis has
been its intended point of fulfillment, and which is fully revealed in the incarnate Christ’s
promise of an eternal kingdom.”71 The narrative of Genesis 1 concerning the beginning

70

It has become more common since Luther to define God’s character and activity in the world relative to
God’s self-revelation in Christ, particularly the cross. In the cruciform pattern of Christ’s life (e.g., Phil
2:1-11) and in his teachings, there is consistently the message of God’s self-giving, self-emptying love on
behalf of others (the term “cruciform” with the accompanying notions is taken from Michael Gorman’s
Cruciformity: Paul’s Narrative Spirituality of the Cross [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001]). This provides a
lens through which to read Scripture. Jesus says that the Law (which includes Genesis) and the Prophets
can be summarized by the command to love God and to love one’s neighbor as oneself (Mt 22:34-40; Lk
10:47; see Michael Lodahl, All Things Necessary to Our Salvation: The Hermeneutical and Theological
Implications of the Article on the Holy Scriptures in the Manual of the Church of the Nazarene [San Diego,
CA: Point Loma Press, 2004], 46-50, esp. 48).
71
Ibid., 52. Gregory of Nyssa believed that creatures were always in motion, developing either toward or
away from God. There is no such thing as being stationary (Scot Douglass, Theology of the Gap:
Cappadocian Language Theory and the Trinitarian Controversy [New York: Peter Lang, 2005], 189).
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itself pointed for Irenaeus to the reality of eras of growth through history.72 Even
creation’s restoration at Christ’s second coming (new creation) is not an end, but a means
for further growth throughout eternity.73
Thus, the beginning is not the end to which we seek to return nor was it ever an
end in itself. Rather, the “genesis of the cosmos is the picture, painted in unfinished
outline yet of significant descriptive value, of its future and, ultimately, of its end.”74
God creates in goodness that creation might grow to participate in the glory of God,
God’s goodness, shared by the Father, Son, and Spirit for all eternity.75
Irenaeus clearly stated that humans, as well as creation, were created as “children”
or “infants.”76 Adam and Eve did not start in perfect adulthood; rather, humanity “must
begin with the other terminus of human growth, that of the babe, the infant, who needs be
suckled on milk before it can graduate to firmer food, which Irenaeus calls the ‘bread of
immortality—the Spirit of the Father’.”77 The incarnation was planned from the
beginning; it was a planned step in the movement toward the adulthood/perfection of
creation to be entered in the eschaton. Until the Incarnation and Pentecost, God and
humanity were getting accustomed to one another.
Irenaeus did not read Genesis 1—3 as a narrative of perfection then fall. Rather,
it was a narrative “of imperfection, growing and maturing into the fullness of life, which
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Irenaeus read the ‘days’ in Genesis 1 as “phases in the economy of salvation” (Steenberg, 86). Thus, on
‘day’ six Adam ate the fruit, died, and Christ came to recapitulate human death. “There is demonstrated in
Gen 1 chiefly a chronology of salvation, framed in a timeline of creation, significant both historically and
eschatologically” (Steenberg, 87; cf. AH 1.18.2).
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Irenaeus often said that to be a creature, to be human, is to grow in grace for all eternity; cf., e.g., AH
2.25.3; 2.28.3; 4.11.1. Cf. Steenberg, 58.
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is ultimately the life of Christ.”78 Christ reveals that the telos of history is congruent with
“the protological witness of all scripture…namely, the eventual perfection of full
participation in the divine life.”79 The garden was created as “a nursery for newlyfashioned human race.”80
In this Irenaean tradition, it was suggested in Chapter 3 that the imagery of
Genesis 1:2 be viewed as infancy instead of within notions of chaos. Whether we are
speaking of God’s initiatory creative act ex nihilo or the synergism of creative activity
between God, existing creation, and the things coming to be, that which God makes
possible begins in infancy when it ‘bursts out of the womb’ (Job 38:8-11).
In a previous section it was mentioned that the birth of creation, its initial coming
to be, is the word it speaks that is made possible by the Spirit and Word. The nonpreexistent creation comes to be in the creative event as a self-expression made possible
through God’s creative activity. This goes beyond the questions being answered in
Genesis 1. It seeks to answer a question that probes into that which happens before the
opening of the narrative, or a question that demands a different kind of answer than
starting with a Genesis 1:2 reply. Within such a framework, Genesis 1:2 would be the
just-birthed creation.
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Ibid. Reading Genesis in terms of a ‘sin-and-fall’ lens is being challenged based on the text itself. See,
e.g., Lyn Bechtel, “Rethinking the Interpretation of Genesis 2:4b—3:24,” in Feminist Companion to
Genesis, ed. by A. Brenner (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993) and “Genesis 2.4b—3.24: A Myth about Human
Maturation,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 67, no. 1 (1995): 3-26.
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Steenberg, 9.
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Ibid., 147. One of the notions this project works against is seeing the creation of nature simply as
background for humanity’s story. Because of Irenaeus’ strong anthropological focus, he often saw creation
as being made for humanity’s benefit; its creation is really just the first step in the narrative that is about
humans. Even so, as is being emphasized in the current project, he did at times mention that “The service
of Creation to the human race is to advance both parties fully into their teloi at the fulfillment of the
economy” (Steenberg, 149). In the end, regardless of the garden’s formation for the young Adam, it was
human community that was ultimately needed to help in his growth into perfection; only Eve was suitable
for Adam (151).
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a. Infancy

With the infant creation in Genesis 1:2 God is seen as relating positively with it in
continuing to offer himself in gift. As was mentioned, self-gifting is the first movement
of God’s creative activity. By the Spirit, God gifts himself as the possibility for the other
(as seen in Gen 1:2). As a mother hen broods over her chicks, the Spirit broods over the
waters.
In the initial scene of Scripture there is all the anticipation of what the infant
creation will become. The divine Parent holds a young, at-this-point barren and empty
creation, knowing the character of expression into which God desires to nurture it and
that there are more creatures God wants to introduce into the community. In addition,
God has greater insight into the interconnectedness of the community and his own
yearning that love be expressed in those relationships to the benefit of all, whom God
loves. The specifics of what creation will do in response are the greatest part of the
anticipation. The hope is that in doing it that creation will come to self-express the
goodness that God gifts to it in himself. In the teaching of the Priestly tradition, whether
in narrating cosmology or tabernacle construction, abundantly good response is the ideal
and indeed possible.81
In this initial condition, creation—the “earth”—bears nothing. What it lacks, God
makes possible. Creation is gifted with the Possibility of God. God is the perfect
Possibility to the extreme youthfulness of his creation. It is not that God makes a chaos,
a disorder, an anti-order. God makes an other with whom he is related positively, in
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See Brown, 209-215.
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favor of whom God acts. He is for and on behalf of this other, as the One into whom/to
whom the other is drawn by the very offering of God’s self throughin.
By the Spirit and Word, God is womb to the unfolding of the promise of this
child. Names are given. These creations/creatures are called to express themselves in
ways 1) fitting to them, 2) nurturing to others, and 3) beneficial to the whole created
community. God by his boundless wisdom begins to parent, counseling and
collaborating in the way creation should go (e.g., Ex 13:21-22)—all the while, being the
very Possibility for creation’s expression, creation’s relation to the o/Other.

b. Growing Up(s)

Creation does not move linearly, forever forward, from not-yet to arriving at a
pre-envisioned order, a static point of fulfillment. There is no precise, determined form
into which all parts will lock into place when they perfectly align one-day. Rather than a
linear movement toward an ideal picture, there is continual oscillation between becoming
in relation to God’s call to the manifesting of good and the making room for something
new. There is conversation and respiration of creation with the Father in and by the
Word and Spirit.
Through the Possibility of God for the other and by the Word a divine call is
uttered throughin creation. Creation comes to be in relation to the very transjective and
transcarnate presence of the Spirit and Word who make it possible. Creation’s response
is a joining with the enlivening self-expression of God. God’s expression is not as much
an object received as it is something that moves throughin creation. Creation’s response
is a tune creation sings with God’s song. The response is not merely a matter of
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repetition. Creation’s response is an imaginative self-expression of (God-natured)
goodness by God’s-other made possible by God’s self-gift throughin creation. In voicing
its word, there is the ‘exhale’ and the ‘listening again’ to God’s call. Creation must
exhale to breath anew or say anything else that is both new and good.
Creation’s becoming is moment by moment and season by season. We do not
live in a fixed state. There is no single perfect or harmonious condition toward which
creation is moving and into which it will be frozen for all eternity. There is no eternal
summer. God is not accumulating perfect things or perfection within creation as if it
were a museum. Perfection cannot be collected since creation does not establish
something at one point that then endures through time in that initially created state.
Rather, creation exists in dynamic relationship to God and others, a relationship of
endless possibility for discovering manifestations of good. In that relationship of joyful
discovery, humanity and all creation breathes.
Fall and winter are as much about God’s design as spring and summer. Rest is as
much about God’s design as work. Decay, dissolution, and erosion are not evil. Having
responded in beauty and goodness to God’s prompting, there is a letting go of that for the
conversation to continue. There is a making room for discovering new manifestations of
beauty, life, and love. There is no idolizing of or resting on past accomplishments. There
is celebration in the exhale of what has been and anticipation of the possibility of the
future—including the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.
God did not design us to be built up into one thing, the greatest, the best possible
thing that is then maintained for all eternity. Rather this horizon toward ultimate
perfection is stood on end in this paradigm. The aim of every cycle, every expression, is
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perfect love of the o/Other. All history is not building in and towards a single perfection.
With the passage of time the people of God certainly have a more extensive collection of
interactions with God in which to understand God’s character. Those living today have
the advantage (or disadvantage) of what has preceded them. Nevertheless, all creation,
with humanity, is not being built into some super manifestation of itself. Rather, each
participant needs maturation in every now.82 Manifestations of the good are enjoyed here
for what they are as they occur; they are encouraged and nurtured in this place and in this
time. The Good One delights in the respirations of his creation and creatures, in their
inventive words.83 There is the enjoyment of building, the enjoyment of tinkering and
watching it for a season, and the anticipation in the making room for the next thing. In
response to and out of God’s making possible activity, there is an open-endedness to
creation’s ingenuity for manifesting goodness, truth, and beauty each moment and season
of creation’s becoming. There is limitless opportunity for discovery.
Another important point to make in regard to God’s creative activity is that
conversations do not happen all at once. In Genesis 1 God began a cosmic community
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It is not enough to say that God was encountered or divine goodness was expressed at some point in the
past and that we are adding on to it. God must be encountered, known, and properly related to in every
present. For example, because Gregory of Nyssa understood this he wrote his own account of the life of
Moses, even though Philo and Clement had already done so (Douglass, 209). He believed every generation
must imagine themselves in that ancient context and wrestle with its significance in the present. “By
standing within the opening of revelation, Gregory was committed to a certain type of transformative
knowing, a metanoetic knowing that ‘does not consist in mere information and notions’” (214). Also, the
Cappadocians fought Eunomius because they understood that everything revealed was revealed in a
context—the adiastemic God was revealed in and through a diastemic context/medium (79-87). Language
is unable to transcend itself and speak absolutely as Eunomius failed to recognize (83). Because of the
limitations of language and the reality that it is always on the move, there is always need for re-expression
(109). Thus, rather than absolutizing the past and building upon it, we must seek to experience that to
which it faithfully points; we must seek to know God in the present and express that reality. The notion of
linear progression needs to be stood on end. The Church is no more holy or loving now than it was at
Pentecost, in spite of the many intervening instances of holy living or loving acts. Rather, in every new
expression and/or cycle we must seek to relate in the goodness made possible to us by God’s self-gifting.
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Any parent gets to experience this by analogy as their children experiment with positive activities and
expressions.
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that unfolded in sequence, over time. From barren infancy the ‘earth’ grew in diversity,
complexity, productivity, and fullness. All of history is a collage of actors in diverse
contexts whom God calls to collaborate and cooperate in imaginatively relating in
goodness.84 Growth and discovery takes time. Creation does not happen in a flash, but
in ongoing exchange.

D. Defining “Chaos”: Growing Pains

Now that a theological framework has been set out in which the grammar of
possibility is used in regard to God’s creative operations and God’s relationship to
creation has been defined as being trans-creation, it is possible to proceed to a definition
and explication of “chaos.”
For good reason, “chaos” has not been used to this point in reference to some
formless/roiling pre-creation milieu or a notion such as Keller’s creativity/tehom. Chaos
is not the pre-creative conditions nor the infant creation nor the decay/exhale that makes
space for discovering new manifestations of good. Chaos is not that which we watch
expectantly, waiting for an abundantly good response. The cyclical dynamic within
creation does not need to be fixed. It is part of living; it is part of the joy of ongoing
creativity and discovery in the relation between God and creation. These movements
through seasons—the movements between inhale/exhale, listening/speaking—are not
demonized, nor is infancy an evil.
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In talking about history Michael Lodahl states: “Stories do not happen all at once; they go somewhere
and take time getting there. To recognize that, in the Bible, God appears in time-full narrative is to
understand God as willingly related to time, to the very history of creation itself. This Actor in the Story
truly does graciously dwell with the world, acting within creation’s own time-full sequence….Time and
duration, direction and goal are inevitable factors in the Story of God, for that matter, in the way God’s
Story gets told” (The Story of God, 15; cf. 97).
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“Chaos” is something different in this framework. Very simply, chaos is coming
to be that is in disharmony with the Possibility of and Call for our becoming in love for
the o/Other. Creation does not always express itself in tune with God’s eccentric call. In
its otherness it makes ventures out of kilter with what is gifted (blessed) to it according to
the goodness of the self-gifting Triune God. These chaotic expressions are possible
because of the nature of God’s transjective, transcarnate operations of the Sprit and
Word, but they are not what God lovingly self-gifts to creation.85 This coming to be of
creation in discord with or in a manner antagonistic to others is chaos.
That discord in the community makes us recoil away from embracing others (and
possibly the Other). We want to shield our eyes, cover our ears, silence our
communication, and pull away from proximity. These expressions of chaos tear at our
relating to others in the community in love. They inspire us to draw in and hold our
breath instead of being moved by the Spirit; in response we leach that life-affirming flow
from the community. Chaos makes us painfully aware of our nakedness and in desire of
defenses from the very ones with whom we are called into nurturing relationship.
On the one hand, chaos can come about in numerous ways: for example, by a
misjudgment of the currents of the Spirit and Word of God throughin creation, by being
inattentive to the currents, by a limitation of understanding concerning the ramifications
of one’s actions, or a lack of thoughtfulness concerning one’s actions. The result is that
an appropriate way of relating to God and others, which is opened up to creation by the
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Because of the stress on possibility over the real—seeing God’s activity as our possibility instead of
seeing God as giving us possibilities—any negative expressions of creation in coming to be are not in God
or among divine possibilities. Rather, they are the word creation speaks in relation to God’s loving selfexpression, God’s making-possible-activity throughin creation.
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transjective Spirit and transcarnate Word, is not expressed.86 This would qualify as
“many halting, stuttering, mis-spoken words.”87 Creation is still getting to know its
Creator; it still sees as though through a dark glass. Having been born in immaturity,
there is much each part of creation must learn; there are many ways it can grow up in its
practices of (self) expressing what God makes possible by his self-gifting trans-creation.
There is, on the other hand, an even more profound “frustration and nullification
of the work of the Spirit”88 and Word. There is a word of blasphemy against the Spirit
and quenching of the Spirit.89 There is a saying of something across-the-grain of the
good intentions of God’s calling unto righteous/just expression.
Whether creation’s responsive expression is dis-harmonious or antagonistic—
maliciously or not—such a word of becoming is mal-creative; it establishes a chaos.
Because the response is a coming to be, in that it establishes something, even if it is
defined by being chaotically related instead of lovingly, it is still creative. Even a
discreative act that defaces or nihilates another creates a circumstance.90 Instead of
always manifesting beauty and goodness, creation at times manifests tangible chaotic
circumstances. Chaotic, dissonant expressions and the consequent chaotic relations lie in
contrast to the array of harmonies that righteous responses make with God’s self-gifted
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Up front it needs to be mentioned that the nature of intent in expressions that are disharmonious with
God’s creative operations is not at issue here. As Susan Neiman points out, in the bewildering testimonies
of those who assisted with the Holocaust, the actions of those with the most benign intentions can facilitate
incomprehensible horror. While at other times, those with the most tortured consciences can be the least
guilty (275). What is at issue is the occurrence of any expression that brings about chaotic dynamics in the
community.
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I thank Catherine Keller for the phrase “discreative act” and for many of the concepts that underlie her
use of it (see Chapter 4). Other possible phrases could be used as well: e.g., “creation-dissolving activity”
or “community-killing activity.”
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goodness. It is not that God’s creative activity has gone awry; it is that the partner(s)
with whom God works in creating falter(s).
Just as hate is not the opposite of love in the New Testament, so chaos is not the
opposite of creation/new creation. The opposite of love—fear—is a condition of not
having yet blossomed under and into the fullness of love.91 Hate is something different
altogether. Hate is a murderous act; it de-faces and nihilates the other. So with
creation/new creation, its opposite polarity is not chaos, but rather the earth tohu
wabohu—a yet-to-unfold, barren infancy. The movement is from tohu wabohu to the
creative (self) expression of God’s goodness or to the creative self expression of chaos, a
creaturely invention—an invention that is a quenching or blasphemy of the Spirit and
Call who are the very possibility of our response.
Creation’s opposite is a condition of not yet having blossomed under and into the
fullness of God’s Glory. Chaos is something different altogether from tohu wabohu.
Chaos is a response of creation; and as such, it is that which, in part, constitutes what is
creation. Even so, chaotic response is a mal-creative activity; it is counter-nurturing. It
harms others and the relationships within the community. In other words, “chaos” is
defined as instances when any part of creation (organic or inorganic) holds its breath
and/or says something in disharmony with the inseparably operating Spirit and Word,
who would have something more beautiful, abundantly life affirming, and rightly related
to God and all creation for it.
Instances of chaos are present throughout all creation—whether in the physical
universe (timing, energy, matter: organic and inorganic) or in the animal kingdom
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E.g., 1 Jn 4:18-19a—“There is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear; for fear has to do with
punishment, and whoever fears has not reached perfection in love.”
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(instincts, habits, perceptions, attitudes, ideas, societal relations, etc.). Those
circumstances themselves can give rise to further instances of chaos—thus growing and
compounding subsequent un-righteousness. Where there has been distortion, where
perversion is the frame of reference or is habitual, responding in harmony with God fully
becomes all the more difficult (and possibly dangerous); it takes even more imagination
to envision the good that is possible. Circumstances condition the shape or extent of
what can be expressed next—whether that next expression is good or chaotic. We
respond to God harmoniously or discordantly within the confines of our current
circumstances. The finitude of our embodiment, to whatever advantage or disadvantage,
tempers what can be done next in creative expression.
Nevertheless, even though the discord of chaos is embodied throughout creation,
that does not determine future expressions that God makes possible. There is not a lone
linear progression of cause and effect at work from the Beginning to the End. History is
full of complex non-linear interactions and bifurcation points. Righteous response to the
Father can happen through the work of the Spirit and Word; this provides, to some extent,
a recapitulation of what was marked with chaos. It is a coming of the Kingdom in the
midst of a creation marred by chaos.
With this use of “chaos”, all discreative acts within creation are treated the same
way. Human sin is a subset of chaos, the umbrella category. Chaos equally needs to be
recapitulated whether it appears in sentient or insentient creation, with malicious intent or
not.
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1. Chaos in Nature

“Chaos” itself is being used as the broadest category for improperly related
becoming. It covers all of creation, even the physical world which speaks upon God’s
call(s)—as in Genesis 1. Much of the work that it would require to fully identify all that
would constitute improperly related expression (chaos) in nature will have to be left to
those more knowledgeable and qualified to make those judgments. Important to
distinguish in assessing nature, however, are the differences between immaturity,
processes involving the second law of thermodynamics, and chaos. For example, it was
noted in Chapter 2 that Sjoerd Bonting at times blurs those distinctions when he says that
during cosmic evolution “entropy”/“chaos” decreases and order increases until God
abolishes “chaos” at the end of time.92 It was mentioned in response that entropy is
essential for the sustaining of life as we know it. Life processes require the energy
released at the breakdown of structures. New life depends on there being entropy in the
system—that not everything is crystallized. For example, without the birth and death of
stars there would have been few of the elements that make up our planet. If food cannot
be broken down in digestion, every animal dies.
Movement back and forth between order and entropy cannot be defined as
inherently bad or evil. Talking about all entropy/chaos being abolished sounds good, but
must be reconsidered. Cycles and seasons are a part of the good creation (Gen 1:14).
God’s goal and work in creation must be something other than battling, subduing, or
abolishing that which makes movement, life, and newness in the world possible. It is one
thing to say that God’s creative work is continual, and another thing to define “creating”
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Creation and Double Chaos: Rethinking Creation through Chaos Theory (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
Press, 2005), 97.
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in terms of what would be a life-ending endeavor, in negative terms as the abolishment of
entropy.
Chaos is a type of coming to be—becoming in the synergism between God,
existing creation, and the new other in the creative event—in a manner discordant with
God and neighbor.93 Thus, in naming examples of chaos in nature, it is important only to
name that which comes-to-be such that it lacks the characteristic love and nurture of the
other seen in God’s operations. Some examples in need of consideration are the
improper copying and division of DNA and chromosomes resulting in birth defects,
health problems, or even death. Cancers, along with certain bacteria, molds, and viruses,
could be examined as possible examples of chaotic, discreative becoming in relation to
God and neighbor. Certainly there are many other possibilities, possibly even ones
concerning inorganic matter, which could be named by those with knowledge of such
things.
The important rule is not to use “chaos” as though the universe is “chaotic” by
nature. Just because many of the responses in the universe are unpredictable, does not
mean it should be called “chaotic.” Part of the fascination and mystery of others is that
they do things differently than we would have done them; or, they come up with
something completely unexpected or imagined by us.94 God makes creation possible
with the openness that it may speak a word as other. Nevertheless, by the very operation
of its Creator relative to creation, it is created/called to in goodness and self-gifted with
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Logically it would not be possible to be in discord relative to God’s self-gifting operation and not, then,
be in discord with others. Likewise, it would not be possible to be out of kilter in regard to being lovingly
related to others and not be crosswise to God trans-creation.
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Scientists are discovering new mysteries and complexities within the universe that make it all the more
difficult to make calculations in the linear way it was once hoped in past centuries. It is worth pondering
that it might be that they are uncovering, much like the ancients in relationship to their environment, the
otherness of the universe made possible by God. Scientists went looking for the inner workings of a
mechanism and have found instead a co-creature, a bewildering other.
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divine goodness. It is enabled to speak in the calling activity of God. It is only the
expressions of nature that are not congruent with the possibility of the call that are
“chaotic,” not the unpredictability of the expressions themselves. It is also important to
stress that the participating others made possible in God’s creative operations are not
necessarily evil, recalcitrant, etc. They are enabled to speak freely. Even so, as
immature, unknowledgeable, and unwise as they are, only a word spoken in concert with
the self-gifting of God is a prudent, divinely intended type of response—a response
which is expressive of God’s goodness/love throughin.
One topic of which it is difficult to give an account is natural disasters.
Historically there have been answers given about them that 1) affirm the overall goodness
of creation and its telos to the extent that natural disasters are simply a necessary part
(although how and why they are is unknowable) to the progression toward ultimate
goodness, 2) speak of them as a design flaw, 3) point to them as evidence for the absence
of a design and/or designer, 4) argue that God and creation are not in fact good, but cruel,
etc.95 It is difficult in the current paradigm to determine whether an avalanche is infancy,
chaotic response, or decay. Are volcanoes and earthquakes improperly related to God’s
good creative call to become, are they halting, stuttering speech or murderous acts? In
incrementally relieving earth’s pressures, thereby saving us all from more widespread
destruction, is the earth’s crust doing so in the manner in which it is called? In a system
such as Bonting’s where “chaos” is anything that is not yet perfected order (thus
something that is not yet fully abolished), there is a way to explain these events away. At
least God could be excused, to a certain degree, from culpability.
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Susan Neiman’s work is a helpful history of many positions on this matter developed during the
Enlightenment and beyond; Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton, N.J:
Princeton University Press, 2002).

255
Irenaeus did not point to the root of the problem being either in embedded effects
of sin or in improper choice; it was an issue of the passibility, weakness, and finitude of
materiality.96 Matter and materiality was not considered evil; Irenaeus’ hope was not in
escaping materiality. He also rejected Greek notions that matter is stubborn or fickle in
its relationship to God.97 Rather, matter was simply yet to be perfected.
Recapitulation/new creation was a solution for the problems (or limitations) of
materiality; it was a refashioning of the material, making it fit for incorruptibility, for
eternity.98 Such perfection/maturation is made possible through the incarnation of the
Word. Thus, in an Irenaean framework, issues such as natural disasters would have been
an issue of immaturity, not yet having come to the fullness of the goodness God, which
God both planned for creation from the beginning and is working on in the incarnation.
There is more work to be done at the second coming. Natural disasters can also be a
consequence of prior chaotic responses to which a not-yet perfected creation was
susceptible. Excluding conversation about the incarnation, God’s creative call throughin
creation has yet to be answered in perfect, ongoing harmony with the o/Other to the
Glory of God (to the exclusion and eradication of chaos). The incarnation was another
step toward the fulfillment of full, mature response. Creation still awaits participation in
the work to be done at Christ’s return.
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Cf. Steenberg, 55, 123; AH 5.3.1.
This idea was not uncommon in Greek thinking. E.g., Aristotle thought that matter was resistant to
imposed forms (T. F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order: Nihil constat de contingentia nisi ex
revelatione [Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1981], 88). Ultimately matter could be blamed
for disturbing the order of the cosmos (88).
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In such a view (though not in Irenaeus himself), death itself has a sacramental character. We are not
passively victimized by death. Rather, we entrust ourselves to the Father that by his Hands this preparatory
work for eternity would be achieved in our death and resurrection. Our baptism is a foretaste and a seal of
what is to come in our death and resurrection. We look forward to the raising of our bodies in
incorruptibility (whatever that may mean). In living and dying it is all unto the Glory of God.
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God did not initiate creation (create) for the ‘earth’ to remain immature. The call
itself is nothing short of complete (divine) goodness self-gifted as possibility for selfexpression by the other. Creation’s immaturity is not “chaos”; being immature is not
evil. However, there are dangers in immaturity. There are pains in growing up:
stumbling, stuttering, etc. The susceptibility of the immature to respond chaotically is
great. Being both immature and marked by chaos increases that susceptibility. Being
not-yet perfected also means that there are significant consequences (shaping effects) to
any responses within the community. As we continue to look for the resurrection of the
dead and the life of the world to come, we attune ourselves to God with utmost attention
and creatively seek to self-express the good even at this time, under these conditions.
Prior chaos clouds our imagination and we are vulnerable to being marked by our
neighbors in ways that shape our responses for good or ill. We do not have to be
determined by our marks; but acting according to them does come ‘naturally’ even if we
will be held accountable for not following in God’s ways.
Creation’s A) exhaling and infancy and B) mal-creative acts may at times be
difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish—especially when so much of creation is
marked by chaotic interrelationships. Nevertheless, theologically these groups should
remain distinct. In so doing: 1) God’s relationship with creation is not defined firstly as
antagonistic; God does not approach creating as problem solving, or creation itself as a
problem to be addressed; God’s creative activity is not firstly negation, but (self) gift; 2)
God’s initiating creative gesture in Genesis 1:2—creating a tohu wabohu earth—is not an
evil or a disaster; it is the start of a relationship with a responsible other; 3) theologically
there is room for Genesis 1:2 and the movement in Genesis 1 from a barren natality to an
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o/Other-affirming community without falling into some of the problems with double
creation; 4) there is room for seasons and the second law of thermodynamics—without
which all in creation would halt immediately; 5) the trajectory of creation is not seen as
being toward a fixed, static state; there continues to be dynamism for exploring
expressions of goodness; 6) there is no endless/upward progression of creation—there
will forever be seasons for rest and for work; 7) the dynamism of God’s creation can be
affirmed as good without confusing that dynamism with the evil of chaotic acts; 8)
“chaos” is then defined such that it is truly a problem that needs to be addressed and the
effects of which need eradication; 9) the eradication of chaos does not entail the
nihilation of an other—on the contrary it would be the nurturing of the other; and 10) the
eradication of chaos entails the same self-gifting of God for the other as God’s creative
activity.

2. Chaos in Humanity

Under the umbrella category of “chaos,” being argued as a fitting label throughout
all creation for coming to be out of sync with God’s self-gifting throughin, traditional
discussions of human sin and sinfulness are a subset. In order to get a more detailed
sense of what chaos in humanity entails, the intended relationship between God and
humanity will be sketched. This will bring into relief, in the portion that will follow the
sketch, the nature of chaotically expressing oneself in relation to God and neighbor.
First is God’s creative intention. It was pointed out in Chapter 3 that in Genesis 1
humans have a different pattern to their creation. For the first and only time in Genesis 1,
at the creation of humans God addresses God’s-self. In a way, God is the ‘environment’
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solicited upon which humans are to be dependent and united; they live out of/in/upon
God’s continued action throughin. They are the ones called to image God as they mature
into the gift of God’s goodness. It was suggested, as with Paul’s statement to the
Athenians, that to be human is to exist in God: “In him we live and move and have our
being” (Acts 17:28).99
A similar theme is present in Genesis 2. In the Yahwist (J) tradition YHWH God
is said to cause trees to grow out of the ground. Two particular trees have names: the tree
of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. These two trees in the middle of
the garden undoubtedly have God as their source.100 If God is the source of these trees,
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is a natural, God-made feature of the garden.
The story does not tell us one tree is good and the other is a menacing evil or a carrot God
cruelly dangles in front of Adam and Eve. One tree does have the word “evil” in its
name, but its symbolism must be something other than being from the very pit of hell if
its source is God. The narrative puts them both together and so any interpretation must
account for that. In God’s design, this tree belongs being planted right next to the tree of
life; it should be planted in the center of the garden next to that tree from which they are
told to eat.
“The knowledge of good and evil” has received several predominant
interpretations. Most common among them historically is a form of sexual knowledge.101
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Cf. Augustine, de Trin XIV.12.16; see also 1 Cor 3:16 and 6:19 along with Augustine's treatment of
these texts in Con Max II.XXI.1. 1 John 4:7-21 also has a wonderful passage about humans living in the
love of God which is manifest most perfectly in God’s actions in Christ’s death on the cross. Cf. Steenberg
on Irenaeus’ interpretation of the imago dei (67, 102, 134-137).
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It has been suggested that the central location is a parallel to the central location of the Tabernacle in the
Israelites’ camp; cf. Thomas Brodie, Genesis as Dialogue: a Literary, Historical, & Theological
Commentary (Oxford: University Press, 2001),124.
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Jacob Milgrom is one who takes a more classic interpretation of “knowledge” as being sexual
knowledge (Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics, Continental Commentaries [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress

259
There are two other places in the OT where “the knowledge of good and evil” appears.
Deuteronomy 1:39 speaks about young children not yet having the knowledge of good
and evil. It could be that they do not yet have sexual knowledge. However, it has been
suggested that a better interpretation is that they do not yet have the discernment for
making their own choices. This later interpretation makes sense in the other occurrence
of the phrase in the Old Testament where Solomon prays for this discernment, this
knowledge of good and evil (1 Kgs 3:9). Surely he is not praying for sexual knowledge
at the dedication of the Temple. Hamilton concludes that “What is forbidden to man is
the power to decide for himself what is in his best interests and what is not. This is a
decision God has not delegated to the earthling…Man has indeed become a god
whenever he makes his own self the center, the springboard, and the only frame of
reference for moral guidelines.”102 It then makes sense why one who eats of that tree of
the knowledge of good and evil would be straying down the path of dying. Literally the
text says, “eating, you will eat and dying, you will die” (Gen 2:17).103

Press, 2004], 188). The original temptation Adam and Eve faced was the urge to procreative creativity.
However, Milgrom claims that this urge toward procreative creativity translates into other realms of
humanity making a good and/or evil world (189). Even Lyn Bechtel (see n. 78) sees this tree as a metaphor
for human maturation specifically having to do with sexual, self awareness—a natural, non-evil step in
human development.
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Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17, The New International Commentary on the Old
Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990), 166.
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Robert D. Sacks, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis, Ancient Near Eastern Texts and Studies, vol. 6
(Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1990), 24. In the framework of St. Thomas Aquinas, as outlined by David
Burrell, the distinction between creator and creature allows this freedom of the creature; “Creatures are
indeed capable of an utterly initiatory role, but it will not be one of acting but of failing to act, of ‘refusing’
to enter into the process initiated by actively willing ‘the good.’ In that sense, we can be ‘like unto God,’
but only in a self-destructive manner…the only absolute beginning available to human willing is selfdestructive. And even this absolute beginning will not be absolute, but the result of prior vices arising from
a particular context. For human beings generally, sin is not so much an exercise of radical autonomy as it
is wandering down treacherous paths with the wrong set of companions. So the exercise of autonomy, even
of the self-destructive sort, is rare; the will is in fact much more moved than mover.” (Freedom and
Creation in Three Traditions [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993], 91, 92). This issue
of “failing to act” will be addressed in the concluding chapter. There is a need to examine the relation of
“improper relation/expression” being suggested in this project with Aquinas’ position of non-action.

260
The tree of the knowledge of good and evil—i.e., charting our own course into the
open-ended possibility provided us by our Creator—is designed to be planted next to the
tree of life from which we should eat—i.e., to be in dynamic, constant relationship with
God, speaking congruent to the goodness of the o/Other orientation made possible from
God in order to image him in all we do.104 Speaking forth our own word without being
tightly related to God’s abundantly life-affirming self-gifting is to speak life-leaching
chaos for us and the community.
This was even true in the wisdom tradition. From the wisdom tradition, Hans
Wolff demonstrates that the Hebrews understood human speech to be done correctly
when it is in concert with God. The right word is the word that comes from hearing
(Prov 18:13; 19:20); is at the right time (Prov 25:11); is quietly thought out (Prov 29:20);
is temperate and kind (Prov 25:15); and requires the fear of God (Prov 1:7; 9:10;
15:33).105 “God is at work even between the word which the wisdom of man conceives
in secret and that which then proceeds from his tongue (Prov 16:1)…Thus if man does
not want to fall short of his real being, either in hubris or in laziness, he remains
dependent on the God who in Israel began to speak with him in a human way.”106
That humans would continually be attuned to God is the intent of God’s selfgifting in his creative operations. However, humans do not always respond congruent
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God’s design is echoed throughout the Bible: “I am God Almighty, walk before me, and be blameless”
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Ibid., 79. Cf. James 3:2—“Anyone who makes no mistakes in speaking is perfect, able to keep the
whole body in check with a bridle.”
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with the dynamic of God’s creative self-gifting. They do not have their tree, their frame
of reference, planted next to the tree of life, but, rather, take ‘nourishment’ from their
own tree, to their peril.
In the course of Christianity’s history, the reason for this phenomenon came to be
addressed under the doctrine of original sin. For much of the doctrine’s history it has
been understood that there was a fall of human nature in the sin of the first parents; that
this fallen nature has been transmitted to all subsequent generations. Thus, the
consequences of that first sin are universal to all humans. By appealing to the notions
that have traditionally been part of the doctrine of original sin, it would be easy to
account for chaotic responses among humans. For example, it could be claimed that they
act according to their damaged nature. However, just because humans are capable of
unspeakable evil—or even to point to the historical fact that we are guilty for doing it—
does not necessarily entail that human nature is inherently, enduringly evil.
Within the notions of creation developed here, they preclude any idea of a fixed,
fallen human nature with which every offspring of Adam and Eve is born. In the present
framework of creation and chaos, original sin would have to be adjusted accordingly in
its articulation. First, chaos has a history, an evolution; it is not fixed. Second, the
context in which we become, inclusive of its instantiations of chaos, shapes and gives
parameters to our responses, but it does not determine them. Inherent in God’s ongoing
creative activity is the possibility of good response. This leads to a third difference.
Because the instances of chaos which are passed on are specific to each place and time,
and because the future is not linearly determined by the past in each moment of creation,
the manner in which each expression is shaped by prior instances of chaos varies by
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degree and kind. There is not a homogeneous, fixed fallen nature transmitted since our
first parents.
More needs to be said about the differences of this new framework of creation and
chaos in how to understand human sin or sinfulness, especially since the traditional
notion of a common fallen nature is being adjusted. It is not as though every human
responds disharmoniously in their conception (i.e., in their initial coming to be), entailing
that we subsequently express ourselves chaotically based on a common fault in each of
our own beginnings. It is not as though a better first step could have been possible in
relation to all others in the community. Rather, humans come to be in the cosmic
community in which the expressions of others, good or bad, affect others in the
community. If, for example, the molecules in that infant-creation misbehave, it can have
far reaching ripples for not only that newly conceived life, but also into the systems that
person is a part (his/her family, neighborhood, town, etc.). A chaotic act in the smallest
of systems can have increasingly bigger effects on the larger systems of which it is part.
Those effects are not necessarily linear (deterministic) all the time. There are choices to
become by all in God’s creation. However, those choices are certainly shaped/directed
by the choices of others. For better or worse, our coming to be is not only a cooperative,
collaborative operation between God and us, it includes the eccentric call of God to the
stuff of the world to support and nurture us, an other. The very stuff of which we are
made participates with us in the cosmic community.107 The actions of our matter can be a
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Some of these ideas concerning increasingly larger, more complex systems were first inspired by
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good to us or mal-creative; it can be affirming or deforming. Where we are plagued by
the chaos of our own bodies, we pray for a new, different expression by our ‘neighbor’ in
relation to God’s call. It may also require that we minister to our ‘neighbor’ (body) so
that it comes to the fullest (self) expression of goodness to us and the overall
community.108 Even so, we ultimately pray and hope for Christ’s second coming, the
resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come. We pray for the refashioning
of the world at Christ’s return—the passing away of one manner of existing to participate
in another.
Much, if not most, of the chaos experienced by humans is due to their personal
injurious relationship with God’s self-gifting or the choices of fellow humans.109 We are
affected by chaotic choices made by others even prior to our conception or our birth.110
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Two clarifications need to be made. First, for those afflicted in their embodiment by misbehaving
chromosomes or cells, their becoming in the world will be shaped by the responses of their bodies to God’s
call. It is not as though they are guilty for the un-nurturing behavior of others. It is not as though they can
change the responses of others and the repercussions. People who are marked by chaos in their bodies are
responsible for growing into the fullness of God’s self-gifting for them according to what is appropriate for
them in their circumstances. They can still choose to express love, beauty, and goodness in the manner(s)
they are able. Second, many in the world are oppressed and discreated by their neighbors. They are
enslaved in systems of chaos. They are not guilty for being marked by the chaos in the environment in
which they become. They are responsible, however, to self-express God’s call to act in love for the
o/Other, doing all they can to be a neighbor to their enemies, praying for them, and nurturing them into the
fullness of God’s self-gifted goodness for them. They should continue to act in ways that affirm their
subjectivity and not just play the part of de-faced object assigned to them by the system and actions of
others. They can keep choosing; they can keep (self) expressing God’s self-gifted goodness—turn the
other cheek, walk the extra mile, etc. Whatever the cost of their choosing to act righteously, they can
entrust themselves to the one who has power over death and the grave; they can be assured of God’s
ultimate faithfulness to them in the resurrection of the dead. These two examples highlight how notions of
individual guilt and individual salvation break down in a relational/communal matrix. Because of the
negative actions of others, we cannot help but have our responses affected by that. In the same way, our
experience of God’s salvific work of new creation is dependent on it being worked out within and among
the community.
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Milgrom says that in the Priestly tradition in the Old Testament they rewrote the beliefs and practices of
their neighbors. Where their neighbors tried to fight off the demonic from their sacred spaces, Israel
replaced the demonic with inert contamination wrought from human misdeeds. Israel’s cultic practices are
about avoiding and removing the impurities resulting from human activity that threaten the sacred and
bring death. There is no demonic, only human misdeeds (Leviticus, 9, 10, 13, 32). See Chapter 3, n. 81.
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An easy example is the possibly chaotic circumstances of our conception, whether it occurred by force,
through intercourse by an unwed couple, etc. During gestation, an unborn child can be affected drastically
and permanently by the choices of substances the mother puts in her body.
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We are affected by or constituted by that which precedes our beginning. We are not just
affected by contemporaneous influences. We come to be in a world already
experimenting with certain expressions of both goodness and chaos.
One illustration: it is fitting that the telling of Israel’s story does not start with
God’s calling of Abram. There is the history of the whole which preceded that call. That
history informed the context and things already in motion at Israel’s beginning. Israel
was an inheritor of generations of growth into goodness and chaos. Israel also inherited
God’s prior relationship to and Noahite covenant with creation.
In the case of human conception, children, whose becoming God makes possible,
are shaped by the relationships of others to the goodness of God’s eccentric calling;
unfortunately they are shaped as much by the chaos-riddled relationships into which they
are born as the righteousness therein. As Gerald O’Collins says, we pass on to them a
“heritage of evil” or an “enduring legacy of evil” as we enculturate them into our chaotic
ways of behaving and relating to others.111 Even though they are not born using the
knowledge of good and evil (especially if they do not developmentally have it—Deut
1:39),112 from infancy they experience the ways of those around them who gorge on the
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O’Collins, 62, 63. This heritage of evil does not have to be as obvious as an abusive home. Any chaos
in our worldview, our manner of operating in the world, etc. can be passed along. For example, one
criticism of capitalism is that it splits up families and communities as people must go to where there is
employment for them. By enculturating children into such a system, we may unwittingly be preparing
them to participate in the dissolution of the most basic human community, the family. We also ingrain in
them a distrusting and isolating spirit of competition with others over a purported scarcity of resources,
instead of a habit of thought that is self-emptying for and openly embracing of our fellow community
members to whom we are, by God’s creative activity, to be neighbor.
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See, e.g., “If any of you put a stumbling block before one of these little ones who believe in me, it would
be better for you if a great millstone were hung around your neck and you were thrown into the sea” (Mk
9:42, emphasis added; cf. Mt 18:6; Lk 17:2). In reference to Rahner’s position, O’Collins states:
“Particular, full individuals in ‘a direct relationship’ with God from the outset, children exhibit, Rahner
wrote, not only a basic orientation to God but also a trust, an open readiness to be controlled by another,
and ‘the courage to allow fresh horizons’ which privilege their response to divine grace” (76). Through
God’s creative operations by the Spirit and Word, humans are created ready-made to grow into
participation in the goodness God makes possible in the cosmic community. Unfortunately, we transition
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fruit of that tree. They play from youth among fountains of chaos. In our enculturation,
the intimate, perpetual relationship with God that is necessary for expressing ourselves in
bountifully good and beautiful ways gets fractured. Participating in these fractured
contexts makes each person both guilty and responsible for the part he/she plays. 113
In keeping with developments in Western thinking, original sin in this paradigm
would not be articulated as a static state or a fallen nature in which all humans since the
first are created. Instead, it has a history, an ebb and flow. Its history is the history of
chaotic expressions in the cosmic community and their contribution to subsequent
becoming. Original sin is a matter of ontology insofar as coming to be in a chaotic
manner embodies that expression, it undermines community. However, original sin is
neither static nor deterministic; in the moment by moment creative activity of God there
is the possibility of something different, new, good, etc. Recapitulation via righteous
expression is an ever available possibility, even in this lifetime. In becoming in tune with
the inseparable creative operations of God, humans can write chaos out of the unloving,
destructive ways we have become related. In responding in concert with God, chaotic

from being trusting children to adults who think we know better (cf. O’Collins, 77). Zachary Hayes
follows a similar line of thinking: “Though no individual is personally culpable except when he or she
personally sins, each is born into an environment that is oriented in the wrong direction. It is a world that is
insensitive to God and resists him. Thus, even the child, while having no personal culpability, is in the full
sense of the word a member of a community which, through the culpable actions of its members, has
constituted itself historically in opposition to God” (91).
113
I am thankful for an in-class presentation by one of my colleagues, Michael Groen, on some of the
recent findings of neuroscience (delivered November, 2007). There are certain emotional, physiological
responses that are hardwired into us at birth. However, our social interactions imprint on our brains what
bodily reactions (somatic markers) to have when certain situations present themselves. These bodily
reactions are unconscious. Our surroundings—our enculturation—truly become embedded in our bodies,
our brains. Based on those imprintings, our body will present us with unconsciously selected data under
certain circumstances. Thus, our “rational” decision making is based on a small selected portion of data
given to us by our body. Nevertheless, our upbringing is not deterministic. Even though our body has been
programmed by our upbringing to react in certain ways, we can consciously choose against what our bodies
present to us. There is also evidence that the brain is more plastic than once believed. Our brains can be
re-taught over time to have different somatic markers to certain stimuli. In this case Christian community
becomes that much more important in helping us grow into the salvation and creative calling made possible
by God.
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activity seems foreign, nonsensical; it is outside one’s vocabulary of ways to function in
relation to others. People can in this life mature into a truly human manner of (self)
expressing divine goodness in relation to others and begin to be freed from enslavement
to chaos as they await the salvation to be revealed at Christ’s second coming (cf. Rom
8:18-25; 1 Cor 15:1-2). God calls us to this holiness of life, this perfection in love. God
has joined himself throughin creation to that end.
The number of goodness-denying expressions among humans is essentially
limitless. There are, nevertheless, certain themes among the variations. For example,
chaos appears in the hyperactive schedules we keep, in our lack of sleep and rest,114 in the
quantity and quality of our food intake, in the substances to which we expose our bodies,
in our choice of work, in our motivation for and manner of our work, in our selfcenteredness, in our self-denial/deprecation,115 in our institutional structures, in our
societal structures, in our cultural norms, in our patterns of thinking, in our treatment of
others, in our manner of speaking, in discreative activities of prejudice, hatred, murder,
and warfare, etc. The list of themes with any possible variation is itself extremely long.
Our ingenuity for discreative acts is as limitless as our ingenuity for expressions of
goodness, both made possible by the gifting of God’s transjective Spirit and transcarnate
Word. Instead of discovering with God endless expression of good, humans have
invented a vocabulary for acting, thinking, and expressing themselves that transgresses
against God, precisely because of God’s self-gifting throughin creation.
114

Although the Israelites did honor the Sabbath through most all of their history, there is no record that
they ever honored sabbatical years, or the year of Jubilee. Centuries later we hardly even go as far as to
take a sabbath. The effects on humans, our ways of living, and on the planet are not fully knowable.
115
See Diane Leclerc’s Singleness of Heart: Gender, Sin, and Holiness in Historical Perspective, in Pietist
and Wesleyan Studies, no. 13 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2001). Leclerc defines original sin in terms
of idolatry, either of self (pride) or others (self-denial). Pride, by itself, is an insufficient definition of
humanity’s problem. Many humans, especially many women and abuse victims, have no sense of self, let
alone an inflated, prideful sense of self.
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Many pious Christians would bristle at some items that have been listed, but there
is nothing we do that is not an act in relation to the very divine activity by which the act
is possible. Our acts are also in relation to all in the cosmic community who nurture us in
our becoming and who we are to nurture in theirs. Every act is righteous to the degree it
rings true with God’s good, loving nature. If our lack of sleep, exercise, or healthy eating
harms us (including the very matter called by God to nurture our unfolding) it is
unrighteous. If it takes someone else’s daily bread or unnecessarily overtaxes the land, it
is unrighteous. If our choices of house and car sizes (or the building materials used)—as
well as our consumption of other products—harms the earth or limits our ability to gift of
ourselves with our time and money to the needs of others, it is clearly antithetical to the
flow of the Possibility and Call of God and in need of repentance. Many Christians
seeking to be holy have been far too narrow in examining areas in need of repentance
because their definition of unrighteousness has been limited and/or their enculturation
into systems marked by chaos have helped them perpetuate discreative acts thoughtlessly.
There is nothing that exists that has not been called according to God’s eccentric
goodness. It is against God’s self-gifting that all acts must be measured.
Whether we are deliberate in our chaotic acts or even conscious of them is not at
issue. What is at issue are instances when the love of God and ‘neighbor’—which
includes the treatment of our own body and the world—is mis-expressed—or worse, we
de-face the other. Any chaotic act is a deformation of our relationship with God and
others with whom we are created to commune. Out of love for the o/Other, the act must
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be repented of and new ground for the imaginative expression of good in the relationship
sought out.116

3. Intent

The issue of intentionality has been mentioned several times in regard to chaotic
responses. It needs to be addressed directly. During the Enlightenment, where natural
human reason was becoming the standard for societal arrangements (including politics,
economics, legal systems, etc.) and morality itself (instead of a religious framework or a
system thought to be inherent in the cosmos), it became the assumption that evil deeds (or
crimes) require malicious intent.117 The focus was on a facet of the human subject.118
Without malicious intent in doing the act, the person’s action could not be considered
criminal.119
Susan Neiman writes of this transition as well as the utter confounding of this way
of thinking in the aftermath of WWII. When the concentration camps were discovered
and investigated in order to bring the people responsible to trial, it was found that the
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Both Rowan Williams (“The Forgiveness of Sins: Hosea 11:1-9; Matthew 18:23-35,” in Stricken by
God?: Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ, ed. by Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin [Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007]) and Miroslav Volf (“Forgiveness,
Reconciliation, and justice,” in Stricken by God?: Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ, ed.
by Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007])
have excellent essays which unfold this idea.
117
This shift can be seen in some of the theology done at this time on hamartiology. For example, in the
theology of John Wesley (eighteenth-century), Sin properly-so-called required a willful transgression
against a known law of God. All other transgressions committed unknowingly and/or unintentionally were
sin improperly-so-called.
118
Kant, e.g., taught that intent was the one thing over which we as humans have control. Therefore we
should act with right intent regardless of what we think may or may not be the effects of that action; those
consequences are largely out of our control (Neiman, 74).
119
Susan Neiman summarizes: “Before [the eighteenth-century earthquake in] Lisbon, evils were divided
into matters of nature, metaphysics, or morality. After Lisbon, the word evil was restricted to what was
once called moral evil… Modern evil is the product of will. Restricting evil actions to those accompanied
by evil intention rids the world of a number of evils in ways that made sense. Less clear were the concepts
of willing and intention themselves” (268; cf. 271ff.).
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people who carried out both the day to day operations at the camps and the broader
infrastructure that made the camps possible had no calculations of genocide or malicious
intent toward their victims.120 Most all of the participants had motives that were utterly
banal: for example, motives of personal promotions within the Nazi ranks or a desire not
to have their own personal lives disrupted.121 The totalitarian regime created a system
that allowed people to do horrific deeds guilt-free, with little to no reflection on the
immorality of their actions. The key ingredient for establishing criminality was absent in
this new, banal type of evil. The basic philosophy of morality and law was left silent.
The concentration camps exposed a type of evil that previous accounts of evil
could give no account; it was a banal evil done by people participating in a system
designed for doing horrific evil thoughtlessly.122 “In contemporary evil, individuals’
intentions rarely correspond to the magnitude of evil individuals are able to cause.”123
This is the great problem with making malicious intent the benchmark in the areas of
morality and criminality.
In the framework proposed, chaos is chaos. Whether coming to be (responding to
God’s call) is chaotic for either banal or murderous intentions, it is still mal-creative or
discreative of self and others; as Neiman states: “What counts is not what your road is
120

Neiman, 270f.
Ibid., 273.
122
It is easy to pick on WWII Germany, but many Westerners with banal motivations work in industries, do
certain leisure activities, and consume goods that not only harm themselves and/or damage creation, but
keep other humans in horrifically poor living conditions. Their acts are discreative of the other and yet they
are done according to a system that allows them (even encourages them) to do them thoughtlessly again
and again and again. E.g., even in the face of global warming, the first thing it is hoped that Americans
will do in a slumping economy is consume more. This characteristic of Western thought should terrify us;
“Precisely the belief that evil actions require evil intentions allowed totalitarian regimes to convince people
to override moral objections that might otherwise have functioned” (Neiman, 275). We cannot
unthinkingly go on following culture and convention just because our intention-alarms are not sounding.
As Neiman, Rawls and other Kantian philosophers urge, we should operate in the world in ways that we
would rationally design given the chance, not according to the irrationality and injustice which far too
abundantly pervade conventions.
123
Neiman, 273.
121
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paved with, but whether it leads to hell.”124 Chaos is chaos; it is a hell of-our-ownmaking on earth. It is in need of repentance, repair, and new response. It demonstrates
ongoing immaturity and imperfection in love. In short, the notion of chaos in this
framework attempts to account for all types of evil. The resultant chaotic circumstance is
in need of the same salvific activity of God no matter the nature of the intention.
The entire purpose of questioning intentionality is not to erase responsibility, but
to understand it in a new, even deeper way. If anything, it should lead God’s people to
cry even more earnestly “Have mercy on me, a sinner!” and “Come, Lord Jesus!”—rather
than “Thank you, God, I am not like those people.” It also keeps at the forefront our
solidarity with the community and how far we have left to go toward universally
expressing God’s goodness.

E. Recapitulation and Glorification

Within this framework of creative activity and growth from infancy, there is
always the possibility of good expression. This good coming-to-be is a positive
adjustment within a system marked by chaos; it recapitulates to some degree chaosmarked relationships.
Irenaeus’ notion of recapitulation has already been appealed to since it was
utilized by Catherine Keller in the cycles of her feedback loops—beginning and
beginning again. These loops mean for Keller that there is not the linear progression of
creation begun ex nihilo. Keller opts for an Irenaean “helical, recapitulatory sense of
history.”125 In the recapitulatory loops, the new creation of all things is forever hoped for
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Ibid., 275.
Keller, 56.
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and possible. Irenaeus himself affirmed that in recapitulation/new creation the substance
or thing itself would not be annihilated, it was its fashion of existence that would pass
away and be renewed and strengthened.126 Unfortunately humans have become old in
corruptions; the making new of things will make them ready for incorruptibility so that
they will not again become old.127
Recapitulation is for the sake of establishing goodness-expressing, life-nurturing
community through the Call and Possibility of God. The fulfillment of the life-nurturing
community in God’s love is the end of creation and salvation (new creation). Inherent in
creation is the telos of growing into maturity in its expressions of good for the o/Other
across all creation. Because creation and salvation have the same end and are part of the
same overall economy, there is only slight distinction between them. Salvation is
brought about by the creative healing of that which inhibits good expression—that which
is mal-creative or deformed. Creation makes possible and nurtures good expression into
maturity. Thus, our salvation is the entering into and enjoyment of that toward which we
are called by God in creation; it is that which we can and do taste in part in the present
because of recapitulatory moments.
Christian hope is ultimately in God’s final work of new creation, the making new
of all things—the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come. The
126

Steenberg, 55; cf. AH 5.31.1. Irenaeus makes it clear that sin and the misuse of freedom are not the
problem. Human flesh has the characteristics of being corruptible and finite—weak and passible. These
qualities of our immature flesh can be problematic and will naturally come to a mortal end, though not
embodiment itself (Steenberg, 123).
127
It is significant that Irenaeus stresses both materiality and divine immediacy in both creation and
redemption; he loved the Genesis 2 narrative of God forming Adam out of the dust and breathing into his
nostrils. Out of that narrative of dust and breath, he stresses that the image of God is both body and soul
(Steenberg, 119). Redemption must include a refashioning of what is going on in our bodies. In addition,
however, it also means that there can be no reduction of what it means to be creation to the purely material.
The “life-giving essence” of one’s being is just as crucial as material fashioning. In terms of the framework
being proposed, the eccentric call of God with/as the very possibility of the other is constitutive just as is
the shape the self-expression of the other takes.
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eradication of chaos from creation and creation’s perfection into maturity is what we so
deeply crave; it is the fulfillment of God’s creative and salvific activity. The new
creation to be revealed at Christ’s second coming also has the quality of incorruptibility,
to which we look forward.128
The nascent chaos that influences new distortions of every degree, even
discreative acts unto the very death (nihilation) of self and other, must be healed. All
creation must be freed from these chains of chaos to express unencumbered true and full
beauty and goodness. Creation’s imagination for self-expressing (divine) goodness will
no longer be clouded by a malformed frame of reference, destructive habits, or the kinesis
of incumbent chaos. It will reach fullness of expression. What that day means for
humanity in Dabney’s view:
…that end is not the imposition of divine will upon recalcitrant matter nor
the rising of contingent being to the contemplation of its necessary first
cause. The end of all things is the cosmic Sabbath, that day in which the
human creature as creation’s steward will stand before God in worship and
thanksgiving and praise and will thereby reflect God’s image in the world,
being and saying and doing what God is and says and does in God’s
creation.129
God will see a family resemblance in creation as his o/Other-driven Spirit and Word’s
love is expressed therein. Creation will answer the first question posed by the Father in
Scripture, “where are you?” with a jubilant childlike cry, “here I am!”130
To that end, God has already been at work. Most powerfully and definitively,
God has been reconciling and recapitulating the world in and through Christ. In Christ,
the work of the Spirit showed that the Spirit will always be the Possibility of God that
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To say that our glorified bodies will not be corruptible does not mean that there will not be continued
discovery and development in expressing the good.
129
“The Nature of the Spirit: Creation as a Premonition of God,” 110.
130
Ibid.
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any brokenness can be “taken up anew and made whole.”131 When Christ returns, the
remaining chaos and brokenness will cease. He will be the Omega. All things will ‘pass
away’ (Rev 21:1) to receive full newness of life. The raging nations will be at peace (Ps
46:9; 76:3); their instruments of war will be turned into instruments to tend the earth (Is
2:4). The animal kingdom will be at peace (Is 11:6-9). Instead of being subdued, that
which lies fractured in chaos will be healed and join in doxology in that day (e.g., Ps
98:6-8; Is 2:2; Phil 2:9-11). Chaos will be no more, not because it is an it (an entity) that
will be vanquished, but because that which is marked by a grating dissonance of
expression will be made new in the fullness of divine goodness. Creation will be at peace
because it will be transformed; that is the hope and promise of our coming salvation, of
which we have a tasting in the present.
There is another note on soteriology that would be helpful to make in regard to
recapitulation and creation’s destiny. The image of the garden’s trees has been used
throughout the Christian tradition for theological purposes. In his book on soteriology,
Gerald O’Collins makes reference to a poem by John Donne which states: “We think that
Paradise and Calvary, Christ’s Cross and Adam’s tree, stood in one place.”132 In a
footnote O’Collins explains that there is an old legend that Christ’s cross was actually
fashioned out of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Thus, Christ paid for
Adam’s taking of that fruit on the very tree itself.
Donne’s words are exactly right, but the legend behind them is wrong. Christ’s
and Adam’s trees stand together. However, given the significance of the two trees in the
Garden, Christ’s cross is not from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Christ’s
131

Dabney, “Naming the Spirit: Towards a Pneumatology of the Cross,” 58.
Gerald O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer: A Christian Approach to Salvation (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 40.
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cross is the tree of life. When Christ is lifted up on that tree, he becomes the very fruit of
the tree of life that humanity was and is to eat—the divine self-giver, Love poured out for
the other. When Christ offers himself up, the flaming sword is removed from the path to
the tree. Once again, humanity is invited to “Take and eat…” Christ is the “the way, and
the truth, and the life” (Jn 14:6).133
Christ, who was poured out for others, is the fruit we eat from the tree of life in
submitting to the Holy Spirit as daughters and sons of the Father. The goodness of God’s
self-gifting character—revealed in the Trinity’s operations in the birth, life, death, and
resurrection of Christ—is that which we are told to eat, that to which we are to be
conformed. The very Word who was made flesh and dwelt among us, revealing God to
us, is the very same self-giving Word, who with the Spirit, makes creation possible. That
character is the pulse of creation. It is our possibility in relation to which we become.
This is consistent with the theological anthropology outlined above. Humanity’s
imaging of God in the world was not supposed to be due to a static nature intrinsic to it.
Humanity was to image God through dynamic relationship to the Triune God by the
inseparable operations of God throughin. Humans were supposed to perpetually come to
the tree, taking in and learning from the humanity of God.134 His “self-giving behavior
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Cf. also John’s use of the analogy of healing for Christ’s death on the cross (Jn 3:14-15). I must thank
Gerald O’Collins for providing the information that inspired this idea that Christ himself is the fruit of the
tree of life, even though he did not say it himself. The implications for Christology, a theology of the
Eucharist, Christian Anthropology, and Ecclesiology are exciting. For example, see Revelation 22:2 where
the tree of life is said to have twelve kinds of fruit and its leaves are for the healing of the nations. Those
who respond to the call to image God in the world become linked with the very self-gifting activity
(mission) of God in the world.
134
Humans must “pray without ceasing” (1 Thess 5:17). Christ invites them: “Take my yoke upon you,
and learn from me; for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find rest for your souls” (Mt 11:29).
Irenaeus believed that Christ reveals God to us as we in turn image God in our humanity; “[If] Christ’s
humanity is not something that sullies or conceals his divinity, but rather makes that divinity available to
human perception, then the same is true of the humanity we share with Christ…in our humanity we can be,
and, indeed, are called to be, revealers of divinity, bearers of divine glory, the means by which God is
glorified (AH IV.20.7)” (Denis Minns, Irenaeus [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994],
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alone is the norm for human activity.”135 Following him is wisdom; “Trust in the LORD
with all your heart, and do not rely on your own insight. In all your ways acknowledge
him, and he will make straight your paths. Do not be wise in your own eyes; fear the
LORD, and turn away from evil. It will be a healing for your flesh and a refreshment for
your body” (Prov 3:5-8).
Lastly, eternity is not about coming to a predetermined destination which will not
be arrived at until checking off all points on God’s agenda. There is no goal among true
friends. The point is not the destination. The point is not to say that one thing such that
nothing more needs to be said. The point of relationship is the joy of the relationship, the
shared expressions of love and companionship.
God delights in nurturing the other into the good. In the nurturing of the other,
there is delight for both God and creation in the journey together, through the unfolding
of each day and the creativity of discovering new ways to manifest goodness, truth, and
beauty in the relationship. There will be the utmost joy for God and creation when all
creation is rescued from its chaos and communes fully with both God and neighbor.
Even at that point, the journey together will only have just begun.
This is in line with the thinking of Irenaeus. He did not define the eschaton as the
ending of the current economy by starting a new one, “but the fulfillment, restoration and

41). The phrase “humanity of God”—used in the body of the dissertation above—is taken from the later
writings of Karl Barth who believed that God’s humanity and humanity’s togetherness with God was
miraculously established in Christ (“The Humanity of God,” in The Humanity of God, translated by John
Newton Thomas [Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1964], 47).
135
Molly T. Marshall, “The Fullness of Incarnation: God’s New Humanity in the Body of Christ,” Review
& Expositor 93 (1996): 192. “The presumed ‘perfection’ of Adam prior to the fall is not the goal of human
existence; Christ is” (Marshall, 200). The Church will be judged based on its faithfulness to the Call of the
Father by the Spirit in embodying God’s humanity, the nature of God displayed in Christ. Judgment does
not take place in Christ. It takes place on the basis of Christ. God in Christ is wooing humanity from
unbelief into a repaired relationship with God. Those who believe and live in obedience will hear the
Father say “I recognize you; we have a striking family resemblance. Well done!”
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renewal of that which God originally began in creating ‘the heavens and the earth’ (Gen
1.1).”136 At that time there is a rest that both God and creation will enjoy. 137 Both will
be at home with each other. In focusing on the restoration of the earthly paradise the
point is not about the heavenly state being a reward; rather, the restoration is more for the
purpose of preparation for future growth and glory.138 The journey of creation with God
will continue.

F. The Ethic and Telos of Creation

An important corollary to the brief mention of glorification in the previous section
is to make explicit the telos of creation in the framework, which is manifest in its
founding ethic. The ethic of God’s creative activity is definitive of the relationships
among all those in the community that is envisioned by the Priestly source. The ethic of
creation’s genesis is its telos.
The God who is our possibility is himself oriented eccentrically to act lovingly for
the other, nurturing the other into the fullness of self-expressing (divine) goodness. God
does not master or coerce, but self-gifts that creation might grow up such that its own
voice is transparent to the o/Other orientation of the Possibility and Call creatively
operating throughin. Divine creation is teleological. To know the character of God is to
136

Steenberg, 55; see 84.
Ibid., 53. Steenberg writes further: “For Irenaeus, God’s rest comes only in the perfect completion of
his cosmogonic work. When God’s nature as creator had been actualized fully in the formation of the
cosmos, he was able to rest. So humankind shall find rest only in the perfection of its own nature, for the
character of ‘Sabbath’ is a reality both for God and humankind” (100). Human perfection is about joining
God’s Sabbath. Interestingly, Irenaeus never uses Genesis 2:1-3 “in the context of a distinctly protological
discussion. In his reading these verses are chiefly eschatological, and stand as among the most important
ancient testimony to the incarnational confession of a chiliastic kingdom” (98). The end is defined relative
to the beginning for Irenaeus, but never the opposite. Genesis 1 has historicity, but of more import is
reading it as a “prophecy of what is to come” (Steenberg quoting Irenaeus, 99); “The true Sabbath is not the
seventh day of creation, but the kingdom which that seventh day indicates” (100).
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Ibid., 58.
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know the character for which creation is destined. In the possibility of our beginning is
our end. God is calling us forward to participate in him.139
In our genesis is our identity and ethic for life as contributors to the cosmic
community. The Possibility by which we respond—that which we should most naturally
image—is not characterized by exploiting creation (other), self-deprecation, isolation, or
by endless growth in knowledge, wealth, and power. The Spirit is the Possibility of God
for the other, operating transjectively relative to creation. Our possibility, our eccentric
orientation to express good toward the o/Other, is our end. Building up the cosmic
community (those in it) is our purpose in existing; it is in our call to be. It is how we
express moment by moment to God and neighbor, not just “here I am,” but “here I am for
you.”140
To reiterate an earlier point, the goal is not to be part of a ceaseless incremental
progression with all humanity and creation wherein we will wake up one day to find we
have arrived at perfection. Rather, we seek in this moment that our becoming be a selfexpression of divinely-enabled/self-gifted goodness to the o/Other. The aim is the
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There is a growing conversation about the futurity of God. It is claimed that this is in keeping with ideas
of God in the Bible—in other words, “the idea of a God who comes to meet the world out of the realm of
the future” (John Haught, “Chaos, Complexity, and Theology,” in Teilhard in the 21st Century [Maryknoll,
NY; Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications; Orbis Books, 2003], 189). This arguably biblical notion fits well
with the direction scientific reflections are heading; “it is the promising quality of this divine futurity that
leaves the present open to the unpredictable surprise and novelty that the sciences of chaos and complexity
are now bringing to our attention” (189f.). Dan Boone, president of Trevecca Nazarene University, uses in
his teaching an analogy for God of parents teaching a child how to walk. They do not stand behind the
child pushing her in the back telling her to go forth. Rather, they stand in front of the child, in the child’s
field of vision, and beckon the child to come (see, e.g., Ex 13:21-22). Thus, God is the one who in creative
expression forever precedes us; he both invites and makes possible our response.
140
I look forward to the completion this fall of Chris Vena’s, a fellow doctoral candidate’s, dissertation
here at Marquette. One of his main points, as I understand it, is that care for creation should not be
discussed as a matter of stewardship, but within the realm of love of God and neighbor. He was the first to
articulate this point for me. My suggestions are compatible with his. In my view, creation is not to be
objectified and utilized to the highest utility, but should be seen as an other with whom we are in a conurturing relationship.
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maturation of things/persons/systems in the time in which they exist, the maximal
expression of good therein.
This again is in keeping with the spirit of Irenaeus’ theology. He does not focus
much on the “how” of creation. That was a topic that he believed was speculative and a
source for many of the erroneous notions against which he fought.141 Instead of
speculating on “how,” he focused on “why” God creates. The answer is God’s
goodness.142 “God’s motivation for creation is his own inherent goodness…his nature
leads to creation in which his goodness can be expressed.”143 In his description of
Irenaeus’ position, Steenberg does not use the language of eccentricity; however, he does
say that there is an “externalizing character of his nature which only finds fulfillment in
sharing its love with another.”144
It is significant that Irenaeus affirmed the character of God’s goodness as such “to
‘bring into being an entity other than himself’, to give being to that which has none, that
it may ultimately find being in himself.”145 As a result, “God’s creative movements are
purposeful, intentional, propelled forward by the goodness of a nature that cannot but
reach out of itself in creative activity and render perfect the beings it creates—a
perfection ‘made visible’ in the incarnate Christ.”146
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In Irenaeus’ words: “We shall not err if we affirm the same thing concerning the substance of matter—
namely, that God produced it—for we have learned from the scriptures that God holds the supremacy over
all things. But whence or in what manner he produced it, scripture has nowhere declared, nor is it for us to
conjecture, forming from our own opinions endless speculations concerning God. Such knowledge should
be left to God” (2.14.4; quoted by Steenberg, 46). The ‘how’ only has value as it relates to the redemption
wrought through the incarnation (46).
142
Cf. Jack Cottrell, What the Bible Says about God the Creator (Joplin, MO: College Press Pub. Co.,
1983), 124.
143
Steenberg, 33, 34. In another place Steenberg writes: “God will create in order to bring this goodness to
another” (22; cf. 84)
144
Ibid., 35.
145
Ibid., 38.
146
Ibid. Irenaeus linked God’s externalizing character primarily with the second person. He did not start
with the Spirit as Genesis 1 and Dabney do. Nevertheless, the roles of the Father, Son, and Spirit from
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In contrast to Irenaeus’ focus on the second person, the language of possibility
used in this framework was first developed by Dabney in regard to the Spirit. This
pushes us to look in different places in Scripture for the ethic of creation. As has already
been argued in relation to creation, the Spirit’s work in Christ and initial connection to
the rearing of the world from obscurity seems to be the broader paradigm in which to
interpret the Spirit’s ministry within and through those on whom he rests. Going further,
within early post-Pentecost communities, the nature of the Spirit’s work is seen in the
erasing of hierarchical or alienating distinctions in favor of the familial status of brother
and sister. The Spirit as Possibility for the o/Other establishes the relational conditions
for something good: namely, human equality in fellowship, in mutual submission147 and
service. Therefore, the consequent operations of those who dynamically cooperate with
the Spirit of Sonship are to participate in God’s self-giving dominion of building up the
other for participation in the cosmic community, into fellowship in love.

G. An Advantage of the Proposed Framework and Definition of “Chaos”

One of the goals of this project was not only to articulate a grammar of creation in
which to define “chaos,” but to develop a grammar that is coherent within a

protology to eschatology are the same in Irenaeus’ work. There is one overarching economy defined
relative to God’s goodness in which the persons consistently fulfill their respective parts; see Steenberg, 72.
147
Submission is an idea that is so easily perverted. Submission is only godly if it is mutual. Otherwise, it
is subjugation of one to another; it objectifies or de-faces one party. It takes mutuality—that both parties
respond in kind. In a small group setting I recall studying Christ’s command to ‘sell all you have and give
it to the poor.’ We were talking about the barriers in the community that inhibit such a move; it requires
vulnerability, trust, and dependence on others that when you have need others will help supply from their
abundance. When I pushed that our fears and excuses should not stop us from living according to the inbreaking Kingdom, one of the people replied in jest, “You go first.” Living in faithfulness to God’s call
does require a community for there to be life-abundant thriving for all. When we live in fear about scarcity
and hoard resources, we neither trust God for our “daily bread” nor see the miracle that there is enough for
everyone (e.g., Mt 14:14-21; 15:32-38). Christ never promised, however, that in this life there would not
be pain for living in obedience; we will be quite vulnerable to those who respond improperly to their
Creator. Nevertheless, the call to obedience is no less legitimate and authoritative.
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contemporary Western context. There were several reasons for wanting to achieve this
goal. First, was to provide a framework with components that are not wholly unfamiliar
for people outside Christianity, who may lack familiarity with the worldviews in which
orthodox positions on significant Christian doctrines were first articulated. Second, for
those inside Christianity, less translation is required between this framework and the
wider worldview in which they function in society and their professional work.148
Specifically, the proposed framework honors the cultural shifts that came of age during
the Enlightenment concerning views of human nature and the nature of evil in the world.
Thus, it seeks to be a theology that is ready-made for living in the world as the
community of faith.
Meeting this goal required some adaptations in the way certain Christian
affirmations were articulated. In classic Greek thinking, the nature of humans never
changed. Christians claimed, as they sought to articulate their beliefs in that intellectual
milieu, that human nature changed once in the fall and has persisted in that broken, sinful
state since then.149 During the Enlightenment that particular formulation of Christianity’s
belief that all are affected by sin was challenged. It was a time period in which what
counts as metaphysics was changing. The first question of philosophy was no longer
being. Questions of epistemology gained precedence over metaphysics. The old first
question of being was thus being asked and answered in very different ways. The topic
of metaphysics was being re-construed in a context where the human subject was
becoming the measure of all things. Matters of history, culture, and relationships became
148

As Zachary Hayes hopes in the creation of such a contemporary articulation of creation: “it speaks in
language that is understandable in terms of modern world-experience, it does not require that the believer,
who is modern in his or her daily experience, must become mediaeval or even pre-mediaeval in the world
of faith” (49f.).
149
Neiman, 44.
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viewed as constitutive of a person/thing.150 Thus, during the Enlightenment, thinkers
such as Jean Jacque Rousseau began saying that humans are inherently good. It is simply
their enculturation that develops in them virtues and/or vices. Further, those cultures
have a history of development. Unfortunately, through the development of social
interactions, what humans have become has developed mostly for the worse; one
dysfunction has been compounded upon another.
In the thoughts of Rousseau (and Hegel later on), evil arose in history and would
be resolved in history.151 Thus, in the present framework, claims concerning the
compounding and complicating of chaos over time, as well as claims concerning
recapitulation even in the present, resonate with the broader intellectual culture in the
West, which sees evil (chaos) as an issue of developments in history—not an issue of our
given/created nature (being).152 Much of society’s aims, in all fields, have been to
resolve the “evils” or problems that have arisen: in education, politics, economics,
agriculture, environment, community development, family dynamics, etc. The hope is to
resolve the problems, to recapitulate that which is manifesting “chaos” (by whatever
standard of measure is being used).
It took a shift in worldview from static notions of being for humans to
intentionally seek to change their world. As Adorno wrote: “[o]nly when that which is
150

I am thankful to Dr. Philip Rossi for challenging me on making statements that “metaphysics” was no
longer an issue; rather, the classic notion of metaphysics was being morphed into new realms or categories
in giving an account of what is constitutive of a thing. The history of a thing and its relationships to other
things began to define what it is.
151
Neiman, 44, 94.
152
We are enculturated—we become—in chaotic circumstances. It does not mean that the problem of
original sin is inherent to human nature: that we are born with it. There is no inherent breakdown in human
capacities or morality due to the manner in which God calls us to respond or our ‘neighbors’ to respond in
love toward us. Our capacities are susceptible to corruption when they operate within and according to the
fractured context. E.g., doing what is laudable, good, or right in a consumeristic, capitalistic society may
have no reflection of the (divine) goodness to which God calls us; context can dull and deceive our
ingenuity for responding to God’s call. No matter of our intention to respond well, participating in these
fractured contexts makes each person both guilty and responsible for the part he/she plays.
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can be changed is that which is not everything.”153 In an intellectual context where
societal arrangements were given naturalistic, historical explanations (instead of
explanations about the God-given order of reality) those arrangements could be critiqued
and changed. In that same landscape, where evil lies at the surface and can be described
in historical, relational terms, humans can be thought of as not just being guilty for being
evil, but being responsible for their participation in evil and able to participate in
solutions.154
In Neiman’s Kantian framework she focuses on the need for reason to work to be
at home in the world where it currently feels homeless; reason should be applied to
systems in which people’s thoughtless, mundane participation enmeshes them in
perpetuating immeasurable evil. In the framework being proposed, reason is a means. It
is God, working by the transjective Spirit and transcarnate Word, who is working to make
the cosmic community homey for us all. God is working to mature the tohu wabohu
earth into a nurturing, abundantly full community. It is God who initiates salvation for
creation marked by chaos. It is divine goodness/love that is working to be at home in the
world.155

H. One Caution Concerning the Framework

One of the concerns Catherine Keller has with many of the theological positions
available is the manner in which they have been used as justifications for one group’s
153

Quoted by Neiman, 308.
In her treatment of Rousseau, Neiman mentions that Augustine made humans guilty for evil (because of
their inherited damaged nature), but Rousseau made humans responsible (because of the part they play in
evil in history); see Neiman, 43.
155
“He was in the world, and the world came into being through him; yet the world did not know him. He
came to what was his own, and his own people did not accept him. But to all who received him, who
believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God, who were born, not of blood or of the will
of the flesh or of the will of man, but of God” (Jn 1:10-13).

154
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power and for the demonization of the (m)other.156 Living in the proposed paradigm
should inspire anything but grabs for power or the demonizing of oneself or others on
account of the chaos embodied therein. God’s call is neither to war nor to self-preserving
defensive posturing. God’s call is to love of God and ‘neighbor.’ The call is to an open,
vulnerable embrace of others. That call includes embracing one’s enemies and laboring
on their behalf that they might come to the fullest (self) expression of (divine) goodness.
That labor is both salvific and creative; it is toward freeing others of the chains of chaos
and toward coming to fullness in God’s self-gift.157 If there are obstacles in loving others
and drawing near to them, most likely immaturity and/or chaos are present; until Christ’s
return we can be certain it is as much one’s own as it is others’. As we can be neighbor
to all in the cosmic community—partnering with them in helping us all flourish in
goodness/love/beauty—we will see the Kingdom expressed.
The litmus test of what constitutes chaos is not one group’s ideals over another’s.
The test is conformity to God’s self-revelation of love in Christ; the test is the degree to
which individuals and groups are able to love one another, even unto death.158 As with

156

See Timothy K. Beal’s Religion and Its Monsters (New York; London: Routledge, 2002). He claims
that monsters “are paradoxical personifications of otherness within sameness. That is, they are threatening
figures of anomaly within the well-established and accepted order of things” (4). There is a tendency for us
to build a comfortable, homey place in which we feel restful and secure. So long as unsettling things stay
outside of our realm of sameness, we are content. If one gets in our space, it threatens our “sense of ‘athomeness,’ not from the outside but from within the house” (4f). Having the monster (otherness) in one’s
house (sameness) is deeply disconcerting (5). A monster can be many things: “that which invades one’s
sense of personal, social or cosmic order and security” (5). It is anything that cannot be integrated into
one’s prior hominess; cf. Stuart Chandler’s similar suggestion concerning the category of ‘chaos’ (“When
the World Falls Apart: Methodology for Employing Chaos and Emptiness as Theological Constructs,”
Harvard Theological Review 85, no. 4 [1992]: 467-491).
157
Such work is living according to the image of Revelation 22:2 in which the tree of life has twelve kinds
of fruit; to be ambassadors of and/or to participate in such work is to image God in the world.
158
“I give you a new commandment, that you love one another. Just as I have loved you, you also should
love one another. By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another”
(Jn 13:34-35; cf. 15:12-14, 17).
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Christ, perfect love requires we die at the hands of others before we ourselves act in malcreative, nihilating ways toward them.
Where love is deficient, repentance, healing, and further maturation is needed.
We need everyone, all within the cosmic community, to work together in building one
another up into the fullness of God’s self-gifting. We all need, together, to work out our
collective salvation with fear and trembling. It may require submitting mutually to one
another that we all might know better our immaturity or blind spots. However, this
framework does not justify putting one group in a place of power over others and/or
demonizing any part of creation. God’s mission is not the annihilation of any of the
others he creates, but that they would come to fullness in him and be freed of any
instantiations of chaos that would hinder that growth.

I. Summary

By expanding Lyle Dabney’s pneumatology and his notion of transject into a
discussion that focuses equally on the second person, a framework was proposed that
sought to move beyond some of the tensions within the tradition related to the doctrine of
creation. God exists and operates relative to creation neither as a foreign causative force
nor within it in an embodied way such that God/Spirit becomes the subject of natural
science. The transjective Spirit and transcarnate Word operate throughin creation as the
very possibility for the self-expression of the other with God’s call. This makes the
creative event a combined act of God with the very other coming into being.
By defining God’s creative activity and relationship to creation in this way, it
precluded any notions of “chaos” as a pre-creation condition or entity. In continuity with
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the movement of Genesis 1 and the theology of Irenaeus, it was suggested that creation
moves from infancy to maturity—the not-yet of barrenness to the fullness of life.
Creation does not move from “chaos” to “order.” “Chaos” was not defined in opposition
to order; it was defined as improper expression, compared against the possibility of
divine goodness self-gifted to creation throughin God’s eccentric call. The expression
was defined as chaotic regardless of whether it was intended maliciously or not. In either
case the discordant becoming could have disastrous discreative consequences in need of
repair. In either case it is also equally in need of a new, righteous relationship to the
o/Other.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A. A Context in Motion

One presupposition of this dissertation has been that theologians have been
adjusting to changes in the broader Western worldview throughout the centuries. As was
tracked in Chapter 2, at certain points there have been decisive changes in that worldview
that demanded of theologians that they find new ways of articulating the faith.1
However, since Galileo, theologians for the most part have been less willing to continue
to adapt their theological language with the developments in the intellectual and scientific
context. Particularly between theology and science “Effective dialogue became
impossible, and theology continued its work in the familiar categories of the late Middle
Ages while science went on its own way independently of any theological concern.”2 As
science was ever more understanding the universe to be in flux and historical
consciousness was coming of age, there has grown a divide between the language of the
church and its surroundings.3 Now “the worldview mediated to both believer and
unbeliever alike by our modern culture is radically different from that which provided
some key structural elements for our familiar theological vision and language.”4
Many proposals, including the present one, have sought to close the gap between
articulations of theology and the present worldview. Interestingly, there is in this
endeavor much that the biblical traditions have to offer as a dialogue partner. By paying
1

As Zachary Hayes, O.F.M states: “As world view changes, the particular shape of the theology of creation
changes as well. A comparison between Aquinas, Irenaeus, and the Old Testament would demonstrate this
with dramatic clarity” (What are they Saying about Creation? [New York: Paulist Press, 1980], 33f)
2
Ibid., 9.
3
Cf. ibid., 11, 15.
4
Ibid., 10. Hayes concludes that from these trends in the past few centuries that “By and large, it would be
true to say that the reaction of modern theology has been considerably less courageous than was that of
Aquinas in the thirteenth century” (11).
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attention to the erosion within biblical studies of certain long-standing assertions of
comparative ANE studies, as well as paying attention to the types of interpretive work
being done in Genesis 1 outside of those “chaos” laden frameworks, this project
attempted to show how suitable the voice of Genesis 1 is for theology in this age.
Where in the biblical view as a whole “creation is related to the gradually
emerging future-consciousness of the Old Testament people”—the hope of salvation
founded in creation that moves to “new creation”—today, more and more, theology of
creation is also linked with theology of history.5 God’s creative activity has a history to
it, as it did for the New Testament authors as they spoke of new creation in Christ. Being
is no longer the focus of the definition of creation in the manner it had been for centuries.
God’s creative activity in the world has both purpose and history;6 “What comes forth
from the creative action of God is not a finished reality but an unfinished world which is
being led by God to the end which he has in mind for it.”7 Thus, a view that resonated
through Scripture until Irenaeus has found new life in the current context, after many
intervening centuries.

B. Pointing Forward: Areas for Extending this Work

There are issues that a project such as this raises that can be pursued in
subsequent projects. In this case, dialogues concerning 1) the implicit metaphysics of
this project, 2) the possibilities for the area of soteriology, and 3) the possibilities for
5

Ibid., 25.
In Hayes’ view “the purpose or goal of created existence is the realization of loving, transforming union
of the creature with the Creator such as has been realized in the incarnation and glorification of Christ. God
creates for this purpose because he is, in himself, a mystery of self-communicative love” (36f). The
implications of this are that “meaning and purpose are not peripheral qualities of finite existence but are
deeply rooted in the fact of existence as such” (37). Hayes’ view is quite compatible with Irenaeus’ and
what has been proposed in the preceding chapter.
7
Ibid., 88.
6
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discussions about Christian holiness stand out as significant and timely among the
possibilities. It is hoped that these areas for future work will be taken up and addressed.

1. Metaphysics

a. Evaluating the Metaphysical Implications of the Proposed Framework

As was mentioned in the introductory chapter, there are many issues of
metaphysics that naturally surround any discussion of God’s creative activity and the
relationship between God and creation. The aim of this project was not to outline current
conversations in metaphysics and show how the grammar of creation that is proposed
herein relates to the various positions. The goal was also not to directly enter those
conversations by proposing a way through any debates within contemporary metaphysics.
In looking at the history of development within Western thinking about the world and the
corresponding adjustments in the church’s theology concerning creation, the goal was to
suggest a way of articulating creation theology where we currently stand and to propose a
specific way to understand and use the term “chaos” for theological purposes. There is
work that needs to be done in going forward of outlining the metaphysical implications of
this framework and evaluating them.

b. Comparing and Contrasting the Metaphysics of the Proposed Framework
with Those of Others

So much of the church’s tradition of creation theology consists of a journey
through centuries of variations on Classical metaphysics, whether those variations were
predominantly Platonic or Aristotelian. Even centuries beyond the cataclysmic shifts in
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relation to these philosophical frameworks within the West, there are some theologians
who continue to champion the merits of positions forged by certain theological giants in
response to issues within those contexts. There is no arguing against the service to the
church of these greats of the tradition and the insightfulness in the ways they carefully
shaped the theological imaginations of generations within their context, emphasizing
certain affirmations of the Christian faith and guarding against patterns of thinking in
those contexts that would undermine the spirit of the faith. It is right that these
theologians and their work are applauded. Nevertheless, Western thinking has changed
in multiple ways, multiple times since those once-dominant Platonic and Aristotelian
paradigms in which they worked were displaced.
Developments in philosophy and science in the seventeenth-century onward in
many ways were a direct assault on previous ways of thinking. Thus, there is some
important work that needs to be done in explicitly stating how the metaphysics of the
proposed framework differs from the classical contexts up through the Middle Ages,
perhaps even through the Modern era as well.
For example, the language developed by Lyle Dabney about the Spirit being the
Possibility of God for the o/Other was an intentional attempt to speak about God in the
present context, in place of classical notions in which God and God’s creative activity is
conceptualized in terms of Being and primary causation. In Aquinas’ position, for
instance, as explained by David Burrell, C.S.C., God as primary cause not only causes
things to be, but causes each “to be the cause that it is (ST 1.105.5).”8 This type of
causation is unique to God because “only God’s activity can enter into the actions of

8

Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1993), 68f.
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creatures in such a way as to make them actions.”9 However, when it comes to matters of
subjectivity and freedom, God’s relationship to creation is one of exteriority as
Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover resided in the outermost sphere of the cosmos; that is, in
Aquinas’ words, while “the very meaning of voluntary activity denotes an internal
principle within the subject, this...does not have to be the utterly first principle, moving
yet unmoved by all else. The proximate principle is internal, but the ultimately first
moving principle is external, as indeed it is for natural movement, this being the cause
setting nature in motion” (ST 1-2.9.4.1).10
As Burrell continues his presentation it becomes all the more clear how much
Aquinas spoke according to his era where motion was thought to be external to objects,
an accident. This changed significantly in Western thinking after Spinoza, regardless of

9

Ibid., 69. This is a good example of primary causation, wherein God is the underlying foundation or
cause for cause and effect (secondary causation) in the creaturely realm.
10
Quoted by Burrell, 91. In addition to this issue of causation, also distinct from Aquinas, the proposed
position does not see all initiation by humans (creation) as a failure to act the good, to freely participate “in
the very being of God” (100), or “‘refusing’ to enter into the process initiated by actively willing ‘the
good.’ In the Thomistic view, we can be ‘like unto God,’ but only in a self-destructive manner” (Burrell,
91). In the present framework, humans do not passively float on God’s river of goodness (see Burrell, 123,
125), they are called to act; even so, they do not act as parrots of God’s Call, but in response to it. There is
a type of initiatory activity that has been labeled as chaos in this dissertation; it is eating from the wrong
tree and is destructive of both self and others. Nevertheless, righteous expression does not exclude input
from the creature; such self-expression is anything but a failure to act the good, a lack. Both becoming in
right relation and becoming in disharmony are activities of God’s other. On the other side, the position of
Duns Scotus has not been proposed in this project, that God has “endowed creatures with a capacity to
originate activity” as autonomous entities (Burrell, 94). Creation does not have that type of autonomy from
the transjective Spirit and transcarnate Word, nor does creation possess them. Burrell believes that Scotus
is guilty of constructing a zero-sum game where either God or humans act. However, Aquinas was just as
guilty of this problem when all activity and motion (due to primary causation) was on God’s side of the
balance sheet. By changing the language from cause to possibility, creaturely response and activity can
still be dependent on God, but there is not the zero-sum balance sheet with all motion, activity, existence,
agency, etc., being ultimately traceable back to God, in terms of primary causation; this is how grace is
introduced in Aquinas: “no created nature can ‘proceed to its act unless it be moved by God’ (ST 12.109.1)” (148; cf. 153 where he says that even human response in redemption comes from God); grace
elevates fallen nature above its hindrances (149; cf. Burrell, 113 as a possible response to this zero-sum
accusation). Where God is said to relate to creation in terms of causation, qualifications must be inserted in
order to answer issues of theodicy; e.g., the omnipotent God is able to cause things to be different, but has
chosen to operate in creation according to some other manner that honors the otherness of creation. God’s
omnipotent nature is placed in tension with a decision of God according to God’s loving nature. Where
God is the possibility for the other, the issue of evil does not fall upon God in that way.
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Newton’s best efforts. In his pneumatology, Dabney’s language of “possibility” and
“transject” seeks to get theology through some of these internal/external problems11 and
the dissolved category of primary causation in broader Western thinking;12 it starts with
God’s activity as possibility instead of God as the Real, the first cause.13
Beyond making contrasts, however, further work can be done showing how the
distinctly Christian concerns of Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysic and theology of creation—
as outlined by contemporary scholars such as David Burrell and his one-time student
Rahim Acar14—are, in this dissertation, placed in new language appropriate for notions
within the broader present context. There has been a concerted effort to keep the
proposed framework within the spirit of the tradition. For example, God’s creative
activity is affirmed as a free choice by God.15 Creation happens instantaneously; there is
not a formation of a subject that is then animated or brought into reality. God’s triune
operations, which are the very possibility of the response of an other, are instantaneous
with the response.
The coloring of panentheistic talk with the emphasis on “in” is also rejected in
keeping with the tradition by the prefix “trans” in transject and transcarnate. God is not
embodied in creation even though there is no speaking of creation apart from God’s
perpetual operation throughin it. There is furthermore a shared sense in which God has a
unique activity in creating because only God is the Possibility and Call by which there is
11

See, e.g., Burrell, 127. Cf. Dabney and his discussion of this ongoing dilemma in the Christian tradition
concerning pneumatology: “Starting with the Spirit: Why the Last Should Now be First,” 3-27; “Naming
the Spirit: Towards a Pneumatology of the Cross,” 28-40; and “The Nature of the Spirit: Creation as a
Premonition of God,” 92-103; cf. also “Pneumatologia Crucis,” 511-512, 516-518.
12
There is a need to examine the relation between 1) Dabney’s theology, 2) the framework proposed
herein, and 3) Burrell’s claims about the merits of seeing being as act (cf. Burrell, 100f, 126f).
13
See Dabney, “The Nature of the Spirit: Creation as a Premonition of God,” 102.
14
Talking about God and Talking about Creation: Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ Positions, Islamic
Philosophy, Theology and Science: Texts and Studies, vol. 58 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005).
15
See, e.g., Burrell, 45.
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the responding other. There is no grammar of primary and secondary causation in the
proposed framework; this is in part because the manner of being (influenced by what
would be secondary causes for Aquinas) is taken less to be an accident to things than
constitutive of them in the contemporary setting; relations through time are given more
ontic weight.16 Lastly, in the paradigm of Aquinas, there is more concern for the reality
of sinful action than the quality of a person’s intention; regardless of intention we are
responsible.17 Aquinas’ concern that we were created “to act intelligently rather than
heedlessly” has been affirmed here.18
It is appropriate not only to look backward and make comparisons, it is also
appropriate to look at the present proposal relative to other contemporary positions. For
example, there are some who are beginning to see God not as primary cause, with the
existence of the world and secondary causation being the effect. Rather, they are looking
at God in terms of futurity, God standing before, beckoning creation to himself. For
creation, having its destiny in God is not a matter of return back to its source; it is a
matter of coming forward into a fulfillment made possible in God’s creative activity.19
As has been suggested, God calls and makes possible the other’s response. God does not
push it into being; creation is not actualizing possibilities God makes available to it. The
result at the eschaton will be the righteous expression(s) of creation, having matured into

16

Compare Burrell, 96f with Hayes, 92.
Burrell, 125.
18
Ibid. Cf. Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton, N.J:
Princeton University Press, 2002); her position is Kantian, but it still relates well to this situation.
19
See, e.g., Hayes, 96.
17
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the full self-expression of God’s self-gift of divine goodness.20 Evaluating the
relationships between these positions is work that is yet to be done.

c. Evaluating the Merits of this Framework for Our Contemporary Context

The proposed framework in this dissertation was developed as an attempt to
articulate a Christian theology of creation for the present context, a theology that has a
very specific notion of chaos in it. It was developed not only in an attempt to be sensitive
to the intellectual context (specifically within the physical sciences), but also to provide a
theology of creation that is tenable enough to the contemporary imagination such that it
could help provide a framework for making sense of the world we encounter and for
shaping the way we communicate those experiences. This is to suggest a role for
theology that it has not had in quite some time; it does not simply work with a context
given to it that is based on non-Christian presuppositions.21 Theology should help
provide the narrative, in dialogue with other academic disciplines, which shapes our
experience of the world but also is adequate (for a time) for hanging our experiences of
the world upon. This framework, with its notion of chaos, was developed to that end.
Now the work of evaluating its suitability for that end in our contemporary Western
context needs to be carried out.22

20

Hayes has a similar vision of the eschaton: “It will be that final state of existence with God in which the
creative power of God’s self-giving love will totally suffuse all creaturely relations, transforming all into
the final perfection of love and mutuality; and ‘God will be all in all’ (1 Cor. 15:28)” (98).
21
See, e.g., the work of D. Stephen Long that challenges the foundational presuppositions of the given
context of capitalism as an example of a theology that does this (Divine Economy: Theology and the
Market [New York: Routledge, 2000]).
22
This should at least be qualified in that there is no single Western context. Each academic field or
culture in itself is diverse. However, there may be ways in which this proposal is well suited for the
broader trends in thinking since the Enlightenment.
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2. Soteriology

Works on soteriology and atonement theories have been abundant in recent years.
There has been a flurry of activity in both Old and New Testament theology on these
issues, as well as within and between various theological traditions. As with the
turbulence in creation theology, much of this trend is fueled by the growth of historical
consciousness developed during and out of the Enlightenment. Many atonement theories
have been linked with the social contexts in which they arose. The concurrent social
relationships, notions of justice and/or law, theological anthropology, etc. all shaped the
way the biblical texts and their terms were read.
It was not until the critical methodologies developed since the seventeenthcentury by thinkers such as Spinoza were employed that there was careful attention paid
to the differences in the way terms have been used across time and by different authors.
This has put into question the degree and manner to which several dominant theological
positions on atonement from various eras can be said to rest on the authority of Scripture.
The debates to preserve, revise, or replace these long-standing theories (e.g.,
vicarious satisfaction, penal substitution, Christus victor) are far from over.
Nevertheless, as with the dilemma of creation theology in the current cultural milieu, it is
assumed here that new contexts demand fresh articulations of the faith—as Aquinas did
at the transition from a Platonic to an Aristotelian worldview. If the proposed creation
theology, with its accompanying notion of chaos, is indeed fitting for the present context,
then the task of articulating God’s salvific response to chaos in the framework needs to
be addressed. Some trajectories were mentioned in Chapter 5, but a great deal more
needs to be done.
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a. Finding Fitting Articulations of God’s Response to Chaos in this
Proposed Framework

According to what has been proposed, each creation’s destiny has always been
maturation into perfect self-expression in relation to God’s triune creative activity—that
is, the pervasive self-expression of God’s love/goodness among the cosmic community
by God’s self-gifting throughin. Nevertheless, the scarring, miring, and enslaving
character of chaos on creation’s subsequent expressions is an evolving condition in
ongoing becoming from which creation needs salvation.
It has already been suggested that the o/Other oriented love made flesh in God’s
humanity, even unto and in his death, is the fruit of the tree of life from which God
intended humanity to eat since the beginning.23 Humans are called to a unique vocation
in their living in the dynamic of God’s o/Other oriented love that God self-gifts; humans
are to image their creator in the community. Even though God self-gifts himself to all
creation in his creative operations, humans have a special role in giving themselves to
others in the cosmic community. It is an activity unique and appropriate to them.
Nurturing the whole community into self-expression of goodness according to their
gifting and the extent of their abilities is humanity’s occupation through which they pour
themselves out as they eat from the tree of life. It should also not be underestimated the

23

God’s incarnation and life in Christ must be included in God’s salvific activity. This was a common
theme in some early church theologians (e.g., Irenaeus), but, in the face of penal substitution theories, has
become superfluous, a nearly nonsensical component in soteriology. According to Andrew P. Klager, the
early fathers avoided notions of penal substitution precisely because it “systemically undermines the
centrality of the incarnation” (“Retaining and Reclaiming the Divine: Identification and the Recapitulation
of Peace in St. Irenaeus of Lyons’ Atonement Narrative” in Stricken by God?: Nonviolent Identification
and the Victory of Christ, ed. by Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Pub., 2007], 445).
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significance of God engaging humans in literal conversation, and humans being able to
construe worlds with their speech.
In seeking to articulate God’s salvific work there are several things to which we
must attend. First, just as Scripture and the early tradition of the church affirm, God’s
salvific work must be understood to include all creation, not just humanity. It was out of
this concern that certain positions were taken in developing this framework. Second, any
account of God’s salvific activity should be understood to culminate in Christ, not just
begin with Christ. Thus a narrative of God’s salvific enterprise is inadequate by New
Testament precedents if it does not include God’s prior and continuing relationship with
the descendants of Abraham, God’s covenant people. Both the Law and the Prophets
affirm that through Abraham and his descendents all the families on earth will be blessed.
A third issue that needs to be addressed in relation to this proposed framework is
perhaps the most important. In the preceding chapter the grammar of “transcarnation”
and “throughin” was used. That the Word became incarnate marks a radically different
relationship of God with creation and activity therein. The creative and soteriological
implications in regard to the proposed framework will need to be explored. The brief
treatment of God’s salvific work offered to this point did not address this difference of
incarnation. It was suggested that in the self-expression made possible by the call of God
that reverberates in the one who hung on the tree that there is recapitulation from chaos.
This is a transformation beyond a simple moral influence; this is a shift in relationships
that has true ontic import. There is a freeing from many of chaos’ chains; there is new,
fertile life that grows on the other side of sin’s scars. There is the possibility for many
relationships, to the extent that it is up to the convert, to be re-birthed in justice—to be
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justified. The initial righteous-coming-to-be upon God’s call in Christ is to begin in a
creative moment to become what God forever self-gifts to creation. It is to take a new
road at that bifurcation point; it is to turn/repent.
A fourth point that needs to be explored is the possibility that in Christ the Triune
God acts in a decisive way that goes even beyond the dynamic of creation of making
possible the expression of an other; such an action can be described as nothing short of
God’s rescue and adoption of the other. The issue of whether God acts on behalf of the
other without their consent and the manner in which God does so must be faced. For
example, in Exodus the Israelites yearned for and called out to God for deliverance from
slavery. Nevertheless, it was not entirely known to the Israelites all that their deliverance
would entail. That for which they were asking unknowingly entailed far more than a
change in geography and governance. It also required a change in their thinking and
habits. God often acted in response to their prayer in spite of their protests and
wandering astray.
All creation continues to groan for deliverance from chaos. Only God knows all
that the answer to that prayer entails. For example, the Book of Acts is full of instances
when God went beyond the disciples’ expectations and they had to react in order to keep
in line with God’s in-breaking kingdom. It at least appears God does not always act in
ways that were fully anticipated and thus invited. In Christ, God tore through all parts of
creation—through the heavens to earth and through the earth to below the earth (Mk
1:10; 15:38).24 God annexed the entirety of creation for his kingdom, even death itself.
No aspect of creation is exempt from God’s enlivening work of rescue and restoration.

24

When Christ exhaled his final breath, the temple curtain was torn from top to bottom. Dominic Rudman
has found first century descriptions of the curtain in which the four colors of thread used to weave it were
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The end of God’s cleansing of all creation from the destructive cancer of chaos is
no different than the end of God’s creative operation. All creation is being freed to
participate in the holy vocation of love of the o/Other. By each member being
transformed into right/just relationship within the community, creation is freed to grow
into maturity in its life-supporting/nurturing destiny, into the Glory of God. There is
much about that activity, nevertheless, that remains to be explored.

b. Examining the Usefulness of the Proposed Framework for Those
Suggesting Non-Violent Atonement Theories

In the debates concerning the contextual limitations of various atonement theories
and the similarities and differences of those theories from the thought-worlds of the
biblical texts, there have been several different proposals put forward on how the
tradition should proceed from here. Many of the new proposals advocate for a nonviolent view of the atonement. They outright reject the way violence can be seen to be
condoned by God within some of the more traditional theories.25 The reasons for
rejecting notions of divine violence in the atonement are: first, its questionability on

understood to represent the four elements of creation. The tearing of the curtain is symbolic of the tearing
through of creation itself (“The Crucifixion as Chaoskampf: a New Reading of the Passion Narrative in the
Synoptic Gospels,” Biblica 84, no. 1 [2003]: 107). I believe this aspect of the curtain tearing that Rudman
suggests has symbolism in Mark’s Gospel beyond the rending of creation. Earlier in the narrative there is a
‘tearing’ of the heavens when the Spirit descends on Jesus at his baptism (1:10). Now there is a ‘tearing’ of
creation at the death of Jesus (15:38). These two places are the only use of the verb skidzō in Mark. Just as
the Word has a two tiered kenosis in becoming incarnate and then dying in the flesh (cf. Phil 2:5-8), the
narrative imagery indicates that the Spirit has a two tiered kenosis by tearing through the heavens at Jesus’
baptism and then in tearing through creation into Sheol at Jesus’ death. The movement of the Word and
Spirit is through the three parts of the cosmos: above the earth, on the earth, and below the earth. Often the
tearing of the curtain is seen as the opening of a direct path between God and humanity, a tearing down of
the barrier; Rudman does not exclude this. However, what is being communicated in the language and
images of the narrative is that the who behind the curtain (God’s presence) also is plunging through
creation into uncreation, into Sheol.
25
Cf., e.g., Anthony Bartlett’s critique of violence in the Christian tradition in Cross Purposes: The Violent
Grammar of Christian Atonement (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2001).
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biblical grounds, second, the rejection of violence in early Christian witness, and, third,
the unattractiveness of such a teaching in our present context.
There have been many suggestions based on Scripture for why the cross should
not be viewed as an act of violence by God or willed by God.26 For instance, that the Son
spoke of being forsaken unto his violent death on the cross does not logically entail that
God either carried out the violence or willed that it should have happened. Not
intervening on behalf of the Son such that he was not spared from death—a result of the
cruelty of humanity—arguably shows a pacifistic character to God. The teaching of
Jesus to turn the other cheek, to love one’s enemies, and to pray for one’s persecutors is
demonstrated to be the mode of God’s operation in Christ.
Second, God’s instructions to the Hebrew Priests about animal sacrifice were that
it was supposed to be done with as little pain and trauma inflicted on the animal as
possible. God did not demand that the priest torture the animal in proportion to the
sinner’s transgressions. Thus, the magnitude of Christ’s sufferings in his sacrifice shows
nothing of the magnitude of our debt or punishment that God exacted on Christ in our
place; it has no relation to the sacrificial significance of his death. The magnitude of
Christ’s sufferings only shows the layers of twistedness in humanity’s discord with God’s
creative operations.
As a last example, it has been suggested that God had to see that “justice” was
fulfilled or God himself would be guilty of being unjust, that God is bound by his own
code of justice. God cannot simply forgive a debt (e.g., Mt 18:23-35) or pardon a

26

Cf. Brad Jersak, “Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ,” in Stricken by God?: Nonviolent
Identification and the Victory of Christ, ed. by Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2007). Jersak believes that Jesus’ death could not have been an act of violence
by God against the Son as a substitute for humanity because it would undermine Jesus’ teachings (34).
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transgression (e.g., Jn 8:1-11) without such an act being a failure to maintain his justice.
This logic concerning justice reveals certain notions of justice and law in the contexts of
Anselm and the Reformers more than it does the biblical narrative.27 It appears, however,
that God is ready and able to forgive without payment or punishment (i.e., retributive
justice). The Ninevites, the prodigal son, the woman caught in adultery, and others in the
Bible were all beneficiaries of this divine quality; it was typically the human onlookers
who wanted retributive justice. It should not be assumed that John the Baptist’s baptism
of repentance for the forgiveness of sins (Lk 3:3) or Jesus’ words of forgiveness in the
Gospels were contingent upon Christ’s subsequent satisfaction of “justice.” God does not
require death as a prerequisite to forgiveness or for reconciliation. Other reasons for
Christ’s death need to be explored.
Several contemporary theologians appeal to the early church’s witness to nonviolence in rejecting certain traditional atonement theories. The testimony of the Gospel,
demonstrated in the faithfulness of the martyrs even unto death, shows the character of
non-violence among early Christ-followers. There is also an explicit rejection of
violence in some early theologians; Irenaeus is popularly referenced. Irenaeus wrote that
God in Christ
27
Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo is often criticized by supporters of non-violent atonement theories. However,
the summarization of the work that they criticize rarely bears resemblance to the actual position of Anselm.
It should be noted that Anselm did not point to God the Father as the one who was willing and/or
performing violence against the Son. The Father would be unjust to do such a thing to an innocent person
whose life was not owed to him. The Father simply willed that the Son should always live in obedience to
the Father. If living in that way led to the Son’s death at the hands of sinful humans, then it is only
indirectly that it can be said that the Father willed that the Son should die. Anselm’s position on this
particular point is not irreconcilable with non-violent atonement theories; God cannot be said to be
condoning the violence, only the Son’s obedience. It is only Anselm’s medieval notion of a debt of honor
that could be satisfied by the surplus merits of Christ’s unnecessary death that should be questioned. So
that the Father was not left holding a surplus that was not rightfully his to take and so the scales of justice
could be balanced, the merits of Christ’s death, which were more than sufficient, were awarded toward all
the debts of all humanity. Even for Irenaeus, long before Anselm, the reason of Christ being killed was that
by his obedience, by hanging on the tree, he was undoing (i.e., recapitulating) the disobedience of Adam by
taking from the tree (cf. Klager, 465f.).
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did righteously turn against that apostasy, and redeem from it his own
property, not by violent means, as the [apostasy] had obtained dominion
over us at the beginning, when it insatiably snatched away what was not
its own, but by means of persuasion, as became a God of counsel, who
does not use violent means to obtain what He desires; so that neither
should justice be infringed upon, nor the ancient handiwork of God go to
destruction.28
The point of not only Christ’s death, but also his life, for Irenaeus, was to eliminate death
and vivify humanity, to “ensure humanity entrance into the divine.”29 There is much in
the tradition that should give theologians pause for claiming that God or God’s “justice”
demanded Christ’s death or that God was satisfied by such a horror. There is room in the
tradition to say that Christ was falsely accused, convicted, and murdered because he
chose to live attuned to the Father even in the face of chaos in the world. The ways in
which Christ’s death (and subsequent resurrection) was used by God to save and
recapitulate all creation is a different issue than the cause of the death.30 The manner in
which the proposed framework can be integrated with a non-violent atonement theory
needs to be examined.

3. Examining the Usefulness of the Proposed Framework for Articulating the a
Doctrine of Christian Holiness and/or Entire Sanctification

Within the Wesleyan-holiness theological tradition their doctrine of Christian
holiness and/or entire sanctification is of great import. In recent decades, there have been
discussions in certain circles of this tradition whether to continue to emphasize a crisis
moment in a believer’s faith journey in which they are instantaneously and enduringly
28

Adversus Haereses 5.1.1; quoted and italicized by Brad Jersak, 34.
Klager, 452; cf. 468.
30
One advantage of viewing Christ’s death non-violently is that it helps to hold the resurrection together
with what God worked in and through Christ’s death. The whole loop of death and resurrection becomes
the atonement. Atonement is not centrally about payment or punishment that is satisfied in Christ’s death.
The Good News is about the abundance of life offered in the new creation worked in and through Christ’s
death and resurrection.
29
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transformed in holiness—i.e., perfected in love. Some have advocated diminishing the
stress on a single drastic event in favor of stressing progressive transformation and
growth in holiness throughout one’s life, with significant moments along the way.
Neither of these options is fully precluded in the framework provided. However,
there is ample room to explore what a fully articulated doctrine of Christian holiness (a
more general notion) would look like within this framework. It is hoped that this
framework not only provides an attractive grammar for understanding and articulating
what holy living means within a community, but that it can also provide a basis for
talking about both the what and how of entire sanctification—the how being crisis
moments (bifurcation points) and the continued growth to which we all look forward.
In regard to holiness, since we are shaped to a great degree by our community, we
look forward to continued growth in response to the eccentric mission of God therein,
which will bring the community-dynamic toward greater expression of God’s goodness.
We look forward to our participation in the community’s perfection of relationships. As
the church, we also look forward to participating in God’s sanctifying work beyond our
microcosm, into the world. These types of theological explorations will hopefully
continue out of this work.

C. Summary and Conclusions

In the second chapter, a sketch was offered of some ways in which creation
theology has changed in the tradition through different contexts. Today, within the
ongoing conversations concerning creation theology in the midst of the erosion of past
foundations and in the uncertainty about what to do with the current context, one of the
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ways theologians have tried to talk about creation is by incorporating the language of
“chaos” with various accompanying notions. Some have tried to use the term as it is used
in science, while others have embraced suggestions that, as in the literature of Israel’s
neighbors, “chaos” is part of the biblical narrative.
These sources from which theologians have drawn have been examined and
critiqued. On the side of science, the manner in which reality has been labeled as “chaos”
based on the epistemological limitations of humans was questioned. Also, the
implications of the way in which science linguistically construes the world, at times
equating entropy with chaos, was questioned. The aim was to suggest that there is
probably a better way in which “chaos” can be used in science and thus in the sciencetheology dialogue. Similarly, the way in which “chaos” has been used in biblical studies,
particularly in relation to Genesis 1 was examined. Serious questions have been raised
here and by others about the appropriateness of the ways in which the term is used and
the implications of some of the notions that are grouped under it. It was suggested that
there are more appropriate ways to read the Genesis text without those commonly used
notions of “chaos.” In that suggestion, the pattern of creation was viewed to be from
immaturity to maturity instead of from chaos/disorder to order. Also, God’s activity in
creating was seen to be more collaborative with creation than creation being by divine
fiat.
In the fourth chapter Catherine Keller’s use of “chaos” to depict creativity within
process thought was questioned. She provides a sophisticated attempt to overcome the
duality of process thought by bringing “God,” “chaos/tehom,” and “Spirit” together as a
trinity. Even though the way she uses the term “chaos” is rejected, she does provide
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some helpful ideas that were brought into the framework proposed in this project. Her
ideas of feedback loops, recapitulation, and discreative acts all influenced the suggestions
made in Chapter 5.
Finally it was suggested that Lyle Dabney’s pneumatology in which the Spirit
operates as transject to creation be expanded to the second person; thus the Word is
transcarnate to creation. In the use of this one prefix, God’s immanence and
transcendence is suggested. The goal is to bypass not only the traditional problem of
interiority/exteriority of God relative to creation, but also to provide a grammar that
moves beyond the zero-sum problem of who is operative, God or creation, in various
circumstances.
Since the ways in which “chaos” has been used in theology had been put in
question earlier in this project, it was then suggested that its place is in the self-expression
of creation for which God is the possibility. Chaos is a coming to be of creation, organic
and inorganic, in disharmony with the Spirit and Word—the Possibility and Call of
God—and thus others in the cosmic community as well. Chaos does not pre-exist
creation, stand at the opposite polarity from creation, or exist as its own entity in creation.
Rather, where creation comes to be in discord to God and others, it instantiates chaos in
the would-be community; it comes to be in a way that is not related to others in the
cosmic community in goodness, beauty, and love. There is always room for maturation
and further discovery in expressing God’s self-gift; immaturity is not the problem. The
problem is the introduction of chaos into creation and its influence on subsequent
expressions of creation. Chaos, as it has been defined here, is that from which creation
needs rescue and recapitulation.
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